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Abstract 
Counselling psychology, with its humanistic value base and adherence to certain 
aspects of the medical model, is in a positional dilemma on issues such as diagnosis.  
There seems to be a current need to define counselling psychology’s epistemological 
position due to doubts about its independence as a profession.  How counselling 
psychologists respond to diagnosis has been tentatively explored in the literature, but 
responses in terms of thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and their interpretation of these 
responses is absent.  To address this gap, semi-structured interviews were carried out 
with six counselling psychologists and the interviews were analysed using 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA).  Two themes were identified:  
‘diagnosis is something to hang your hat on,’ and ‘the bigger picture.’  Like previous 
research, these themes highlight the different epistemological positions taken up by 
counselling psychologists on diagnosis.  However, the current findings also describe 
the lived experience of holding these different positions; for example feelings of 
tension are expressed and the level of uncertainty that needs to be tolerated is 
explored.  A suggestion is made in terms of defining this changeable position, as one 
of safe uncertainty (Mason, 1993), in order to facilitate clear communication 
regarding a position. Specific recommendations are made for research, training and 
practice, including: the need for tolerance of uncertainty to be made more explicit on 
counselling psychology training programmes; suggestions for further IPA and 
Grounded Theory Research; and the development of a special interest group has 
been suggested, where counselling psychologists and other professionals can share 
ways of managing the impact of diagnosis on their practice.  
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Researcher’s Personal Standpoint 
Before introducing the current research I felt it was important to describe my 
relationship with the topic and how this may have impacted on the research, in order 
to contextualise the thesis. 
Psychiatric diagnosis is a concept that, in the past, I have given little attention 
to.  This position was influenced by my role within a service that does not diagnose 
its users, but instead places emphasis on the importance of each individual’s personal 
experiences.  I always felt a sense of pride in being able to explain and justify to 
others, the reasons why this was so valid. 
However, when I began my counselling psychology training in 2011, I began 
to realise that, while there was a place to not use diagnosis, perhaps holding a strong 
and consistent anti-diagnostic view was quite naïve.  The main therapeutic approach 
that I am trained in is Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT).  I found that diagnosis 
was quite important within my first placement when taking a CBT approach, since it 
largely informed the formulation and understanding of my clients’ difficulties.   
Consequently, I found that with my state of not knowing in the early stages 
of my training, I leant quite heavily on the diagnosis, sometimes at the expense of 
engaging with the client’s experience.  This approach was also influenced by my 
own difficulties with tolerating uncertainty and ‘needing to know.’  In particular, I 
worked with one client who had a diagnosis and I approached them in terms of this 
diagnosis.  However, this relationship ruptured and the therapy ended prematurely, 
partly because I had not paid sufficient attention to their experience or some of the 
relational difficulties that became quite apparent. 
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Following this early experience in training, I began to question my views on 
diagnosis and was also left wondering if other counselling psychologists have shared 
the experience of responding to the diagnosis rather than the person.  My emerging 
interest in this area was also influenced by a professional skills module in my first 
year that covered the topic of diagnosis as a critical issue within counselling 
psychology practice.  
Within the literature review, hopefully it will become clear to the reader, that 
I found the issue of diagnosis to be very relevant to counselling psychologists, 
particularly in terms of how we position ourselves on diagnosis.  While I have come 
to realise that this position is hugely flexible and uncertain, I think it is important not 
to shy away from this, but to embrace it and communicate it to other professionals. 
Given my very personal interest in this research topic, I believe it is very 
evident throughout the thesis how this research has been a learning experience for 
me and how my position on diagnosis moved quite quickly from a very anti-
diagnostic realist position to a more critical realist one, where I pay some attention to 
diagnosis, but also pay a lot of attention to the individual, acknowledging that the 
diagnosis cannot tell me all there is to know about the person.  Furthermore, my 
ability to tolerate uncertainty and realisation that this is necessary for my chosen 
career has developed and is very evident within the research.  Similarly, during my 
training I have really got in touch with the fact that my felt experience of something 
is often different from my expectations.  For instance, I was really excited about the 
training when I applied for it and was focused on the end goal of qualifying.  
However, I soon realised that the felt experience was far more challenging than I had 
ever imagined.  This may have influenced my interest in highlighting the internal felt 
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experience of counselling psychologists’ responses to diagnosis.  So I suppose on 
reflection, this thesis was not only about clarifying issues around diagnosis for the 
profession, but also clarifying these issues for myself.   
While a reflexive statement at the end of the thesis has attempted to highlight 
the specific impact of my interest in the topic at particular points in the research 
process, I hope that this explanation of my positioning will help to inform the 
readers’ understanding of my relationship with the research as they read on. 
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Introduction 
“To diagnose, or not to diagnose, that is the question” (Frank, 1975, p. 63).  
As is highlighted here, the use of psychiatric diagnosis in the mental health field is 
one of longstanding debate.  Psychiatric diagnosis is, according to Segal, Corcoran 
and Coughlin (2002), “the identification and labelling of a psychiatric disorder by 
examination and analysis” (p. 13).  Psychiatric (or mental) disorders, according to 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM-5; 
American Psychiatric Association (2013) are:   
A syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an 
individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behaviour that reflects a 
dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental processes 
underlying mental functioning.  Mental disorders are usually associated with 
significant distress or disability in social, occupational, or other important 
activities. (p. 20) 
The term ‘diagnosis’ will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis with 
‘psychiatric diagnosis,’ but refers to the same term defined above.   
Given the longstanding nature of the diagnosis debate, there are many 
different perspectives in play.  For instance, there are those who believe in the 
benefits of diagnosis, such as those within the psychiatry field, who argue that 
diagnosis facilitates communication between professionals and provides a shorthand 
for disorders that share features (Tyrer & Steinberg, 2005).  However, there are 
others who are more critical of diagnosis, claiming that diagnosis pathologises 
experience and misses important parts of individuals (Parpottas, 2012).  It has also 
been argued that diagnosis can lead to stigmatisation (Biggs, 2010) and that 
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clinicians often diagnose according to their own biases (Boyle, 2002).  This tendency 
for bias adds to an ongoing argument regarding the lack of validity in diagnostic 
manuals such as the DSM which have been referred to as “a great work of fiction,” 
(Davies, 2003, p. 21).   
In terms of where psychologists stand within this debate, according to the 
British Psychological Society’s (BPS, 2013) Diagnosis Policy and Guidance, they 
recognise benefits brought about by having a diagnosis, such as access to services, 
but are also aware of possible harm from a diagnosis, such as pathologising 
individuals. More specifically, counselling psychology has its own division within 
the BPS, which does not have a position statement on diagnosis.   
Counselling psychology, as a profession has a unique philosophy at its 
foundation which is summarised by Bury and Strauss (2006): 
At its core, counselling psychology privileges respect for the personal, 
subjective experience of the client over and above notions of diagnosis, 
assessment and treatment, as well as the pursuit of innovative, 
phenomenological methods for understanding human experience.  At the 
same time however, we find ourselves working within mental health teams 
and other health-care settings, where notions of “sickness” and the associated 
labels that go with the concept of mental illness prevail.  (p. 120) 
As such, counselling psychology’s philosophy is grounded within humanistic values, 
but also incorporates more scientific philosophies such as positivism and empiricism 
(Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2011).  This positivist philosophy is one that is shared with 
the medical model, and views knowledge and fact as valid only when it is observable 
and measurable (Freeth, 2007a).  These views held by the medical model oppose 
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those held by the humanistic position which, according to The Association for 
Humanistic Psychology in Britain (AHPb, 2013), views people as more than the sum 
of their parts, they cannot be condensed to component parts, people have choices and 
responsibilities, and emphasis is placed on personal growth.  These opposing views 
have led to a debate within counselling psychology about how they are positioned on 
issues such as diagnosis (Bury & Strauss, 2006).  
 There have been several calls for counselling psychology to define its 
position on diagnosis.  For example Sequeira and Van Scoyoc (2000) identified a 
divide in terms of how counselling psychologists position themselves on diagnosis, 
with some supporting the use of the DSM as a diagnostic manual and others 
opposing its use, and identifies this as an issue worthy of further attention.  
Furthermore, Kindermann (2009) suggests a defined position is necessary at a time 
when counselling psychologists are struggling to maintain a unique identity and are 
at risk of being merged with other professions.  In addition to this, it has been 
suggested that counselling psychology needs to do more research as a profession, in 
order to survive (Jordan, 2009).   
Consequently, this thesis endeavours to contribute to research within the 
diagnosis debate in order to build upon the minimal research that exists regarding 
counselling psychology’s position on diagnosis.  The ontological and 
epistemological underpinnings of the researcher’s stance, as well as that of the 
research, are considered in order to help contextualise the thesis before a literature 
review will consider literature relevant to the humanistic position, the medical model 
position, and finally that of counselling psychology.  The terms “humanistic 
perspective” and “humanistic position” will be used throughout as all-encompassing 
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terms to include those such as person-centred approaches, existential-
phenomenological and Gestalt psychotherapy, because they all sit within the 
humanistic perspective (Plock, 2010).   
This review then goes on to consider a specific element of the diagnosis 
debate that features quite predominantly, and that is the issue of bias in diagnosis. 
Poland and Caplan (2004) outlined bias as: 
any inclination or tendency toward responding or acting in one way rather 
than another[...]many biases result from deep-seated personal, social 
economic or political interests and values, some arise from the practical 
demands of specific situations or from human cognitive limitations. (p. 9)  
What this term refers to will be explored and how it applies to counselling 
psychology specifically will be considered before a contribution to counselling 
psychology research is proposed.  Following the literature review, an Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) methodology is justified and described. Following 
the methodology, a detailed analysis of the research data is provided and discussed in 
relation to existing knowledge, and recommendations for how the findings can 
contribute to practice are proposed.  Final conclusions are then drawn and the 
researcher’s own reflexivity and how their own experiences, views and positions 
may have impacted upon the research process are considered.     
Ontology and Epistemology 
 Ontology is the fundamental philosophy concerned with assumptions 
regarding the nature of the world.  Epistemology, on the other hand, is a philosophy 
concerned with how and what there is to know in the world.  The stance that I have 
taken with this research is one of critical realism because, while I acknowledge that 
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there are realities and truths to be discovered in the world, not all can be known 
about these realities (Willig, 2013).  This position is underpinned by my realist 
ontology, that there is a real world beyond my perception of it (Maxwell, 2012).  For 
instance, I believe that laws, religions, and political perspectives exist beyond my 
own beliefs about them.  However, when it comes to epistemology, I believe that my 
interpretation of the world is constructed by me, which is more in line with a 
relativist epistemology.  As such, this position of critical realism that I have taken, 
means I have integrated ontological realism with epistemological interpretivism 
(Maxwell, 2012).  Consequently, I do not believe that any data I collect will give me 
direct access to reality, and will need to be interpreted to gain further understanding, 
but not full understanding of reality (Willig, 2013).  Therefore, I hope to say 
something about, but cannot directly access the reality of, participants’ responses to 
diagnoses in terms of their thoughts and feelings.   
However, as is acknowledged by The British Psychological Society’s (BPS) 
Standards for Doctoral Programmes in Counselling Psychology, as a trainee 
counselling psychologist, I am also able to recognise the diversity of ontological and 
epistemological positions (BPS, 2014).  Consequently, what will become apparent to 
the reader is that the research incorporates different ontological and epistemological 
positions at times and this is considered to be a demonstration of the plurality in 
counselling psychology.  The reader may also find that this reflects the nature of the 
findings in this research.  Similarly, this fits with the humanistic approach featured 
within the thesis, which arguably lends itself to a pluralistic epistemology (Ashley, 
2010).  This is consistent with the previously acknowledged idea that humanism can 
be considered an umbrella term for a number of perspectives (Plock, 2010).  One 
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example of the positions held by the humanistic approach is a phenomenological 
position in terms of its approach to both therapy and research, particularly when 
using qualitative methodologies (Plock, 2010 & Ashley, 2010).  This plurality in 
humanism’s epistemological position suggests an ontology that is similarly 
pluralistic and therefore incorporates both realist and relativist ontologies.  For 
example, a phenomenological position considers experience to be constructed and a 
product of interpretation, but is still a reality to the person who has the experience, 
and is considered to be ontologically positioned somewhere in between realism and 
relativism (Willig, 2013).   
In contrast, the thesis incorporates the medical model position which makes 
assumptions based on reductionism, realism, essentialism and naturalism ontologies 
(Patil & Giordano, 2010). Furthermore, the thesis includes the psychoanalytic 
position at certain points, from the perspective of Klein and specific concepts such as 
splitting (Klein, 1946).  Similarly to the medical model and myself, Klein was a 
realist (O’Shaughnessy, 2013).  This is evident in her concepts, for instance, the 
concept of splitting suggests a person and the world around them are split in to 
pieces and projected outwards, which implies that the individual and the world exist 
in reality in order to be split, thus resembling the realist ontology that the world is 
made of structures and objects (Willig, 2013).  
Therefore, given the conflicting ontologies of realism and relativism that 
feature in the thesis, my epistemological position of critical realism is in some ways 
necessary in order to incorporate these different positions, since it sits in-between the 
two (Willig, 2013).  
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Literature Review 
Overview 
The following literature review will begin by considering literature related to 
the medical model and humanistic perspectives on diagnosis.  While counselling 
psychology’s pluralistic stance can consider a number of different perspectives and 
approaches, these two perspective have been chosen because, as was outlined in the 
introduction, holding these two positions together creates a dilemma for counselling 
psychology (Bury & Strauss, 2006).  Therefore, these positions seem important to 
consider when exploring the relations between counselling psychology and 
diagnosis.  Consideration is given specifically to the counselling psychology 
perspective before considering the literature on diagnostic bias both in the process of 
diagnosing and in terms of how clinicians respond to diagnoses.  From this literature, 
consideration is given to the use of the term bias and the number of different terms 
used within the literature to refer to a similar phenomenon.  Consequently, the term 
‘response’ is proposed as an appropriate alternative and counselling psychology 
literature concerning responses to diagnoses, and epistemological positioning on 
diagnosis, is then considered before a gap in the existing literature is identified and a 
research question is proposed.   
The Medical Model Position 
The medical model has a focus on the expert treating the patient 
(Hammersley, 2010) and problems of mental health are viewed in terms of a disease, 
in the same sense as physical illness (Laungani, 2002).   Therefore, mental illness, 
like physical illness is assessed, diagnosed and treated, taking an experimental 
approach aiming to collect data, interpret it and categorise it (Freeth, 2007a).  
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Furthermore, Freeth suggests that the medical model is the dominant approach 
within the NHS and Western societies.  Golsworthy (2004) is in agreement with 
Freeth with his reference to diagnostic categories forming the “dominant language” 
in mental health care (p. 23). 
Many benefits of the medical model’s diagnostic approach have been 
highlighted in the literature.  Segal et al., (2002) and Freeth (2007b) have both 
outlined largely similar benefits of diagnosis: diagnostic categories help to organise, 
structure and understand client information; diagnosis facilitates understanding and 
communication among professionals; diagnosis is supposed to determine treatment; 
and finally, diagnosis can assist research in to the causes and treatments of different 
disorders.  In addition, Freeth recognises some benefits for the individuals who 
receive diagnoses, such as legitimising distress and providing a sense of not being 
alone.   
The Humanistic Position 
In humanistic therapy, the role of “expert” is held by the client rather than the 
professional (Plock, 2010).  The subjective experience of the client is the focus of the 
therapy, and the humanistic practitioner seeks to understand a person’s inner world 
and how they construct reality, with an emphasis on the therapeutic relationship and 
“being with [rather than] doing something to” the person (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 
2010, pp. 10-11). 
  Carl Rogers, (as cited in, Vincent, 2005) one of the founding fathers of the 
humanistic movement, refers to diagnosis as destructive.  Furthermore, Vincent 
describes diagnosis as judgemental, which is not harmonious with the unconditional 
positive regard, empathy and congruence that the humanistic approach promotes. 
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 Freeth (2007b) indicates a number of criticisms of diagnosis from a person-centred 
perspective.  She suggests that diagnosis is dehumanising, reducing people into 
categories; that the medical model focuses on what can be objectively described 
rather than on someone’s subjective experience; and finally that the humanistic 
approach challenges the validity of mental illness existing through the voice and 
views of mental health professionals. As is implied in this final critical point, it can 
be argued that diagnosis can never be completely objective; people will always be 
diagnosed through the subjective lens of the clinician.  While this can be true of the 
diagnostic process, the same can also be true in the context of therapy, whereby the 
individual phenomenology of the therapist and their existing knowledge of 
diagnostic labels can influence how they make sense of the client in terms of their 
expectations, attitudes and responses.  In some literature, this phenomenon has been 
referred to as bias.   
The humanistic approach has not avoided criticism.  As Martin, Carlson and 
Buskist (2010) highlight, the humanistic approach has been criticised for its key 
concepts being empirically untestable. Today’s emphasis in the mental health field is 
on evidence-based practice and empirically supported treatments (ESTs) and 
humanistic approaches, which tend to privilege qualitative approaches to research, 
do not easily fit into the EST paradigm, (Bohart, 2005).  So while the humanistic 
approach highlights faults in the system in terms of diagnosis, it does not offer an 
alternative that would be accepted within the current mental health field.   
Counselling Psychology’s Position 
Frost (2012), in his theoretical paper on the humanism versus the medical 
model debate, describes a dilemma for counselling psychology in terms of their 
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epistemological position.  While he does not explicitly address diagnosis, it is an 
inescapable element of this debate because of its roots in the medical model.  Frost 
suggests that the two views are present in counselling psychology philosophy, but 
oppose each other, creating a conflict.  He asserts the need to find a common ground 
between these two viewpoints, by which counselling psychologists can define 
themselves, rather than fighting the medical model.  He stresses this not only for his 
own clarity, but also to define the profession at a time when it is under question in 
terms of its identity, where others such as Kinderman (2009) and Cooper (2009) 
have suggested that clinical and counselling psychology are so similar that they 
could be merged together as professions.    
In the context of treating depression, Frost proposes a need for Cooper and 
McLeod’s (2011) pluralistic approach to treatment as a way of “bridging the gap” 
(Frost, 2012, p. 60) between the medical model and the humanistic position.  This 
seems an appropriate proposal, rather than choosing a single epistemological 
position, why not promote counselling psychology’s ability to hold multiple 
positions since, according to Milton, Craven and Coyle (2010), counselling 
psychology takes a pluralistic stance when it comes to practice. In addition, James 
(2010) in her opinion paper presented at the DCoP (2010) conference discusses the 
position of counselling psychology and suggests that with its philosophical base, it is 
different to clinical psychology, which does not have a philosophical base.  
Therefore this highlights all the more reason for counselling psychology to 
communicate their philosophy and epistemological position as a way of maintaining 
a separate identity.   Jordan (2009) in her opinion paper, also considers the survival 
of counselling psychology with the transition in health care to evidence-based 
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practice, and suggests that counselling psychologists need to do more research as a 
profession, in order to survive.   This seems a sound suggestion since research is 
something recognised by the dominant medical model, so is likely to be heard and 
understood.   
 In parallel, to Frost’s article, Larsson, Brooks and Loewenthal (2012a) 
review literature on the conflict between epistemological positions that exist for 
counselling psychologists.  They highlight the dilemma for counselling 
psychologists: there is a drive to use diagnoses so that counselling psychologists can 
fit in with other professions.  However, at the same time, there is a resistance to their 
use because of the concerns associated with labelling and the risk of losing their 
identity, for example, by moving away from humanism.  They conclude by 
suggesting that counselling psychology’s ability to hold on to different 
epistemological positions may be a positive attribute.  This is a similar conclusion to 
that proposed by Frost, to take a pluralistic stance that welcomes input from more 
than one perspective.    However, like Frost, some element of anxiety remains for 
Larsson et al. with a concern that counselling psychologists are at risk of losing their 
identity, calling at the end of their review for an exploration of “views, opinions, and 
ways of working for counselling psychologists that are outside their traditional roles 
as applied psychologists” (p. 64).     
Perhaps by focusing on one specific element of the diagnosis debate, a 
contribution can be made to what will hopefully become an abundance of research 
that together will communicate counselling psychology’s position. As earlier 
indicated, the issue of diagnostic bias that has frequently featured in the literature 
will be considered next. 
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Diagnostic Bias 
Biases associated with diagnostic labels have frequently been highlighted 
throughout the literature.  For example, Nehls (1998) explains how clients with a 
diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) have often been viewed to be 
untreatable and therefore, in some instances, have been denied treatment.  Poland 
and Caplan (2004) stress the importance of being aware of one’s biases and their 
impact on clients.  This tendency to act or respond in certain ways to diagnostic 
labels can be labelled as bias, but has been labelled using other terminology within 
the literature.  An exploration of the literature may help to make better sense of and 
potentially define this phenomenon. 
Bias in the Process of Diagnosing 
Clarke and Rowe (2006), in their study, set out to find if psychiatrists view 
individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia as more likely to be violent than 
individuals with a different diagnosis.  They sent vignettes of a non-specified clinical 
case, one of which contained information about a history of violence and one that did 
not, to 818 psychiatrists and asked them to rank diagnoses of schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder and bipolar affective disorder in order of which they thought 
would be most likely.  They found that the vignettes with a history of violence 
contained significantly more schizophrenic diagnoses than bipolar diagnoses.  The 
authors suggest that this apparent bias in diagnosis could affect treatment and may 
add to the negative stigma associated with the schizophrenia label.   
While this result provides interesting insight into bias in diagnosing, it may 
not truly highlight what the authors claim.  While, as the authors suggest, this could 
show that psychiatrists view people with schizophrenia as more violent than others, 
                                  MAKING SENSE OF DIAGNOSES
  
 21 
 
 
 
 
it could also show that psychiatrists think that violent people have more chance of 
being schizophrenic: the cause and effect is unclear.  Therefore, these findings 
potentially have two implications.  Firstly, a bias that individuals with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia are more violent, suggests that those with this diagnosis may be 
treated as violent individuals, which may not be the case.  On the other hand a bias 
that violent people are more likely to be schizophrenic may lead to violent 
individuals being inappropriately diagnosed with schizophrenia.  Consequently, 
rather than adding to the stigma attached to schizophrenia, it could actually create a 
stigma for violent individuals. 
Mendel et al. (2011) investigated confirmation bias in diagnosis.  They 
describe confirmation bias as “a tendency to confirm a favoured hypothesis” (p. 
2651).  For diagnosis, this would mean, following a preliminary diagnosis, one only 
seeks information that confirms the initial diagnosis and any contradictory 
information is ignored.   Mendel et al., presented vignettes of a clinical case to 
psychiatrists and medical students.  They were asked to make a preliminary 
diagnosis of either Alzheimer’s disease, or severe depressive episode.  They were 
then given access to additional information to either confirm or revise their diagnosis 
choice.  They found that 13% of psychiatrists and 25% of students showed a 
conﬁrmation bias when looking for additional information and those who showed 
confirmation bias were significantly less likely to make a correct diagnosis than 
other participants.  Furthermore, there were significant differences in treatment 
choice between those choosing the incorrect diagnosis and those who chose the 
correct diagnosis.  This study highlights how a biased diagnosis can affect treatment, 
and so have a direct impact on clinical practice.  
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However, like Clarke and Rowe (2006), the authors made use of vignettes, 
which can be criticised for not resembling real life. Moreover, as is acknowledged by 
the authors, participants were asked to choose between two diagnoses when in 
practice the diagnosis options would be a lot broader.  Consequently, their 
methodology may lack ecological validity.  While the findings from psychiatrists 
and medical students were different, this difference was not discussed in any great 
detail.  A greater consideration of this difference would have been useful in terms of 
the implications for training.  For instance, there may be a need for a greater focus on 
being aware of bias in training programmes. Finally, it is worth noting that this study 
alludes to a “correct” diagnosis that exists.  This implies that a diagnosis is an 
objectively true entity to be applied to an individual when even the DSM does not 
assume objectivity.  The DSM-5 articulates that it is not possible to portray the full 
diversity in psychopathology within the available diagnostic categories and places 
emphasis on paying attention to an individual’s aetiology, expressing that it is not 
satisfactory to just tick off symptoms during the process of diagnosing an individual 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Thus, diagnosing is a process that 
considers a best fit with each individual’s circumstances, rather than a process of 
selecting a “correct” diagnosis.  
The studies considered so far did not find bias in 100% of the sample, which 
highlights the complexity of this concept.  Furthermore, both samples were made up 
of psychiatrists, but the potential impact that bias can have on treatment are also of 
interest to therapists.  This impact on treatment, as suggested by Clarke and Rowe 
(2006), can add to the stigma of some diagnostic labels.  In addition these studies 
made use of quantitative methods, which is in line with the scientific and objective 
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approach taken by the medical model.  However, as is indicated by Poland and 
Caplan’s (2004) earlier definition, bias forms part of one’s subjective experience, the 
deep examination of which may be achieved using qualitative methods (Eatough, 
2012).  Finally, the existence of bias for professionals who diagnose has been 
considered, but biased responses to someone with an existing diagnosis, has not yet 
been considered, and will be next.     
Biased Responses to Diagnoses 
Brody and Farber (1996) focused their quantitative study on the diagnoses of 
depression, schizophrenia and borderline personality disorder (BPD).  They recruited 
psychologists as participants and were concerned with whether level of professional 
experience affects therapists’ countertransference reactions or their attitudes toward 
these reactions, and whether these reactions differed depending on the client’s 
diagnosis.  While acknowledging the difficulty in defining the term 
countertransference, due to the number of definitions available, they acknowledge 
that nearly all definitions describe the therapists’ conflicts and emotions that arise 
when working with their clients.   
They recruited 336 participants, 71 of whom were in graduate school for 
clinical psychology, 39 of whom were on internship or had completed all 
requirements of the course except their dissertations and 218 were qualified and 
licensed practitioners.  Participants were given three vignettes describing a 
depressed, schizophrenic and borderline presentation, following which, they were 
asked to rate the degree to which they imagined that working with each client in the 
vignettes would evoke positive, negative countertransference feelings, and 
countertransference-related behaviour.  They found that countertransference 
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reactions differed significantly between diagnoses.  More specifically, depressed 
clients elicited positive countertransference reactions, borderline clients elicited 
negative countertransference reactions and schizophrenic clients elicited more 
complex countertransference reactions.   
Brody and Farber also considered level of professional experience and the 
affect this has on attitudes towards countertransference reactions.  They found that 
students are significantly more likely to regret saying things to clients, and are more 
likely to feel their emotions are too strong, frequent and need to be defended against.  
Brody and Farber’s concern with the attitudes towards countertransference reactions, 
rather than the reaction itself, is interesting in highlighting how psychologists make 
sense of their responses, and how this can change with experience. This is promising 
because, as is indicated by Poland and Caplan (2004), it is important to be aware of 
one’s responses because awareness alone can prevent one from acting in accordance 
with biases that can potentially be harmful to clients.  
However, this study has its limitations, some of which do not go unnoticed 
by the authors.  They acknowledge that their measures, which have been designed by 
themselves, may lack validity; the use of vignettes may not closely resemble real life 
situations; and the measures used may not accurately tap into countertransference, 
which is an unconscious process.  In addition, it seems unclear how the 
countertransference responses can be associated solely with the diagnostic label 
since they may have been a response to the vignette description as a whole.  
Brody and Farber (1996) do not refer to bias per se, but speak to the strong 
reactions that mental health professionals can have to diagnostic labels.  The 
phenomenon in both studies is arguably the same thing, as participants demonstrated 
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an “inclination or tendency toward responding or acting in one way rather than 
another” (Poland & Caplan, 2004, p. 9). 
Similarly, Colli, Tanzilli, Dimaggio, and Lingiardi (2014) carried out a 
quantitative study that did not refer to bias, but to an emotional response, which like 
Brody and Farber, they also refer to as countertransference.  In their study they 
considered the relationship between therapist emotional response and client 
personality disorder and they claim that an understanding of clinician responses is 
important for understanding client relationship patterns. Specifically, they 
hypothesised that specific personality disorders elicit noticeable countertransference 
responses in therapists. Participants were randomly selected clinicians from various 
locations, some of which specialised in personality disorder.   
Participants were asked to randomly select an adult client that they have 
worked with, who had no psychotic or other symptoms that may confuse the 
difference between psychological states and personality traits.  Participants were 
asked to rate their emotional responses to their chosen client using a therapist 
response questionnaire and one to three weeks later to complete the Shedler-Westen 
Assessment Procedure-200 (SWAP-200).  The SWAP-200 is a psychometric 
measure that provides assessment of personality and personality pathology.  
The authors found that there were consistent, significant links between 
personality types and countertransference types.  For example, when working with 
clients with a narcissistic presentation, clinicians are likely to feel bored, distracted, 
disengaged and frustrated.  The authors conclude that their findings demonstrate how 
transference feelings can be used to recognise interpersonal patterns.  As such, it 
seems that this study does not indicate that clinicians respond to their clients’ 
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diagnostic labels per se, but respond to relational themes that can then be used to 
produce a diagnosis.  So, it might be argued that they are diagnosing themselves 
rather than their clients.  It can also be argued that rather than responding in a biased 
way, the authors have in some ways created a bias or a categorisation system in order 
to simplify human responses.   
The authors themselves acknowledged limitations with the study including 
the possibility of a measurement bias due to participants measuring their own 
responses as well as their clients’ personality characteristics.  Moreover, they suggest 
that participant self-report may have led to defensiveness and difficulty recognising 
their unconscious feelings.  This limitation may have been exacerbated by the use of 
a quantitative methodology.  Participants may have felt restricted in how they 
responded with the use of specific measures which then could have seemed 
defensive to the researchers.  In addition, quantitative measures are arguably more 
likely to miss valuable information about a participants’ responses that fall outside of 
the measure; such as unconscious feelings.    Therefore, it may be the case that a 
qualitative methodology would have been more likely to capture unconscious 
processes and more detailed information regarding participant responses. 
It seems that there is some evidence within the literature that biases in 
response to diagnostic labels do occur, and that individuals can also hold attitudes 
about these responses.   However, it also seems evident that while diagnostic labels 
may elicit biased responses, responses can also be used to create biases or diagnostic 
categories. There is also a tendency to use quantitative methods, when the study of 
countertransference or emotional responses form part of subjective experience, 
which is perhaps more suitably explored with qualitative methods (Eatough, 2012.)   
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It is apparent from the literature considered that clinicians’ responses to 
diagnosis cannot necessarily be categorised as any one kind of bias.  Different types 
of bias have been referred to and there have been other terms used, such as 
countertransference, to describe a similar phenomenon as bias.  Furthermore, Colli et 
al.’s (2014) study demonstrates that bias may simply be a label for a response.  
However, regardless of the terminology used within the literature, it seems that what 
all the literature described is a human response, whether it be bias, 
countertransference, or any other kind of response.  Therefore, the most appropriate 
all-encompassing term that will continue to be used is that of ‘responses’ to 
diagnosis.  Counselling psychology’s contributions to this area of literature will be 
considered next.    
Counselling Psychology and Responses to Diagnoses 
The British counselling psychology empirical literature concerning responses 
to diagnosis seems limited, however other literature is considering responses to 
diagnosis.  For example Hutchinson and Lema (2009) wrote a paper that explores 
ways of working with trauma, speaking mainly from their own perspective, but also 
drawing on research.  They consider diagnosis and argue that placing labels such as 
post traumatic stress disorder and sexual abuse on traumatised clients can limit and 
constrain individuals and that negative labelling can enhance effects of negative 
outcomes.  They suggest that this is due to peoples’ responses to labels, for example 
in terms of assumptions or behaviours.  They argue that diagnostic labels are 
“dominant narratives” (p. 10) that restrict interpretation and action, and form part of 
a story co-created with clients about what has been experienced and what may be 
experienced.    
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Similarly Biggs (2010), in his examination of literature, explores and 
discusses the negative stigma associated with borderline personality disorder (BPD) 
and suggests that counselling psychologists, with their humanistic roots, would be 
best placed to challenge this stigma.  Biggs stresses the importance of 
acknowledging the whole person and where their problems originate, as well as 
therapists exploring and working through their countertransference responses to 
clients with BPD through supervision and personal therapy, rather than acting them 
out in a prejudiced way to the client. 
Milton (2012) is the editor of the book “Diagnosis and Beyond: Counselling 
Psychology Contributions to Understanding Human Distress” which is an illustration 
of how counselling psychologists make sense of and understand human distress.  The 
contributors have written chapters that consider a variety of diagnoses and speak 
from their own experiences of working with clients with these diagnoses, but also 
highlight how they “go beyond diagnosis” (p. xiv) and attempt to understand the 
individual experience.  In the preface to the book, Milton refers to a conflict between 
the narratives of pathology and the meaningful, personalised client account that 
counselling psychologists and other therapists have to navigate.  He explains that the 
book demonstrates how, while they engage with the medical model, counselling 
psychologists also challenge it and work with clients in “creative and flexible ways” 
(p. xiii).  In his epilogue of the book, Milton acknowledges how the contributors 
encourage therapists to go beyond assumptions about diagnoses and engage with the 
meanings that people bring, and that diagnosis is only a part of experience.  Milton 
ends with inviting others to “go beyond diagnosis” (p. 136). 
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Milton’s book excellently communicates counselling psychology’s position 
on diagnosis: a capacity to work with diagnosis, but also to acknowledge and attempt 
to understand the person as more than just a diagnosis.  The importance of being 
aware of responses to diagnostic labels and going beyond assumptions is implied.  
Furthermore, it demonstrates how counselling psychologists’ ability to do this serves 
to demonstrate their position on diagnosis.  However, as Milton himself 
acknowledges, this is just the beginning, which implies that further steps need to be 
taken to communicate this position, such as further research.  
While British counselling psychology empirical literature has so far been 
limited, one fairly recent contribution comes from Larsson, Loewenthal and Brookes 
(2012b) who investigated ‘how counselling psychologists experience working with 
clients diagnosed with schizophrenia and how they construct this diagnosis when 
working with these clients.’ They were curious about the organisation of talk and 
how socially and culturally significant interpretative resources are drawn upon in 
terms of the diagnosis of schizophrenia. Consequently, they carried out a critical 
discursive psychology analysis of semi-structured interviews with trained 
counselling psychologists.   
They found that there was particular emphasis placed on the therapeutic 
relationship and its importance over technique and that there were attempts to 
normalise experience.  They suggest that these findings are indicative of how 
counselling psychologists construct experience of working with individuals with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia in a relational way, in line with their humanistic value 
base.  However, they also found that the use of language that pathologises is always 
evident.  They highlight how this mirrors the epistemological conflict for counselling 
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psychology that has been previously outlined.  They suggest that future research may 
want to consider whether sitting in between two epistemological positions is a 
hindrance or a help.  It seems that counselling psychologists are becoming more 
active in diagnosis research, which is helping to communicate their position within 
the debate.  It seems to be a valuable finding that counselling psychology’s 
epistemological position is evident through their talk about their experience of 
working with individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia.  While the question 
remains as to whether this is a hindrance or a help, this may become clearer with 
time as more research comes to the fore.   
While Larsson et al. (2012b) considered the diagnosis of schizophrenia, 
Craven and Coyle (2007) considered diagnosis more generally in their qualitative 
study on “how counselling psychologists talk about psychopathology and diagnostic 
categories” (p. 235).  They interviewed qualified counselling psychologists and a 
Discourse Analysis of these interviews revealed two repertoires that participants 
drew upon when constructing their position: empiricist repertoire and contingent 
repertoire.  It seems that the empiricist repertoire featured more medical model 
language and the contingent repertoire featured more concerns about client 
experience.  Again, this finding reflects counselling psychology’s positioning on 
diagnosis, in that they are able to speak from more than one position.    
Both Craven and Coyle (2007) and Larsson et al. (2012b) made use of a form 
of Discourse Analysis in their research, which is a social constructionist 
methodology concerned with how individuals construct their social reality 
(Langdridge & Hagger-Johnson, 2009) and suggests that experience is mediated by 
history, culture and language (Willig, 2008).  Discourse Analysis is also concerned 
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with the role that language plays in the construction of social reality and is critical of 
cognitive perspectives.  However, it would be interesting to explore what a more 
phenomenological methodology may have highlighted, which is concerned more 
with how phenomena emerge in conscious awareness as individuals engage with 
their environment (Willig, 2008).  While the experience of diagnoses, as constructed 
through language, could be considered a response, it may be interesting to consider 
responses in terms of interpretations and perceptions of diagnostic labels, and the 
thoughts and feelings about these labels, all of which are of concern to 
phenomenological approaches.  Furthermore, the perception, interpretation, thoughts 
and feelings about these responses may also be interesting to explore.  
It seems that counselling psychology’s position on diagnosis is beginning to 
be communicated through research.  It also seems apparent that while other literature 
concentrates on biased or stigmatised responses to diagnosis, the counselling 
psychology literature seems more focused on minimising such negative responses by 
going beyond the diagnosis and considering the impact on the whole person rather 
than being concerned solely with the response itself.  This is not to say that 
counselling psychologists do not respond in a biased way to diagnosis or in any other 
unhelpful way, but they may use their reflective capacity to help make sense of their 
responses to reduce the extent to which they act on prejudiced responses.    
Conclusions and Research Question 
It seems clear that there is a need to clarify counselling psychology’s 
epistemological position in terms of diagnosis.  There seems to be a current pressure 
to define their identity as unique from other professionals.  In considering therapist 
responses to diagnostic labels, it seems to be an area of research that counselling 
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psychology is beginning to embark upon. The existing research provides insight into 
how counselling psychologists construct their experience of diagnosis through 
language.  However, how counselling psychologists respond internally to their 
external world, such as thoughts and feelings, as well as how these responses are 
interpreted, has yet to be considered.  Furthermore, following existing research, there 
are unanswered questions such as whether or not holding more than one position on 
diagnosis is a hindrance or a help (Larsson et al., 2012b).  A question that focuses 
more on counselling psychologists’ experience of their positioning’s may be more 
able to answer these sorts of questions.  Consequently, this research asked the 
question: “how do counselling psychologists respond to their clients’ psychiatric 
diagnoses and how do they make sense of these responses?”   
This research aimed to offer some clarity to counselling psychologists and 
other professionals about counselling psychologists’ responses to and positioning on 
diagnosis.  It was also hoped that the findings will be useful in training for 
counselling psychologists because it may foster a shared understanding of 
counselling psychology’s epistemological position on diagnosis.  Finally, as Biggs 
(2010) suggests with their humanist orientation, counselling psychologists have an 
ability to see the whole person and to self-reflect and work through responses rather 
than react in a prejudiced way.  Consequently, if this self-awareness is 
communicated through research, it could stimulate other mental health professionals’ 
own self-awareness and reflective capacities which could potentially lead to a fairer 
and more effective therapeutic experience for clients.  
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Methodology  
Choice of Methodology and Rationale 
A qualitative methodology was adopted for this research which is concerned 
with individuals’ experiences and sense-making and aims to understand individual 
experiences (Willig, 2012).  Quantitative methods, on the other hand, approach 
knowledge empirically and hold the position that we can make accurate 
measurements of phenomena that allow claims to be made with some certainty. 
Quantitative methodologies also focus more on predictions about behaviour and aim 
to be objective.  Unlike quantitative methodologies, qualitative methodologies do not 
believe that there are truths waiting to be uncovered and take an inductive approach 
to research rather than the hypo-deductive approach taken by quantitative methods 
(Langdridge & Hagger-Johnson, 2009).  Therefore a qualitative methodology was 
deemed most appropriate for answering the research question that was focused on 
exploring counselling psychologist’s experiences of, and responses to, their clients’ 
psychiatric diagnoses and how they make sense of those responses.  
Phenomenological Approaches 
Phenomenological approaches to qualitative research are underpinned by 
various philosophies, all of which are concerned with phenomena that present in an 
individual’s consciousness as the world around them is experienced, and engaged 
with, which varies in context and time (Willig, 2008).  One key concept in 
phenomenology is Husserl’s concept of intentionality (Smith Flowers & Larkin, 
2009).  Intentionality suggests that consciousness is always of something, such as a 
sound or a smell, and there is an intentional relationship between individual 
consciousness and the object within the individual’s consciousness (Langdridge and 
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Hagger-Johnson, 2009).  Therefore, phenomena within the world are not separate 
from individual experience of these phenomena, but are intrinsically linked (Willig, 
2008).   
Phenomenological research methods share three fundamental principles: 
epoché, phenomenological reduction and imaginative variation (Willig, 2008).  
Firstly epoché, another of Husserl’s concepts, also referred to as bracketing, 
describes phenomena as they are without being influenced by other assumptions.  
Secondly, phenomenological reduction, refers to the process through which the 
experience of the phenomenon in consciousness is described in as much detail as 
possible.  The aim of phenomenological reduction is to uncover different layers of 
meaning.  Finally, in order to gain further meaning, imaginative variation allows for 
the phenomenon within conscious experience to be considered from different 
perspectives (Langdridge & Hagger-Johnson, 2009). 
While there are various phenomenological approaches, they can be broadly 
categorised in terms of being either descriptive or interpretative. Descriptive 
phenomenologists, such as Husserl, draw on transcendental traditions and believe 
that phenomenological research should involve the researcher bracketing all past 
knowledge and assumptions about the phenomenon they are researching and to focus 
on the participant’s experience of the phenomenon.  Whereas interpretative 
phenomenologists such as Heidegger, draw on the hermeneutic tradition and do not 
view description and interpretation as separate, but that description is another form 
of interpretation (Willig, 2008).  Rather than bracketing assumptions and views, 
interpretative researchers interpret what is experienced or encountered, but this 
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interpretation is always influenced by the researcher’s fore-conceptions (Smith et al., 
2009). 
The phenomenological approach considered most appropriate to address the 
research question was the interpretative.  This is mainly due to the greater relevance 
of interpretative approaches to counselling psychology than descriptive approaches. 
Counselling psychology places emphasis on their clients’ subjective experience and 
pursue phenomenological approaches when attempting to understand human 
experience (Bury & Strauss, 2006).  Therefore, phenomenological approaches to 
research are relevant to counselling psychology.  However, counselling psychology 
places emphasis on the therapeutic relationship and collaboration with clients (Bury 
& Strauss, 2006).  As such, the role of therapist and client are considered important 
in counselling psychology, much like the relevance of both researcher interpretation 
and participant experience to interpretative phenomenological research.  In contrast, 
a more descriptive approach would aim to isolate participant experience and would 
not consider researcher interpretations.   Consequently, an interpretative approach 
was considered more appropriate for the research question, which was very much 
related to counselling psychology.  Of all the interpretative approaches, 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) was chosen to address the research 
question and the reasons for this are considered next.  
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) is informed by the 
philosophies of phenomenology, hermeneutics and idiography.  Firstly IPA 
incorporates the philosophy of phenomenology and concepts from both Husserl, 
such as intentionality and epoché, and Heidegger who placed emphasis on meaning-
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making and considered the human inter-subjective relatedness to the world (Smith et 
al., 2009).  As such, IPA is phenomenological in that it is concerned with examining 
lived experience in detail as well as individual perceptions of that experience (Smith 
& Osborn, 2008). 
IPA also incorporates the philosophy of hermeneutics which is concerned 
with interpretation and Heidegger defined phenomenology as hermeneutic in that 
what is experienced or encountered is interpreted, but this interpretation is always 
influenced by the interpreter’s fore-conceptions (Smith et al., 2009).  Therefore, IPA 
uses the role of the researcher and the influence that their experience can have on 
their understanding of their participants’ experiences (Smith & Eatough, 2007).  In 
particular IPA entails a double hermeneutic whereby “the participants are trying to 
make sense of their world; the researcher is trying to make sense of the participants 
trying to make sense of their world” (Smith, & Osborn, 2008, p. 53).   
 Finally, IPA is influenced by idiography which considers the particular.  
More specifically, IPA uses in-depth analysis of data, and small purposeful samples, 
examining individual cases and then moving on to more general statements.  
However, it still allows for returning to the perspectives of any one individual and 
acknowledges that each individual’s perspective on their experience must inevitably 
be considered within a wider context (Smith et al., 2009).   
In addition, due to IPA’s focus on sense-making it is also considered to be 
concerned with cognition and assumes that there is a “chain of connection” between 
what people say and their thoughts and emotions (Smith & Osborn, 2008, p. 54).  
Nevertheless, IPA does not share the same views on cognition as that of mainstream 
psychology, but is distinct since IPA considers cognition to be complex, affective, 
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embodied and difficult to pinpoint.  Cognition is considered in IPA to be one part of 
human experience and is observed indirectly through meaning-making. Cognitive 
psychology, on the other hand, assumes that cognition can be measured and 
separated from emotions (Smith et al., 2009). 
Consequently, IPA was considered most appropriate to address the research 
question because firstly, it aimed to explore counselling psychologists’ responses to 
diagnosis, which is part of their lived experience and therefore is consistent with 
phenomenology in IPA.  Secondly, the research question aimed to explore internal 
responses and IPA, while it acknowledges that an individual’s internal experiences, 
such as thoughts and feelings can never be fully transparent, it seeks to say 
something about individual thoughts on a topic (Smith, Jarman, & Osborn, 1999).  
Finally, with IPA’s focus on sense-making and interpretation, it may also highlight 
how counselling psychologists make sense of their responses to psychiatric 
diagnosis.  
Alternative Methods Considered 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) was also an approach considered, 
because it shares with IPA an interest in individual subjectivity within the context of 
how discourse relates to individual thoughts and feelings and what people do. FDA 
in particular is concerned with how language constructs social reality, and offers 
various ‘subject positions’ to be taken up which then influence subjectivity (Willig, 
2008). Therefore, it could be used to examine, for example, the subject positions 
offered by the discourses of psychiatric diagnoses and which of these positions are 
taken up by counselling psychologists.  However, FDA’s emphasis on subjectivity 
has been criticised because it cannot explain individual differences in choosing 
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subject positions or individuals’ emotional investment in said position (Willig, 
2008).  IPA, on the other hand, while it recognizes that cognitions are not 
transparent, it does suggest that through the analysis of interviews something can be 
said about internal experiences, such as an individual’s thoughts and feelings (Smith 
et al., 1999).   Accordingly, while IPA acknowledges that subjective, internal 
experience is not directly measurable, it speaks more directly to internal experiences 
than FDA. Furthermore, IPA may be more able to say something about how it feels 
to take up certain positions. 
Additionally, previous research has already said something about the 
positions on diagnosis that counselling psychologists take up.  Firstly, Craven and 
Coyle (2007) made use of Discourse Analysis (DA) in their research that looked at 
“Counselling psychologists’ talk about ‘psychopathology’ and diagnostic categories” 
(p. 235), and identified two repertoires that participants drew upon when 
constructing their position: empiricist repertoire and contingent repertoire.    
Secondly, Larsson, et al., (2012b), also made use of a DA method to explore how 
counselling psychologists experience and construct the diagnosis, schizophrenia.  
They found that participants constructed experience of working with individuals with 
a diagnosis of schizophrenia in a relational way, but that the use of language that 
pathologises is always evident.    
However, neither of these studies are able to say how participants felt about 
taking up these positions. Therefore, for these two previous research questions, DA 
was an appropriate methodology with its emphasis on how individuals construct 
social reality, particularly through the language that they use (Langdridge & Hagger-
Johnson, 2009).  Whereas, the current research question aimed to explore internal 
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felt experience in response to diagnosis and with IPA’s recognition that something 
can be said about internal experience through the analysis of interviews (Smith et al., 
1999), it was considered to be more suited to the research question than a discursive 
approach. 
Consideration was also given to using Grounded Theory since it has been 
considered to be IPA’s main alternative method (Smith et al., 2009). This is partly 
due to the fact that Grounded Theory considers participant talk as offering direct 
access to participant thoughts and feelings (Payne, 2007).  As such, Grounded 
Theory shares with IPA the belief that something can be said about a participant’s 
internal world through analysis of interviews, but IPA differs in that it acknowledges 
that this experience is not directly measurable (Smith et al., 1999).  This is indicative 
of the fundamental difference between the two methods in that Grounded Theory 
traditionally takes a realist position, which believes that data gathered can say 
something about what is truly happening (Willig, 2013).  IPA, on the other hand, 
suggests there may be a reality to discover in terms of participants’ thoughts and 
feelings, however this is always interpreted by the researcher and is influenced by 
their own thoughts and assumptions (Willig, 2013).  Therefore, IPA arguably takes 
more of a critical realist stance. 
Furthermore, the role of the researcher is considered by IPA to be necessary 
when developing an understanding of the participants’ experiences, whereas for 
Grounded Theory the researcher is considered to be more of a witness to the 
observations they make and are careful not to allow their own assumptions to 
influence the data (Willig, 2013).   Consequently, the critical realist stance of IPA 
was considered to be more compatible with that of the current thesis. 
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Grounded Theory has also been criticised for not satisfactorily addressing 
issues of reflexivity, whereas in IPA, the researcher is required to have a reflexive 
attitude (Willig, 2013).  Reflexivity is something that is considered important in 
counselling psychology research and so, as a trainee counselling psychologist, the 
researcher was seeking a method to allow for sufficient reflexivity (Kasket, 2011).  
Nevertheless, while Grounded Theory considers the researcher to be objective in the 
research and can be criticised for inadequate attention to reflexivity, the method is 
also able to take a constructivist stance (Charmaz & Henwood, 2008).  This 
constructivist stance lends itself more to address issues of reflexivity and considers 
the researcher to be more than a witness, constructing their own understanding of the 
investigated phenomenon (Willig, 2013).  Nevertheless, as has been outlined, a 
constructivist approach is that taken by discursive approaches and the researcher did 
not consider a constructionist approach to be appropriate to address the current 
research question.  
Furthermore, Grounded Theory seeks to contest existing theories and develop 
new ones (Payne, 2007).  As such, Grounded Theory aims to say something about 
broad populations whereas IPA tends to consider convergence and divergence in 
small samples (Brocki & Wearden, 2006).  Additionally, IPA does not oppose broad 
claims, but focuses its attention more on micro level analyses which may then serve 
to enrich any further development in terms of macro level claims (Smith el al., 
2009). The current research question was not concerned with challenging or 
developing new theories, but was more concerned with understanding the 
experiences of a small number of counselling psychologists in the first instance.  
More specifically, the current research question was concerned with the particular 
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lived experiences of counselling psychologists and how they respond to their clients’ 
diagnoses, rather than aiming for a theoretical account of their experience.   
Finally the current research question is very much about experiences of 
counselling psychologists, and Grounded Theory has been criticised for its ability to 
address questions of experience over those of social processes.  More specifically, 
Grounded Theory is able to highlight the concepts and categories that participants 
use to make sense of their experiences in the form of a systematic map, but this is 
rather descriptive, making it difficult to actually develop a theory.  Therefore it may 
be that questions regarding experience are better addressed using more 
phenomenological methods like IPA and Grounded Theory is better suited to those 
focused on social psychological processes (Willig, 2013).  Since the current research 
question intended to consider counselling psychologists’ responses to diagnoses and 
how they make sense of this, it is a question more concerned with experience than 
social process.   Consequently, given the subtle differences between Grounded 
Theory and IPA outlined above, the researcher asserted preference for IPA over 
Grounded Theory.    
Epistemological Stance            
The epistemological position that I have taken in this research is that of 
critical realism because I am curious about counselling psychologists’ experience 
and sense-making in relation to psychiatric diagnoses, but am aware that I will not 
fully access their realities, much like the critical realist position (Willig, 2008).  The 
critical realist position recognizes that knowledge, rather than being objective, is 
specific to its context and can also be influenced by who perceives that knowledge 
(Lyons, 2007).    IPA is a method that also shares this critical realist position with its 
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aims to understand individual views on a topic while acknowledging that this 
understanding can never be gained completely (Smith, et al., 1999).  Moreover, IPA 
acknowledges the complications relevant to this understanding brought about by the 
influence of the researcher’s views (Smith et al., 1999). 
The critical realist position and IPA are also both consistent with counselling 
psychology philosophy.  For instance, as Kasket (2011) argues, counselling 
psychologists’ therapeutic work is very individualized, viewing each client as 
unique, but at the same time recognising all the complexities that come with human 
experience and acknowledging that much will remain unknown. 
Procedures 
Design. 
Six counselling psychologists were recruited and interviewed on a 1:1, face 
to face basis.  The interviews were semi-structured and were analysed using an IPA 
method. 
Sampling and recruitment.  
In order to obtain a homogenous sample, as is favoured in IPA studies (Smith 
& Osborn, 2008), the participant criteria initially included qualified counselling 
psychologists who live and/or work in or around London, Oxfordshire, 
Buckinghamshire, Milton Keynes, Bedfordshire or Hertfordshire.  However, as 
recruitment was rather slow initially, the participant inclusion criteria extended to 
include qualified counselling psychologists who work or live in the UK. 
While the inclusion of trainees was considered, they are still in the process of 
making sense of issues such as diagnosis, and their responses, and therefore may not 
have established an understanding of such issues.  Qualified counselling 
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psychologists, on the other hand, may have a better understanding of their responses, 
greater experience of working with clients who have a diagnosis and views about 
issues such as diagnosis.  Markham (2003) suggests that qualified practitioners have 
a greater knowledge of diagnostic categories, so this may extend to awareness of 
responses to these categories.  Consequently, only qualified counselling 
psychologists were included. 
Participants were required to have worked with clients with an existing 
psychiatric diagnosis, so that accessing information about the responses that they had 
to these diagnoses would be possible.  They would also need to feel comfortable to 
talk about what diagnosis means to them, their experience of working with clients 
who have previously received a psychiatric diagnosis, including what responses they 
might have had to these diagnoses, and their understanding of their responses.   
Participants were recruited using an opportunity sampling method 
(Langdridge & Hagger-Johnson, 2009).  Firstly, a recruitment advert (see appendix 
A) was posted on relevant Facebook pages and Linked-In groups.  Other social 
media avenues were also pursued, for example, posting the advert on an IPA 
discussion forum.  This recruitment advert was updated to a poster format (see 
appendix B) when recruitment initially proved slow.  Furthermore, recruitment via 
social media did not elicit enough interest, therefore recruitment procedures were 
extended to include firstly, contacting relevant Member Networks within the British 
Psychological Society (BPS) to seek assistance in disseminating the recruitment 
advert.  Secondly, universities that offer doctoral counselling psychology training 
and universities who have psychology departments were contacted, as were the 
counselling services within these universities.  The appropriate contact person within 
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each relevant department was located and contacted.  These people were then asked 
to disseminate the recruitment advert to any counselling psychologists working 
within their departments.   
Finally, a snowball sampling technique was used (Langdridge & Hagger-
Johnson, 2009).   Participants who were interviewed were asked to inform any other 
counselling psychologists they know, who may be interested in participating, about 
the research project.  Furthermore counselling psychologists known to the researcher 
were given the recruitment advert and asked to pass it on to any counselling 
psychologists they know who may be interested in participating.   The majority of 
participants were recruited from university counselling services, with the exception 
of one being recruited via Facebook and two from the snowballing method. 
When participants contacted the researcher to express interest, they were sent 
an information sheet (see appendix C).  Following this, a time, date and place for the 
interview that was convenient for the participant was negotiated and booked.  Ahead 
of the interview date, participants were sent a copy of the consent form (see 
appendix D) to read through before the interview. 
Participants. 
Participant demographic information is provided in table one.  The purpose 
of highlighting this information is to provide relevant descriptive information about  
participants that will help to contextualise the findings.   
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Table 1 
Participant demographics 
 
Pseudonym Gender Age Counselling psychology 
qualification 
Years since 
qualifying 
Abigail Female 31-40 Doctorate in counselling 
psychology 
1 
Settings worked in: Adults; groups; inpatients; charity; Community 
Mental Health Team (CMHT); Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapies (IAPT); personality disorder; family drug and alcohol; 
health psychology; GP practice. 
Barbara Female 51-60 Chartered Counselling 
Psychologist 
5 
Settings worked in: NHS voluntary sector charity; substance 
misuse; further education. 
Colin Male 41-50 Masters in Counselling 
Psychology 
20+ 
 Settings worked in: NHS (HIV, GP services); charity; university 
counselling service. 
David Male 41-50 Masters in Counselling 
Psychology 
8 
 Settings worked in: NHS (severe & enduring); higher education. 
Eleanor Female 31-40 Doctorate in counselling 
Psychology 
3.5 
 Settings worked in: NHS (adults & older adults); university 
counselling service; charity; school; private practice. 
Fern Female 41-50 Doctorate in Counselling 
Psychology 
1 
 Settings worked in: NHS, CMHT, GP surgery, charity, university 
counselling service, private practice, clinical research. 
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Data collection. 
At each interview with each participant, the researcher introduced 
themselves, and asked if there were any questions.  Two copies of the consent form 
(see appendix D), were read and signed by the participant and researcher and the 
participant was given a copy to keep.  The participant was also asked to complete a 
demographic information sheet (see appendix E).  When it was clear that there were 
no remaining questions the researcher began the interview and turned the digital 
recorder on.   
The interviews were guided by a semi-structured interview schedule (see 
appendix F) that was developed with guidance from Smith (1995) and Smith and 
Eatough (2012).  Using this guidance, interview questions were initially formulated 
in light of the overall research question.  Questions were also informed by the 
researcher’s knowledge of existing literature and the gaps in the literature that the 
researcher intended to explore, such as counselling psychologists’ thoughts and 
feelings about their clients’ diagnoses. The questions were re-formulated several 
times following discussions in supervision and with the researcher’s training peer 
group.  Due to the nature of semi-structured interviews, these questions were used as 
a guide and were not followed rigidly.  This was to allow the opportunity for 
participants to open up about a subjective experience that the schedule did not 
anticipate and the semi-structured nature of the schedule allowed for this digression, 
while being careful to stay on topic (Smith & Eatough, 2012).  In developing the 
interview schedule, the researcher also read literature on semi-structured interviews 
in order to understand the kind of questions that will be appropriate to ask (for 
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example, Langdridge & Hagger-Johnson, 2009).  The interviews lasted an average of 
45.72 minutes in duration.   
Following the interview, participants were asked how it was to take part in 
the interview, to give them an opportunity to voice any thoughts or feelings about the 
interview experience.  This final question elicited some detailed responses from 
participants and so was included in the analysis of all participant interviews.  
Participants were then given a debrief sheet to keep (see appendix G).  The 
researcher then made a note of their own reflections following the interview in their 
reflexive journal. 
Analysis. 
The data analysis procedure was informed by analysis guidelines for IPA, as 
outlined by Smith and Eatough (2012), and is described here. However, this 
guidance was used flexibly because IPA guidance is not supposed to be prescriptive 
(Smith, et al., 2009).  The aim of an IPA analysis is to immerse oneself in the data, 
and to pay attention to and record evidence of the participants’ sense-making of their 
experience as well as the researcher’s own sense-making of the participants’ sense-
making, in accordance with IPA’s double hermeneutic (Smith & Osborn, 2008).   
Following the interviews, each interview was transcribed and the researcher 
formatted the transcripts with both a left and right hand margin.  Once all interviews 
were transcribed, the first stage of analysis began which involved reading and re-
reading of the first transcript several times and making initial notes in the left hand 
margin.  These notes contained preliminary thoughts, comments, interpretations and 
the researcher’s own responses.   
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These initial notes in the left hand margin were then condensed into initial 
emerging themes in the right hand margin of the transcript.  Through this process 
the researcher aimed to ensure that the link between the participant’s words in the 
transcript and the researcher’s interpretation was not lost.  An example of these 
initial stages of analysis, taken from Barbara’s transcript, can be found in appendix 
J. 
The next stage of analysis then involved clustering the emerging themes (see 
appendix K for Barbara’s emerging themes) together, according to any connections 
between them.  Some themes that were similar were merged together at this stage 
whilst others were discarded if they did not group together, or if they had weak 
evidence supporting them.  This process of clustering was completed more than 
once in order to condense the themes.  Each emergent cluster formed groups of 
subordinate themes that were then given a superordinate label (see appendix L-N for 
an example of this process from Barbara’s transcript).   
These stages of analysis were then completed for each transcript, but each 
transcript was considered independently of the others and the researcher was careful 
to acknowledge any repetition in themes across transcripts, but also to remain alert to 
any new themes (Smith & Osborn, 2008).  
Following the independent analysis of each transcript, the clusters of 
subordinate themes, with their superordinate labels, were considered across all six 
transcripts, looking for connections between them.  An illustration of the first stage 
of this process can be found in appendix O.  Again, some themes were merged whilst 
others were discarded at this stage and as such, some were renamed.  Like previous 
stages of the analysis, during this stage, the researcher moved between the stages of 
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analysis in order to ensure that the connection between themes and the participants’ 
words had been preserved. Through this process, two superordinate themes were 
developed that were congruous across the six transcripts, each of which had three 
subordinate themes within them.   
Ethical Considerations 
Careful consideration was given to The British Psychological Society’s Code 
of Human Research Ethics (2010), and this section aims to highlight how the 
research intended to adhere to the four main principles.  In accordance with the first 
principle, this research aimed to have respect for the autonomy, and dignity of the 
participants and to treat them without prejudice. For example the researcher did not 
decline the participation of any individuals without a clear rationale based on 
exclusion criteria.  Furthermore, this principle also states that researchers should gain 
consent from participants and maintain participant anonymity.  This was adhered to 
by, as has already been outlined, participants signing two consent forms.  This was 
prior to informed consent being sought from participants by giving them an 
information sheet ahead of the interview, within which the nature of the research 
project is explained as fully as possible (see appendix C).  There was no intention 
within the research to deceive participants and they were asked to read the 
information through before confirming whether or not they were content to 
participate.  Within this information sheet participants were informed, firstly about 
their right to withdraw from the research project up to four weeks post interview due 
to data analysis beginning shortly after the interviews.  Furthermore, they were 
informed that they could decline answering questions that they did not wish to 
answer, or could request for the interview to be terminated at any point.   
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Secondly, the information sheet detailed how each participant would be 
allocated a pseudonym available only to the researcher and that any identifiable 
information related to participants, their clients, their place of work and any clinical 
experiences they disclose would be altered in the verbatim transcripts and throughout 
the write up of the research.  Thirdly, participants were informed that all data or 
information about them would be kept securely in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act (1998) and that following completion of the thesis, all data will be 
stored securely for a maximum of 10 years, as is recommended in London 
Metropolitan University’s Code of Good Research Practice (2014).   
Finally, the participant information sheet outlined the measures taken to 
maintain confidentiality.  However, participants were also informed that the 
researcher had an obligation to break confidentiality, in accordance with the BPS 
Code of Ethics and Conduct (2009), if serious and immediate risk of harm to self or 
others was revealed during the interview process. 
In terms of the second principle outlined by the BPS, scientific value was 
adhered to by the researcher attempting to be as transparent as possible with the aims 
of the research, and endeavoured to design research that is sufficiently robust and of 
a high enough standard.  This standard was approved when ethical opinion was 
sought and obtained from the ethics committee at LMU (see appendix H).  In 
addition, when changes were proposed in terms of extending participant criteria and 
changes made to the recruitment procedure, further approval was sought and granted. 
The third principle, social responsibility, was also considered by 
acknowledging and contemplating the implications that the research may have for 
counselling psychologists, trainees, clients and other professionals.  Furthermore, the 
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researcher remained alert to possible unexpected outcomes and, while the intention 
was for the research findings to be of benefit for the relevant stakeholders, the 
researcher also acknowledged that this may not be the outcome.  For example, if the 
findings are unexpected, or if a participant reads the research and does not agree with 
the researcher’s interpretations, or if other counselling psychologists do not approve 
of the findings.  While this can never be ensured with complete certainty, attempts 
have been made to keep this to a minimum by the researcher remaining attuned to 
the ethical implications of their work whilst writing and seeking supervision where 
necessary.     
In addition, consideration was given to interpretation of the data and findings, 
and how this can often be problematic.   The researcher is inevitably in a position of 
power during the analysis of interviews in terms of being able to shape the 
participants’ experiences.  Therefore, the researcher made every effort to remain 
engaged with this responsibility during the analysis process so as to aim for ethical 
interpretations (Willig, 2013).  Furthermore, as can be seen in the analysis section of 
this chapter, efforts were made to maintain a connection between the themes 
produced and the participants’ words in an attempt to leave at least some of the 
power with the participants.   
Finally, attention was given to the fourth principle to maximise benefit and 
minimise harm.  More specifically, careful consideration was given to the potential 
risks of harm, discomfort or stress that the research may have to participants.  For 
example, risks to psychological wellbeing, mental health, personal values, beliefs or 
dignity, social status, privacy, personal relationships, and adverse effects of 
disclosing illegal, sexual or deviant behaviour (BPS, 2010). 
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   The risk for participants brought about by discussing their responses to 
their clients’ psychiatric diagnoses was considered minimal and no greater than that 
in everyday life, thus was in accordance with this principle.  However, the issue of 
the researcher inevitably being in a position of power in relation to the participants 
was considered again here, in order to minimise any possible harm brought about by 
such dynamics.   The power in interpretation has been considered already, but 
additionally, during the whole research process the researcher attempted to remain 
sensitive to, and maintain awareness of, possible power dynamics.  For example, the 
researcher disseminated the recruitment advert in a way that aimed to minimise any 
pressure to participate and the researcher met the participants for interview in a place 
of the participant’s choosing, rather than determining where this should take place.  
Furthermore, the researcher made conscious attempts to not impose their own 
assumptions on participants during interviews, while acknowledging that this is not 
fully possible.   
Furthermore, this standard outlines the need to minimise harm throughout the 
research process, right up to the dissemination of the research findings.  
Consequently, since the researcher’s intention was to potentially publish the research 
in a relevant journal following completion, the researcher obtained participant 
consent for the research to be published.   
Despite these lengths taken to minimise harm, the inevitable uncertainty 
when it comes to unwittingly causing harm or distress for participants was 
acknowledged and consequently a distress protocol was in place in case distress did 
occur (Cocking, 2008; see appendix I).  Participants were also provided, in their 
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information sheet, with details about how they might make a complaint if any harm 
or dissatisfaction were to occur at any stage.     
Finally, following the interviews participants were provided with a debriefing 
document (see appendix G) that thanked them for their participation, provided 
guidance on how to make a complaint and provided them with information about 
appropriate services to access should the interview evoke any distressing or difficult 
feelings.    
While these ethical issues were considered by the researcher, thought was 
also given to the fact that ethical issues may continue to arise throughout the research 
process, and so the researcher made a conscious effort to remain alert to ethical 
issues throughout (Willig, 2013).  Consequently, this section does not offer an 
exhaustive account of ethical concerns, nor does it eliminate them, but it does 
highlight the researcher’s attempts to attend to ethical issues as thoroughly as 
possible. 
Quality 
In determining the quality of this research, the four dimensions considered 
for assessing a good qualitative research proposed by Yardley (2000), were 
considered.  The first dimension is sensitivity to context which has been ensured by 
making every attempt to remain grounded within the philosophy of IPA.  Within an 
IPA study, this sensitivity begins early on with consideration being given to the 
existing literature which, in this case, informed the reasons for choosing an IPA 
study and the research question.  Moreover, as is typical in an IPA study, the relevant 
literature has also been considered in the discussion of the findings.  Finally, as in 
other IPA studies, sensitivity to context has been demonstrated by the raw material 
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from participants remaining part of the analysis and write up with the use of 
verbatim extracts from the interviews to support interpretations being made, which 
has also allowed the reader to check the foundations for the interpretations (Smith et 
al., 2009).   
The second dimension is commitment and rigour.  The researcher 
demonstrated commitment firstly by maintaining engagement with the area of 
research and secondly, by remaining attentive to participants during recruitment and 
the interviews (Smith et al., 2009).   Rigour refers to how complete the data 
collection and analysis is and depends in part on how adequate the sample is.  Rigour 
has been demonstrated through choosing a sample that is both homogeneous and is 
relevant to the research question (Smith et al., 2009).  As has been highlighted, every 
effort was made to carry out a rigorous interview process and as is highlighted 
below, the process followed for analysis attempted to be as thorough as possible and 
included both a description of what participants said and an interpretation (Smith et 
al., 2009).     
The third dimension is transparency and coherence.  Transparency has been 
maintained by detailing every part of the data collection and analysis and has been 
supported by a detailed appendix.  In addition, the inclusion of reflexivity and how 
the researcher’s own experiences may have impacted on the research within a 
reflexive statement has demonstrated transparency. Coherence was ensured by 
carefully considering the fit between the research question and the philosophy of 
IPA. Furthermore, as in other IPA studies, the analysis and write up of the research 
were written and re-written to ensure a coherent argument was formed (Smith et al, 
2009). 
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  The fourth and final dimension considered is impact and importance and 
Yardley states that research is mainly judged on how much impact or influence it has 
on others.  The impact and importance of this research has been ensured by giving 
detailed consideration, in the discussion chapter, to the ways in which the outcomes 
of this research can be communicated to others and to the recommendations for 
training, research and practice that can be made. 
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Analysis 
Overview 
Following the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis of the interviews, 
two superordinate themes were identified: “Diagnosis is “something to hang your 
hat on” and “The bigger picture.”  There were six subordinate themes, three in each 
of the superordinate themes, all of which are highlighted in table two.  Between four 
and six participants featured in each subordinate theme.   The following chapter will 
explore these themes in more detail and quotations from the original transcripts have 
been included in both the table and the body of the text to aid understanding and to 
maintain sensitivity to the context (Smith et al, 2009).  These quotations are 
presented in the format of page number: line numbers, for example, 1: 15-18 
represents page one, lines fifteen to eighteen.  Additionally, participant quotations 
are presented in an italic font in order to distinguish them from the main text of the 
chapter. 
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Table 2  
Master table of themes 
Superordinate theme: Diagnosis is something to hang your hat on 
 
 
 
 
Subordinate theme Quotations with participant pseudonym and transcript 
line number 
Diagnosis as 
provision for 
individuals vs. 
provision for society. 
“My experience for, a lot of clients is absolute RELIEF in 
getting an appropriate diagnosis” (David, 2: 55-56). 
“Labelling a person’s problems so that they can get a 
service” (Abigail, 1: 21-23). 
Restriction vs. 
freedom and 
creativity 
“I guess for me when you haven’t got the diagnosis you, 
often haven’t got all the other restrictions as well” 
(Abigail, 36: 1166-1168). 
“I just think it shuts DOWN a bit of your curiosity” 
(Barbara, 20: 657-659). 
Diagnosis as real and 
not real 
“Is it because they’ve got a hidden diagnosis you know 
they’ve got something REALLY going on” (Eleanor, 42: 
1358-1360). 
“Those kind of diagnoses, bipolar, much less accurate” 
(Colin, 2: 57-58). 
Superordinate theme: The bigger picture 
 Subordinate theme Quotations with participant pseudonym and transcript 
line number 
Tension in position 
 
 
 
 
 
“I think this has always BEEN an internal dilemma, for, 
myself” (David, 46: 1503-1505). 
Holding diagnosis in 
one hand, but what 
does this mean? 
“What I’m interested in is their journey and their 
experience, at this moment as opposed to, er any 
diagnostic label[…].  Um, but that may play a part, of, er, 
the understanding of their experience” (Fern, 13: 400-
406). 
Navigating 
complexity in human 
experience and 
diagnosis 
“There are two processes but you can’t necessarily tease 
them apart” (Barbara, 18: 566-568). 
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Diagnosis is Something to Hang Your Hat On. 
This superordinate theme encapsulates participants’ considerations about 
how, on the one hand, diagnosis provides something for both them and their clients, 
and is a reality that can be relied upon, and on the other hand it can be very 
restrictive, taking away creativity, it is more about provision for society, and doubts 
are expressed in terms of its validity.   Therefore, participants together seem to 
discuss whether diagnosis is something that they can reliably ‘hang their hat on,’ or 
whether it should be used more cautiously.   
Diagnosis as provision for individuals vs. provision for society. 
The initial element of this subordinate theme, is that of diagnosis providing a 
service.  Specifically, Abigail, who generally held quite an anti-diagnosis position, 
expressed that it is important for individuals to have a diagnosis because without it, 
they will not receive a service: “what it means is a way of um, labelling a person’s 
problems so that they can get a service” (1: 20-23).  However, she also implies that 
this is not her voice, but that of the services she works in and a position she does not 
feel comfortable holding: “they HAVE to have that, diagnosis to get, to get the 
service, ummm, so THAT can be difficult for me” (2: 35-38).  This could be 
interpreted as diagnosis providing something in the eyes of society, but in fact the 
individuals receiving services do not necessarily benefit from this as much as the 
services themselves.  It seems that Abigail is saying that clients and clinicians 
conform to rules outlined by services in order to get their needs met, but this comes 
at a cost because, for the clinician they may not share the service’s position, and for 
clients they end up with a diagnosis that they may not want.  
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While Abigail seems to hold quite a negative and suspicious view of 
diagnosis providing a service, Eleanor voices how the support provided by services 
is greater when a client has a diagnosis: “then they’re with their intervention team 
for three YEARS, with, ABSOLUTELY brilliant support[…]if they didn’t have that 
diagnosis, they’d be, they’d be wandering around, all sorts of things going on” (4: 
97-105).  Eleanor may also be saying that diagnosis is supportive for her as a 
clinician.  The suggestion that without the diagnosis there would be “all sorts going 
on,” suggests an element of uncertainty and anxiety that is taken away by diagnosis.  
Moreover, the use of the word “wandering” suggests that a client is out of the 
clinician’s control to some extent, when they do not have a diagnosis. This is further 
implied when Eleanor suggests that diagnosis provides a sense of support from 
colleagues:  “as soon as they’ve got a diagnosis, HERE I actually feel quite 
um.…….quite kind of um, trying to think of the word, um, it feels a lot more like a 
team effort” (8: 237-241).  This could be interpreted as diagnosis providing guidance 
and support for the clinician rather than the client and alleviates some kind of a sense 
of responsibility that comes with diagnosis, since she is not alone with a client who 
may wander unpredictably. It could be said that Eleanor is demonstrating the idea 
that diagnosis is more for professionals and their own sense-making and 
communication than it is for clients.   Furthermore, it can be interpreted that this 
level of support is provided with a service, thus, as Abigail vocalised, without 
diagnosis, you do not get the service and therefore the support.  
However, there is a sense that diagnosis brings a sense of relief for the client.  
Firstly, from the client’s perspective, Eleanor states that:  “you could actually have 
generalised anxiety disorder, or you could have social anxiety, um, more importantly 
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you could have post-traumatic stress disorder which REALLY RELIEVES a client 
when they, understand what’s going on” (5: 153-159).  It seems that the relief 
Eleanor emphasises here is the answer that diagnosis provides for their experience. 
David seems to share this view, but names what brings the relief more specifically: 
“um, something like depression, the diagnosis can inform, what IS the best 
intervention” (5: 134-136).  This idea that diagnosis can inform “the best 
intervention” can be interpreted as diagnosis providing a sense of knowing and a 
solution which is relieving for clients.   
This sense of knowing is voiced directly by Eleanor: “there’s a sense of 
knowing, what’s going on there, which is then both helpful for you know for the, for 
the client and, and yourself” (43: 1398-1401).  This sense of knowing for both client 
and therapist suggests that relief is felt by therapists as well as clients and that 
diagnosis provides a shared language between client and therapist. 
 It seems that within this theme, participants share the view that diagnosis can 
offer provision in various ways such as providing services and providing relief for 
both client and therapist.  However, where participants diverged from one another on 
this theme was in terms of whether the provision from diagnosis is for the benefit of 
individuals or wider society.  When combining these two positions, it seems that what 
is being communicated subliminally here is that diagnosis can provide for 
individuals, but that this is at times deceptive because diagnosis provides for services 
and society in advance of individuals.  Nevertheless, this is a cyclical relationship 
between services and individuals because without the individual you would not have 
a service.  Therefore, it can be interpreted that diagnosis provides for both 
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individuals, services and wider society, but it seems impossible to determine whom it 
primarily serves. 
Restriction vs. freedom and creativity. 
 Some of the participants shared the perspective that diagnosis provides a focus, 
for instance Eleanor states: “and it gives you a real focus and, definitely in short term 
work, to have that focus is, is great” (25: 801-804).  She later elaborates on this 
focus, describing a “path that we could quite easily follow and the treatment model 
we could go down” (41: 1343-1346).  So it seems that diagnosis provides solutions in 
that the path that it lays out for the clinician, eliminates any need to think beyond a 
focused, short term treatment plan, and makes their work easier.  While Eleanor 
spoke quite favourably in terms of this focus, other participants seemed to be more 
hesitant.  For instance, Colin acknowledged that diagnosis provides “a pointer” (2: 
25), that helps him “look for certain things” (2: 25-26), and that:  “It, it’s, it’ll 
obviously, keep me ALERT” (13:390).  This focus that diagnosis provides for Colin 
suggests that without diagnosis he would miss things and so it acts as a reminder of 
sorts.  However, he also acknowledges that:  “I tend not to foreclose just on the basis 
of diagnosis” (2: 27-29).  The use of the word “foreclose” here suggests that there is 
a risk of becoming too reliant and focused on diagnosis as a guide to the point where 
all other information is excluded.   
 In addition, Colin adds a contradictory perspective to the focus provided by 
diagnosis that is stressed by other participants:  “I use it more often as a, (intake of 
breath) um, for, elimination rather than support” (1: 17-19).  The use of the word 
“elimination” here suggests that rather than being governed by diagnosis and 
following its focus or knowledge, he instead uses diagnosis to eliminate what he is 
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not going to focus on.  This contradicts his comments about diagnosis keeping him 
alert and it serving as a pointer, as well as stating that he does not foreclose on the 
basis of diagnosis.  Perhaps what he is saying here is that diagnosis can provide 
information, but not all of this should be paid attention to, and that one’s own 
judgement also plays a role in finding a focus, drawing on information that feels 
useful, not simply following it blindly.  Alternatively, this idea of elimination could 
describe how parts of the person with the diagnosis get eliminated when particular 
parts of the information provided by diagnosis are ignored.  Consequently, to have a 
diagnosis may in fact restrict a person due to how the therapist responds to them. 
This theme of diagnosis restricting featured quite predominantly across 
participants, offering a contrast to the also very evident theme of diagnosis providing 
various things.  Firstly, Barbara refers to diagnosis as being “reductionist” (12:390), 
and on the one hand she externalises responsibility for this reduction to the medical 
model:  “so it’s JUST, a medical way of CUTTING, into somebody’s presenting 
problem I suppose” (1: 12-14).  The use of the word “cutting” here implies 
something quite violent, intrusive and out of one’s control.  It also has connotations 
of surgery, suggesting that diagnosis is a way of cutting somebody up in order to fix 
them, much like older psychiatric treatments such as the lobotomy.  It is suggestive 
of individuals not having a lot of choice in the matter and that diagnosis is ‘done to’ 
people and therefore restricts in that the person and their choice does not come in to 
it at all.  The person is not seen as a whole individual, but they are broken down into 
parts, which suggests the understanding of that person is also restricted.  Later on she 
refers to people being “cut up in to tiny, micro, disorders” (14: 452-453), where the 
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use of the word “micro,” suggests that diagnosis means that the person is no longer 
seen because they are so reduced by the diagnosis. 
This theme of reduction and cutting people down is also reminiscent of 
Klein’s concept of splitting which suggests that bad parts of the self are split off and 
projected outwards (Klein, 1946).  Therefore, what Barbara may be implying here is 
that diagnosis serves to narrow a problem down into something that feels more 
bearable and manageable and the other elements of the person are split off.  She 
seems to suggest that this splitting is done by the professionals and so is making it 
more manageable for them.  However, it may also be that this breaking down can 
also feel more bearable for those who receive a diagnosis.  This concept of splitting 
echoes Colin’s reference to elimination, but conversely he is splitting parts of the 
diagnosis off that are not going to help him address the person.  Nevertheless, in 
either scenario, part of the person will inevitably be lost.   
Furthermore, the restriction that happens around diagnosis has not only been 
located in the diagnosis itself.  Participants were quite open about the extent to which 
their own response, or the response of the client to the diagnosis, is restrictive.  This 
was most powerfully acknowledged by Abigail:  
you didn’t have, that restriction of the diagnosis, in terms of me or her 
because she, you know, i-in that, I guess if the client’s, wanting a diagnosis 
or likes a diagnosis then you’re,[…] you’re kind of tackling THAT, and then 
also maybe MY feelings about that. (20: 642-649) 
Here she suggests that when a diagnosis is present, it can be restrictive to the 
therapeutic process because of the feelings that the client or she may have about it.  
She speaks about diagnosis as if it is some kind of obstacle that must be overcome in 
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order to do therapeutic work. However, it could be suggested that the real obstacle is 
her and her own strong, opposing response to the diagnosis and how this can 
sometimes conflict with the client’s position. 
In contrast there was a sense from other participants that the restricted use of 
diagnosis was due to external forces. Barbara for instance states: “everything in the 
CONTEXT CONSPIRES to make you just be a bit cruder” (23: 757-758).  Here, 
Barbara indicates that when working within a medical model, this impacts on her use 
of diagnosis.  Her use of the word “cruder” suggests that diagnosis is used in a way 
that is simplistic and lacking.  The use of the word “conspires” suggests that it is 
something within the wider context that means diagnosis is used in a restrictive way.  
This is suggestive of an external conspiracy, implying that there is a limit to free will 
when working with diagnosis.  This alludes to some kind of unspoken rule or secret 
within society that is conformed to.  However, this also implies that diagnosis itself 
may not be restrictive, but it is the context within which it is used, i.e. society, that 
makes it restrictive.    
Barbara is suggesting that there is a loss of control due to an external force 
when it comes to diagnosis.  This is expanded upon by Eleanor who suggests that 
she has a loss of control when it comes to working within a role that abides by the 
medical model:  “I was really being, FORCED all the time to kind of come and play 
with the sort of medical model,[…]diagno- fitting everyone into boxes, when 
actually, a lot of the time they didn’t, really fit (laughs)” (21: 654-660).  Eleanor 
may also be saying that she is “forced” to be restrictive by reducing people to certain 
“boxes.”  The use of, and emphasis on, the word “forced” also sounds aggressive, as 
if there is a lack of choice, and suggests she is left feeling powerless.  Her laughter 
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may be an expression of discomfort or embarrassment because she is aware of how 
she has used diagnosis restrictively, but this does not match up with what she 
believes in.  Moreover, the use of the word “play” suggests she believes that the 
medical model is in some ways a fantasy and that diagnosis is not taken completely 
seriously. 
Eleanor highlights how diagnosis can restrict her own sense of competency:  
“but I think that’s an important thing with diagnosis is like where is your 
competency level” (40: 1291-1294).  Here she is saying that clinicians have a 
competency level, shaped by diagnosis, for instance she speaks about her 
competency in working with an anxiety disorder and feeling “most at HOME” (40: 
1303-1304), but suggests there are more “extreme” (14: 455), or “severe” (11: 350), 
diagnoses that she feels less competent in being able to work with.  This suggests 
that in some ways diagnosis places doubts on her capabilities as a counselling 
psychologist.  Equally, this could also be relieving her doubt because if a client has a 
“severe” diagnosis, she knows not to treat them.  The use of the word “home” 
implies a feeling of contentment and familiarity and suggests that moving away from 
this elicits some anxieties.  It seems as though her response to diagnosis is to 
diagnose herself in terms of how capable she is in working with certain diagnostic 
categories.    
Furthermore, Eleanor seems to associate diagnosis with levels of risk, which 
may also be linked to her feelings of competency: “anxiety disorders there’s not as 
m- not necessarily as much of a higher suicidal,[…] risk as, you know someone 
who’s severely depressed, or someone who’s been psychotic” (13: 398-403).  What 
Eleanor seems to be saying here is that particular diagnoses elicit assumptions about 
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the level of risk for the person.  There is also a sense of anxiety around this, perhaps 
in terms of how to manage risk. Therefore, it seems that it is her association between 
risk and diagnosis that means she responds anxiously to diagnosis and possibly 
contributes to her feelings of incompetence.  It could be interpreted that she is 
actually responding to the risk, or the fantasy that risk is associated with diagnosis, 
rather than the diagnosis per se. 
It seems that across participants there is a shared view that diagnosis can be 
restrictive in various ways.  In parallel to this, participants also shared a view that 
diagnosis takes away part of their creativity. This is voiced by Abigail: “but when 
someone comes kind of FRESH (laughs), no diagnosis, I guess there’s more 
freedom” (20: 650-652).  This reference to freedom may be suggesting that 
diagnosis in some way traps the client and therapist, and implies a loss of free will.  
Her use of the word “fresh” to describe clients here implies that diagnosis in some 
ways decays or spoils a person.  Her laughter after saying this could be her 
vocalising her discomfort with holding such a strong position.   
Similarly, Barbara alludes to this sense of freedom: “what you’re picking up 
are, um, IN THE MOMENT THINGS, that ARRIVE between you and that person” 
(23: 731-733).  Here she speaks about being with a client without a diagnosis and 
being “in the moment” which resembles spontaneity and freedom.  Additionally, the 
use of the word “arrive” suggests that exchanges between client and therapist are 
new when there is no diagnosis and perhaps they are also fresh and unspoiled, as is 
suggested by Abigail.  
Moreover, Barbara’s reference to being in the moment indicates something 
naturally evolving and, since diagnosis has been considered absent during these 
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interactions, it may be that diagnosis does not evolve naturally like the relational 
process.   Consequently, what Barbara may be saying here is that without diagnosis 
she is free to be with the person.  Barbara’s use of the word “arrive” suggest that 
there is space for things to occur between you and the client and to be worked with 
creatively as opposed to being so focused that she is unable to allow other 
information  to arrive. This reference to the freedom to evolve is shared more 
explicitly by Eleanor: “I’d kind of SEE what EVOLVES” (41: 1337).  It is also 
possible that what both Barbara and Eleanor are saying here is that their ability to 
use themselves in their work is limited by the diagnosis because of their own 
responses to it, thus adding another dimension to a relationship.   
A further restriction from diagnosis is acknowledged by Barbara: “STARTED 
using diagnosis, and I just think it shuts DOWN a bit of your, curiosity perhaps” 
(20: 657-659).  This can be interpreted as a loss of part of her skill set as a 
counselling psychologist and being “shut down” implies a restriction and a loss of 
freedom: her ideas and her voice go largely unnoticed when something as dominant 
as diagnosis is present.  Consequently, anything more naturally evolving in the 
relationship or the work is not going to carry as much weight.   
What seems to be implicit in this theme is that diagnosis can provide a focus, 
but when this is paid attention to, it is important not to lose one’s creativity and to 
become too restricted by it.  Fern vocalised this balanced approach most coherently.  
She states that diagnosis “helps you to work with people in specific ways” (5: 141-
142), and suggests that it is “best not to QUESTION” (7: 206) when a diagnosis 
points to a particular intervention.  However, she also suggests a more creative 
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approach in that the therapy “could go anywhere” (6: 181), whether there is a 
diagnosis or not.  
Consequently, it seems that Fern values diagnosis and she finds it helpful in 
providing a focus, but at the same time it is important to be able to let go of the focus 
at times when it feels more appropriate to be creative.  Fern is quite open about not 
feeling overly guided by diagnosis, but the evidence in her use of language suggests 
that on some levels she feels the pull from diagnosis to follow a focus, whether she 
chooses this option or not.  However, what she is quite articulately communicating 
here is that diagnosis can provide a focus, but that even this can be integrated into a 
more creative approach by using it flexibly.   
Within this subordinate theme, participants have voiced how they can 
experience diagnosis as providing a clear focus, but at the same time this can be 
restrictive for both the therapist and the client.  What seems evident through their use 
of certain language, is that this restriction can feel quite aggressive.  Furthermore, 
they seem to experience diagnosis as taking away part of their clients, but also part 
of themselves and are aware of this, as is voiced by Fern.  Fern highlights how 
attempts are made to minimise the restriction as much as is possible and maintain 
some creativity, but what remains unclear is the extent to which this is possible.   
Diagnosis as real vs. not real. 
There seemed to be a difference of opinion between participants about 
whether diagnosis is a real thing or not.  “I think that just shows how, lack-the lack of 
validity I guess within and there’s so much cross over” (6: 166-168).  Here Abigail 
refers to a lack of validity in diagnosis that implies diagnosis is not a real thing, 
therefore should not be relied upon so heavily.  Her statement that there is, “cross 
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over,” between diagnoses suggests she may be confused by diagnosis at times and 
that she may have a desire to have something to rely upon, and that a reality does 
exist, but it cannot be found in diagnosis.  She herself states: “I couldn’t come up 
with a massive alternative” (5: 155-156).  Alternatively, what Abigail could be 
alluding to here is that the lack of objective validity and the cross over between 
diagnoses largely resembles an individual’s experience, and this is the ‘reality’ we 
should be working with.  
Colin also questions the quality of diagnosis, but paints a broader picture in 
terms of what constitutes a diagnosis and suggests that there is variation between 
these methods in terms of the quality and reality: 
Um, well if someone is depressed, DEPRESSED, the quality of the, the 
quality of the diagnosis varies massively, often nurses can do it here with a 
tick box, chart pretty much […]and then that’s VIRTUALLY a diagnosis so I 
think that’s not REALLY kind of INFORMATIVE if someone’s had MAJOR 
depression, er then I think that’s a bit more informative. (7: 218-229) 
The use of the word “quality” implies that there is some kind of standard to be met in 
diagnosis, which could suggest that there is a real truth out there in terms of what 
constitutes a real diagnosis.  He also refers to major depression as being more 
informative, which is a universally recognised diagnostic category and features in 
diagnostic manuals such as DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
Therefore, he may be saying here that there is a shared reality in medical diagnosis 
that makes problems real and possibly manageable, whereas other forms of sense-
making that resemble a diagnostic process are less informative, or real, possibly 
because this is not necessarily a shared knowledge in the same way that a diagnostic 
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manual is. His use of and emphasis on the word “virtually” resembles a virtual 
reality which by definition, is not real, so Colin is saying that some ways of 
diagnosing are more real than others.  Consequently, what he may be saying is that 
the reality of a diagnosis is based on the extent to which it is a shared knowledge.  
This is further implied in his distinction between “psychoanalytic diagnosis” 
(11: 322) and “ICD or DSM” (11:329) diagnoses.  He states that psychoanalytic 
diagnoses “VARY between practitioner” (11: 323-324), are “PERSONALISED” (11: 
332), and he is “mistrustful” (11: 331), of them.  Whereas, DSM and ICD, on the 
other hand, offer a “positivistic kind of description” (10: 317).  Consequently, it can 
be interpreted that Colin does not consider the very individualised ways of 
diagnosing to be real because they are not shared and cannot even be trusted, 
possibly because of the lack of certainty with them.   
This idea of an ultimate truth in diagnosis suggests that individual sense-
making may be lost when using diagnosis: 
 I can absolutely guarantee that you do NOT have bipolar effective you do     
NOT have, classic, manic, phases with all the kind of, um, grandiose, 
delusional ideation and er, you know that would NEED to be part of that.  (19: 
615-621) 
Here, David is speaking about a client who made sense of their problems in the 
context of bipolar disorder, which he disagrees with, stating that certain symptoms 
“would NEED to be part” of them for this to be reality.  The emphasis on the word, 
“need,” here implies that David needs diagnosis to be real, perhaps so he can use it as 
a reference point for his clients’ problems. Therefore, it may be interpreted that David 
may feel quite lost if diagnosis is not a reality to be relied upon.  Furthermore, this 
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idea of an “absolute guarantee,” implies something about an absolute reality.  The 
client here was making sense of their difficulties in their own way, but this seems to 
have been lost because David’s sense that there is an objective reality in diagnosis. 
The insinuation that diagnosis can be real is strengthened by the frequent use 
of personification among participants.  For example, David states: “to, have, that 
diagnosis something to literally hang, their hat on” (9: 266-267).  Here David is 
saying that diagnosis is a real thing that can be really helpful for clients in terms of 
making sense of their problems.  It can be interpreted that diagnosis helps to 
externalise difficulties and that these difficulties can be “hung” on something 
external to the person.  This hanging up also suggests diagnosis allows for problems 
to be tidied away where they do not necessarily have to be thought about or intrude 
upon day to day reality.  This would imply that diagnosis does not form part of day 
to day reality.  Alternatively, it could be interpreted that diagnosis needs to be 
personified in order to be real.  Maybe the reality of diagnosis is actually so vague, 
that this serves as a way to make sense of it. 
 What is also implied in this use of personification is that individual problems 
are not real until they have been diagnosed.  This is further elaborated on by Eleanor: 
“is it because they’ve got a hidden diagnosis you know they’ve got something 
REALLY going on that could be di- you know, a diagnostic thing or, or is it 
something that’s…yeah it’s sub-clinical” (42: 1358-1362).  Eleanor suggests that 
diagnosis can hide, which is another form of personification. Furthermore, the use of 
“sub-clinical” is reminiscent of the medical model and does not seem to value 
individual subjective experience, but rather an experience can only be real if it is 
diagnosed.   
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 So the argument as to whether diagnosis is real or not seems to be quite mixed 
among the participants and is made quite implicitly.  However Barbara speaks quite 
explicitly about this: 
you’re talking about, the diagnosis, the EXISTENCE of a diagnosis, of a 
category, but then you, you DO something to someone when you give them a 
diagnosis,[…]do you know what I mean?  You give them something they’ve 
got to carry around.  (5: L. 144-152). 
Barbara here seems to imply that the existence of diagnosis is questionable.  What 
can be interpreted from this is that once you admit the existence of a diagnosis it 
becomes real and is given to someone to carry around.   Furthermore, it seems that 
once a diagnosis is acknowledged as real, it adds to the problem, since it is 
something else to be carried.  So while Barbara acknowledges the same doubts that 
Abigail does in terms of the reality of diagnosis being questionable, Barbara suggests 
that admitting the existence of a diagnosis is almost a choice, since we never really 
know if something exists or not.  However, once this choice is made you make a 
person’s problems real and then this is something to carry around.  
Within this subordinate theme the participants seem to really grapple with 
whether or not diagnosis is a reality.  They also seem to ask questions about what an 
alternative reality might be and whether a true reality can ever exist.  Nevertheless, 
participants seem to be seeking some kind of reality and so it may be concluded that 
diagnosis is at least a shared reality that the participants work with, which may be 
good enough since there may not be an ultimate truth. 
Overall, this superordinate theme represents various dichotomies that the 
participants move between within each theme, such as diagnosis as real versus not 
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real, diagnosis as provider for individuals versus for society and diagnosis as 
restrictive versus not restrictive.  This reflects the dichotomous nature of diagnosis 
itself, as an individual either belongs to a diagnostic category or not.  Yet, what 
seems apparent is that the participants move between dichotomous positions and 
consequently, their ability to ‘hang their hat on’ diagnosis is uncertain and 
changeable.   
The Bigger Picture 
 This superordinate theme encapsulates the participants’ expression of how 
they are always working within a picture bigger than the diagnosis.  This bigger 
picture refers to their own changeable position on diagnosis, the client as a whole 
person, and the number of complexities that they find themselves navigating during 
therapy.  Participants also acknowledged their own drive to categorise and makes 
sense of the bigger picture.  Therefore, participants considered where they sit within 
this bigger picture and also where diagnosis is positioned, for them.   
Tension in position. 
 Participants seemed to acknowledge their capacity to hold more than one 
position on diagnosis.  However, the impact that this had on them varies somewhat.  
Barbara spoke about how her position on diagnosis has changed:  “it’s  been a 
process for me, and I did arrive, in the ***, vitriolic about labels, REALLY vitriolic 
about them, but I CAN’T say they’re not useful, it’s just WITH caution” (24: 763-
768).  Here she uses the word “vitriolic” to describe her previous meaning making 
about diagnosis which suggests a very strong anti-diagnosis position that is quite 
aggressive in nature.  Furthermore, “vitriolic” implies something about corrosion 
which might suggest that holding this kind of position is destructive and unhelpful.  
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She goes on to say that now she cannot deny their usefulness, and the emphasis on the 
word “can’t,” indicates a sense of not being able to return to her previous position 
and that she is perhaps forcibly having to hold both the position of seeing diagnoses 
as useful, but also being aware of possible pitfalls.  Specifically, she warns to use 
labels with “caution,” which implies an element of danger and destruction related to 
diagnoses.  Yet, it can also be interpreted that Barbara is able to hold both the 
position of valuing diagnosis and of knowing the disadvantages of diagnosis. 
Barbara describes what it is like to value both working with and without 
diagnosis: “it’s just the difference between having, a paint pallet with six BOLD 
colours in it and a paint pallet with 150 subtle shades of grey, they’re both really 
interesting” (23: 742-747).  It might be assumed that the six bold colours are the 
diagnoses and the 150 shades of grey refer to what she is faced with when a client 
does not have a diagnosis.  Therefore, the boldness of diagnosis is indicative of 
clarity, whereas the grey reflects more uncertainty.  Although, what seems implicit 
here is that the different positions she holds are not necessarily isolated to two.  The 
separation between six bold colours and 150 shades of grey, or working with 
diagnosis or not, is not a clear cut distinction since six bold colours can be mixed 
together to form new colours, much like diagnosis being more complex then it 
initially seems.  Barbara goes on to say that “a counselling psychologist should be 
using BOTH” (23: 749-750). Which suggests that counselling psychologists should 
be able to work both with and without diagnosis.   
However, in contrast, Barbara goes on to name an experience of tension 
around the subject of diagnosis: “it i-it does say to ME, that, that where I sit as a 
counselling psychologist is very much, that there’s a tension” (25: 808-811).  
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Barbara’s reference to where she “sits” as a counselling psychologist is indicative of 
positioning and may suggest something about what it feels like to hold different 
positions; that it can feel tense.  The word “me” is interesting here and could be 
interpreted as Barbara holding different identities as herself and herself as a 
counselling psychologist and that this forms part of the tension when thinking about 
her position on issues such as diagnosis.  Alternatively, it could be that Barbara is 
acknowledging how other counselling psychologists may hold a different view to 
her. 
Barbara goes on to acknowledge her difficulty in talking about diagnosis: 
“So it’s actually just EVERY bit as hard to talk about it as to work with it (laughs)” 
(25: 824-825).  This serves to support the idea that the tension she experiences 
makes it difficult for her to articulate her position.  However what seems unclear is 
whether or not Barbara feels comfortable experiencing this tension.   
This sense of tension was shared across participants, but not always in the 
same way.  Abigail, for example, states: “So that TENSION, so really I’m not giving 
her what she wants, umm and obviously ME trying to manage my feelings” (12: 364-
366).  Here, Abigail is referring to a client she worked with who wanted a diagnosis, 
but she was not able to give this to her, due in part to her own views, but also due to 
service restrictions.  Therefore, she is not so much expressing an internal conflict 
regarding what her position is, but is more stating that conflict arises when her 
position is not shared by a client.  She later describes how this feels for her:  “I guess 
that’s something I have to battle with is, I don’t like diagnosis” (34: 1116-1118).  
The use if the word “battle” indicates the extent to which she has to fight to 
maintain her position, whilst allowing others to hold a different one.  She may be 
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suggesting here is that she is battling with a majority position held within society 
regarding the acceptability of diagnosis, and that holding a position that opposes the 
dominant one requires a fight.  Alternatively, Abigail may be implying that her 
experience of tension is not a comfortable, but is a struggle.  Specifically, she may be 
talking about an internal battle within her where she does not like diagnosis, but is 
also able to consider alternative positions, thus feels she has to battle to remain 
consistent and true to one position.  Consequently it seems, that whether a firm 
position is held or whether more than one position is held, the experience of tension 
remains.   
 What was also evident is that a position on diagnosis is not static.  For 
example, Fern states: 
when I was doing A-level psychology we were discussing, Szasz and Laing 
and er all the anti-psychiatry movement errr, individuals, and you know as 
one would at that age and get quite excited about this idea of um, how 
harmful it is to label people and to um, not get CAUGHT UP in the whole 
sort of, medicalisation of,  of, of er, deviancy,[…]but, I soon came to realise 
that you can, it’s important to, take a FLEXIBLE approach. (12: 361-377) 
Here, Fern highlights how her position on diagnosis has adapted with experience and 
has become more flexible with time.  Throughout the transcript, Fern suggests that 
she is very comfortable with holding a flexible position on diagnosis, and does not 
suggest any experience of tension.  This excerpt implies that this has taken some 
time to develop and that it may continue to change over time.  Therefore Fern alludes 
to the idea that her position is adaptable when it comes to diagnosis and that she is 
comfortable sometimes being in a position of not knowing.   
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However, this sense of contentment with uncertainty was not shared by all 
participants: “everything came in to question because I was kind of thinking, you 
know in our training we were so critical of it and now I’m just, ha- that’s all I’m 
having to, all I’ve been able to do” (20: 649-654).  Eleanor here, expresses the 
impact of adapting her position from being critical of diagnosis to using it all the 
time in accordance with the work setting.  While this is part of being a counselling 
psychologist, it seems that her internal experience is that “everything came in to 
question.”  This can be interpreted as her experiencing anxiety in terms of the 
uncertainty in her position when this is in a process of transition.  She may also be 
saying here that her whole identity as a counselling psychologist is brought in to 
question when her position on a topic like diagnosis is challenged and is having to be 
adapted.  The experience she is referring to may also be one of a loss of part of her 
professional identity and a coming to terms with a change in her identity.   
Additionally, Eleanor identifies “a kind of tense, sort of feeling” (6: 174-
175), when her clients have a diagnosis, explaining that “there’s labels that come 
along with diagnosis[…]which don’t necessarily always benefit the client” (6: 183-
187).  It seems that Eleanor is saying that moving to a position of diagnosing clients 
feels tense because it does not benefit the client and is not in accordance with her 
training.  Eleanor may experience the tension that comes from moving positions as 
quite anxiety provoking where everything she believes in is questioned and may 
need to change. 
What became apparent, particularly from David is that this ability to hold 
more than one position can at times sit comfortably within him, and at other times 
can feel uncomfortable.  On the one hand David states:  “For me I can hold them 
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quite easily I, I, I REALLY can” (47: 1520-1521).  Here, he is saying that he can 
easily hold both a scientific practitioner position and a social constructionist 
position.  However, on the other hand he previously contradicted this by stating: “I 
think this has always BEEN an internal dilemma” (46: 1503 – 1504).  This indicates 
that there are times when he can feel at ease with holding different positions, but at 
other times, he shares the internal tension expressed by other participants. David 
speaks more directly about a feeling of tension:  
we all do it as clinicians we start to, (laughs) stereotype a di- ‘oh you’re just 
like so and so I saw last year […] it’s an easy trap to fall into and of course it 
[…] does interfere with you REALLY seeing the person as an individual […] 
I think that’s a real tension (36: 1167-1176).   
Here David specifies a tension for him between approaching someone 
according to their diagnosis, or approaching them as an individual.   This echoes the 
tension that both Barbara and Eleanor alluded to, and that is a tension in trying to 
hold a position of both paying attention to the diagnosis and to the individual.  
Therefore, this may suggest that no matter how comfortable David is about holding 
more than one position on diagnosis, an internal sense of tension remains.  This 
contradiction between a sense of tension and one of ease in holding different 
positions, may be symptomatic of the tension itself in that it feels difficult to admit 
that there is a sense of tension and uncertainty around diagnosis because the 
expectation is that counselling psychologists will be able to hold more than one 
position.  As such, the reality that this can sometimes feel uncomfortable may feel 
like admitting a level of incompetence.  Alternatively, it may be that David is 
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suggesting that the internal dilemma he experiences does not necessarily have to be 
difficult to manage and is largely advantageous.   
Similarly, Fern, although mainly expressed comfort in holding different 
positions, more implicitly shared the sense of tension at times: “what is it that would 
be most helpful for you in terms of where I could start or, what perspective I could 
talk from?” (4: 112-115).  Here she seemed to hold different positions as part of her 
lived experience in the room, rather than having to just speak about them and was 
asking the researcher which of her many perspectives they would be interested to 
hear from.  Implicit in what she is saying here is that she experiences tension in that 
it is difficult to freely answer questions without first having to consider how to 
position herself.  What Fern highlights is that the experience of tension that other 
participants describe can be a positive one and that an ability to view things from a 
range of perspectives, as well as having different things to say about a single topic is 
a privilege.   
It seems that throughout this subordinate theme, participants share in their 
ability to hold different positions, but it seems that this can lead to a felt experience 
of tension.  It seems that for some this tension can feel bearable and advantageous 
while for others, it can sometimes feel uncertain and anxiety provoking.    
Holding diagnosis in one hand, but what does this mean? 
This subordinate theme refers to taking a stance of acknowledging and 
making use of the diagnosis, at the same time as knowing that this only forms part of 
the client as a whole person.  Colin explicitly refers to diagnosis as being part of a 
“bigger picture” (20: 631).  He expands on this by describing diagnosis as “a 
triangulated piece of information which includes, MY experience of the individual, 
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how I see the,[…]phenomenology of what it is that they’re experiencing,[…]and how 
they experience the world.  Um, and, so it’s another piece of information” (19: 618 – 
626).  Colin’s use of the word “triangulation” is really insightful because it is 
reminiscent of an interwoven cycle between client experience, therapist experience, 
their understanding of each other’s experience, and accepts that diagnosis forms part 
of this understanding.  Therefore, diagnosis is not considered to be a separate piece 
of information and his position on it may not even need to be defined, because it is 
simply part and parcel of experience.  In addition, this idea of triangulation may be 
another way in which Colin is diagnosing his experience. 
However, this reference to triangulation is not explicitly shared by other 
participants, but others do acknowledge that diagnosis, to a greater or lesser extent, is 
part of individual experience.  Fern, for instance states:  “it may be how they’ve 
defined themselves or how they’ve lived, er, with themselves and, it may have, 
defined their own EXPERIENCE so, that’s important to understand that” (14: 420-
425).  Here she describes how diagnosis can define experience which suggests an 
intricate relationship between a diagnostic label and an individual’s subjective 
experience.  With Fern’s emphasis on the word “experience,” it seems she is 
suggesting that while a diagnosis and individual experience may be closely linked, it 
is still a priority to consider this experience, possibly irrespective of her own views.   
Furthermore, she suggests that while it is important to bear in mind a diagnosis, it is 
important not to respond to it: 
you would, always approach, every individual in the same way so, in the 
same way, just because somebody has BLONDE HAIR, one wouldn’t 
automatically assume that they ah, that you’re going to behave to them or 
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respond to them in a different way than you might do somebody with brown 
or red hair they’re just another human being. (13: 389-398) 
So, she is explaining that just because someone has a particular element to 
their experience such as hair colour or diagnosis, it is important to acknowledge it as 
part of them, but it is important not to treat them differently because of it.  It may 
also be interpreted that hair colour is something that an individual will have feelings 
about, for example, they may not like their hair colour.  As such, the impact that 
one’s response to that person’s hair colour has may vary, for example, offence may 
be caused or a sense of pride could be elicited.  Therefore, Fern may be saying that 
individuals have particular thoughts or feelings about their diagnosis, which may 
have to be carefully considered before responding to the diagnosis.  However, 
bearing in mind human nature, and to a certain degree our inability to control what 
we respond to, this viewpoint may position counselling psychologists in quite a non-
human position.  This is quite contrary to her suggestion that she approaches 
everyone as a “human being.”  Perhaps what Fern is really saying, is that it is 
important not to fixate on diagnosis and respond only to that, but to see it as part of 
the person, as you would their hair colour. 
It seems that Fern is implying that diagnosis is part of understanding the 
whole person, but is not the most significant factor to consider.  This is further 
expanded upon by Barbara:  “Um….it’s quite difficult, because actually for ME, the 
moment I’m working with them it becomes, pretty meaningless” (3: 78-81).  
Moreover, Barbara states that: “I don’t remember them by their, diagnosis” (25: 
798-799).  This suggests that diagnosis is not consciously meaningful or memorable, 
but rather is being held, unconsciously in one hand, while paying attention to other 
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parts of the individual.  Alternatively, she could be describing how the diagnosis 
may form part of the client’s experience, but it is such a small part when the whole 
of the individual is considered that it is not specifically memorable.  This contradicts 
the perspective of Colin who through his reference to triangulation, suggests that 
each piece of information has equal weighting.  
Barbara further illustrates her approach to diagnosis: “it’s the same as saying, 
“she’s got a blue skirt on, and a black CARDIGAN.” What does that say about, you 
know what you think about your clothes” (24: 771-774).  Here she has identified the 
colours in the researcher’s clothes, hence their diagnosis, but she is also suggesting 
that it is important to know and understand how they perceive their clothes, thus to 
look beyond their diagnosis to their experience of it.  Thus, she is viewing diagnosis 
as something that lies external to the individual, like clothing, which can tell her 
something about the individual, and what that means about them.  However, clothing 
is something that can conceal parts of an individual, so perhaps Barbara is saying 
here that diagnosis conceals part of a person and rather than taking the clothes, or the 
diagnosis at face value, she is curious about what it means about the individual.  
What seems to be shared between these differing views is the idea that 
diagnosis does form a part of understanding the individual, but the difference in 
opinion lies in terms of whether this diagnosis is given much weighting once other 
information comes to the fore.  Nevertheless, Abigail took a contradictory position 
where diagnosis acts as more of an obstacle in the way of understanding the person.  
She refers to, “TRYING um to, to go beyond” (38: 1224-1225) the diagnosis, which 
to an extent reflects other participants’ views, but is also reminiscent of an obstacle 
course.  Furthermore, she is more dismissive of the diagnosis: “we’re throwing that 
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out the room, actually what, we’re worried about here is you and what’s going on 
for you” (27: 859-861).  Here she refers to throwing the diagnosis out the room, 
which sounds quite aggressive and dismissive.  Therefore, it seems that she does not 
consider diagnosis to be an important part of understanding an individual’s 
experience, but more that it is separate from the individual and is an obstacle in the 
way of viewing the whole person.  This contradicts Colin’s position of triangulation 
because it suggests that the diagnosis and the person are separate. This is potentially 
problematic for the client who, as has been indicated by other participants, may view 
their diagnosis as an important part of their experience. 
Eleanor offered a different stance to the argument that diagnosis only forms 
part of understanding individual experience: “So, in the TRAINING, you’re really 
HOLDING diagnosis in one hand, but we’re ALL saying, ‘what does this mean?  
What’s it about?  where’s the client in this?’” (1: 17-21).  Eleanor appears to be 
echoing other participants when she suggests diagnosis can be held in one hand, but 
there is a broader experience to be explored in addition to the diagnosis.  However, 
the question of, “where’s the client in this?” implies that diagnosis is being held as 
the bigger picture, and the client is having to be found within that, which opposes the 
view that diagnosis is part of a client’s broad experience.  What Eleanor might be 
saying here is that diagnosis can be quite a dominant and loud piece of information 
in the room and so has to be temporarily put to one side in order to hear other 
information.   
It may also be interpreted from her use of the word “hand,” that, like a hand 
is attached to a whole body and alone cannot tell you what the rest of the person 
looks like, a diagnosis alone cannot tell you about the whole person.  In addition, her 
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reference to training here is interesting, as it indicates how a position on diagnosis is 
shared and feels certain during the infancy of her career, but perhaps she is implying 
that this changes post-training where things become less certain.  Consequently the 
position of holding the diagnosis in one hand and exploring client experience 
alongside this, may be an ideal that she does not always feel she holds. 
Throughout this subordinate theme, participants all acknowledge that 
diagnosis forms part of understanding a person, but how this is paid attention to 
appears debateable.  Additionally, it seems that participants share in the view that a 
person cannot be understood purely as a diagnosis.    
Navigating complexity in human experience and diagnosis.  
In this subordinate theme, participants shared views on how their own 
experience, that of the client and the diagnosis itself make for a complex picture and 
they all grapple with this and what it might mean for them when trying to make 
sense of their own experience. 
There was a sense of clients bringing experiences that do not just belong to 
them, but those of the wider systems they have been in previously.  For example, 
Barbara states: “it feels as if, our work together is not, is starting from, not from, her 
experiences just as a human being, but her experiences in systems, in the ***” (4: 
116-120).  Here Barbara articulates this quite clearly.  The way that she refers to, 
“experiences just as a human being,” suggests that to be human and to know 
someone as a human is quite straight forward, it is the interactions that they have 
with the world around them and the connections that they make that are complicated.  
Alternatively, she could be valuing the human part of a person and viewing it as 
separate from the context within which they are from, in order to value them more.  
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In either case, it seems that working with human experience is complicated and is 
influenced by many factors.  
In addition, cultural implications, as part of the experience that a client comes 
with and how this impacts on the diagnosis are acknowledged by Fern: “so they 
could arrive with a really firm diagnosis, um especially if they come from North 
America, very sort of medicalised, view of, er, difficulties” (6: 182-185).  Here, Fern 
suggests that the extent to which the diagnosis is part of the person, i.e. whether it is 
“firm” or perhaps loose fitting, is influenced by their background and in turn will 
have implications for the role that the diagnosis might play in the work with the 
client. She may also be suggesting that the way the client relates to their diagnosis 
may need to be considered and may influence her own experience of that client. 
The impact that these background complexities have on forming relationships 
with clients is acknowledged by Abigail: “sometimes they come quite jaded, and 
quite UNHAPPY, with services, so I think THAT’S an impact, on the relationship” 
(22: L. 705-708).  Here she is acknowledging that when she forms relationships with 
clients, she is not just forming that with them, she is also forging a relationship with 
their previous experiences.  What she may be saying here is that when a client has 
had a bad experience in services, she is tarred with the same brush as a professional 
and feels she has to prove herself as something different.  This may mirror the 
experience of the client in that they too feel they are treated in the same way as 
others with the same diagnosis and so feel they have to differentiate themselves to be 
heard.  
Furthermore, her strong feelings may also have a part to play in this complex 
picture: “not to ENFORCE my, you know my FEELINGS, um, being very aware that 
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I’ve got strong feelings about, diagnosis” (7: 221-224).  The use of the word 
“enforce” is quite strong and the emphasis Abigail places on the word implies that 
she has to work really hard not to do this.  She may be saying that not only do the 
diagnosis and her strong feelings around this impact on her relationships with clients, 
but their previous experiences with diagnosis also adds a level of complexity to the 
work.  She herself refers to “a number of levels” (2: 29), on a few occasions 
throughout the transcript when describing her experience, which suggests that she, 
her client and both of their backgrounds all have a number of levels of complexity 
that come in to play when forming a relationship and working together.   
Therefore, it seems that there are a number of things that participants may be 
responding to at any one time when working with clients.  Colin describes a frequent 
response that he experiences when working with depressed clients: 
I’ll be- I’m often, find myself, struggling in the kind of, SWAMP of, their 
inactivity, the behavioural inactivity, and wondering, about um how to kind 
of engage with that so I can, I can SWITCH off in sessions and that can be 
kind of, ah it’s a STRUGGLE to stay awake in the way that they’ll be 
experiencing something. (8: 231-238) 
Colin’s use of the word “swamp” indicates a sense of him feeling overwhelmed 
which may be due to the level of complexity that is needing to be made sense of in 
terms of a client’s experience and how he responds to it.  This response suggests that 
it is difficult to make sense of and unpick this experience in the room. Furthermore, 
he honestly describes how he can “switch off” in response to, and struggles to stay 
with, the client’s experience.  However, he goes on later to describe how he does 
make sense of this complexity: “actually you can SEE your own counter-
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transferential experiences and see how that might map onto, kind of categorisation 
of, of what the person’s experiencing” (17: 523-527).  Here, he is suggesting that his 
own responses, which he labels as counter-transference, can be categorised or 
diagnosed in some way.  He is also saying that diagnosis helps to make sense of his 
own responses, for instance if he experiences the response he earlier describes, then 
he will assume that this is because they have a diagnosis of depression.  An opposing 
interpretation might be reminiscent of a self-fulfilling prophecy in that if he is aware 
of a diagnosis of depression, he will respond in this way because of his own 
expectations based on the label.   
This implies that diagnosis takes away any uncertainty in terms of unpicking 
complexity in experience, but others seemed more comfortable to sit with the 
complexity and not knowing: “I can’t, TOTALLY, say that inexperience wasn’t one 
of the, VARIABLES, in my early, kind of, confusion and, you know, not knowingness, 
it clearly was” (19: 609-613).  Here Barbara is referring to a time when she did not 
work with people with a diagnosis, but acknowledges that this was at a time when 
she was less experienced and so this would also have had an impact on how she 
experienced the work with these clients.  The use of the term “variables” is 
indicative of something scientific and perhaps she too is looking for an answer of 
sorts.  “Variable” is also indicative of something changeable, which may have 
added to her sense of “confusion and not knowingness.” This reflects the number of 
complexities in trying to understand her own and the client’s experiences which 
leaves it difficult to detect whether the diagnosis per se is something she is 
responding to, or another variable. Nevertheless, she does also make attempts to pin 
things down: 
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Managing those strengths of feelings that, that come up because I’m aware of 
the diagnosis, and/or the way somebody’s behaving, cause that’s the thing I 
think, there are two processes but you can’t necessarily tease them apart do 
you know what I mean? (18: 562-568) 
 Here Barbara is referring to managing her own strong feelings in a therapy 
session, but suggests that this response may be to the diagnosis, but it may also be to 
a person’s behaviour and it is difficult to separate these two processes and make sense 
of them.  However, what is evident from other participants is that there are probably 
more than two processes going on and that this may be evidence of Barbara trying to 
simplify things in order to make sense of a complex picture.   
 This difficulty unpicking and making sense is articulated by David:  
it’s, very difficult I, I, you know um, to know WHAT, is YOUR feelings, er 
but, you know literally and it doesn’t, it’s got nothing to do with the patient, 
maybe it’s something that’s happened in your own personal life the patient 
reminds you of your own stuff, er or literally sometimes what is being 
projected into you, and I think that’s one of the hardest things to do, um, is to 
work through that. (16: 488-499). 
Here he acknowledges how he not only has to make sense of his own feelings, but he 
also has to work out whether they are his, where they might have come from and that 
this needs to be worked through to make sense, or simply excepted for what it is. 
Therefore it seems that diagnosis is one of many factors that counselling 
psychologists could be responding to at any one time and being able to isolate their 
response to diagnosis is extremely difficult. 
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 To add to this already complex relational picture, it seems that diagnosis 
itself and how it is applied is multifaceted.  As a starting point, Abigail states that 
“there’s so many different diagnoses” (4: 96), and further expresses that one of her 
“MAIN issues, with diagnosis is it’s-it’s so BROAD” (18: 568-569). So Abigail 
seems to be saying that while diagnosis is designed to be a guide of sorts, it is 
difficult to navigate her way through this and it has its own complexities.  Not only 
are the diagnoses themselves complicated, but the way that a person can come about 
receiving a diagnosis seems to be varied.  Fern expresses: “and um, you know 
because, people arrive at the, point of diagnosis via SO many different routes” (8: 
231-233).  This concept of arrival could be interpreted as diagnosis being an end 
point and that the journey may be tough and complex, but the end point is in sight.  
Alternatively, the use of the word “arrive” can suggest that arrival is temporary and 
an individual can continue to travel following an arrival.  This is reminiscent of the 
fact that individuals can have multiple diagnoses which can add a layer of 
complexity when making sense of a person’s experiences.    Nevertheless, Fern 
states that diagnosis does not “ring any alarm bells” (2: 46), which suggests that she 
does not feel overwhelmed by diagnosis or the complexity involved and does not 
have a particularly strong response to it.   
 What seems apparent from this theme is that human experience is complex 
and how the therapist, the client and the diagnosis all offer something complex to the 
picture.  Consequently, participants have expressed that it can be difficult to identify 
what they are responding to at any one time.  However, what is also implied is that 
we may not need to know what we are specifically responding to at any one time and 
that it is enough to accept the complexity for what it is.  Despite this acceptance there 
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also seems to be a drive to categorise and make sense of the complexity in one way or 
another.  It may be that what the process of diagnosing represents is a very human 
drive to simplify and make sense of something complicated.   
 Overall this superordinate theme represents how diagnosis can only form part 
of a bigger picture that is the complexity in human experience, it cannot provide an 
understanding of human experience in isolation, and how much attention is given to it 
may vary.  The bigger picture does not only refer to the client, but includes 
complexities around the therapist and the diagnosis itself.  Consequently, this theme 
is saying something about what it is to be human and that while participants shared a 
drive to categorise and make sense of experience, it was also acknowledged that it 
may be enough simply to accept the complexity and not knowing for what it is. 
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Discussion 
Overview 
The following discussion will consider the findings from each superordinate 
theme in turn in relation to existing theory and research.  There will then be an 
exploration of possible limitations, and recommendations for how the findings may 
be applied to practice and future research are then outlined and explained.  The 
chapter ends with the researcher’s reflexive statement that considers the impact their 
own experiences may have had on the research process, before final conclusions are 
made. 
Diagnosis is Something to Hang Your Hat On 
The participants discussed within this theme, whether diagnosis was real and 
something that could provide various benefits or whether it was quite detrimental in 
that it is restrictive, provides for society rather than individuals and it is not even a 
reality to be relied upon.  The discussions within each subtheme seemed to provide 
something of a dichotomy in terms of participants’ responses to diagnosis.  These 
dichotomies included firstly whether diagnosis provides for individuals or society, 
secondly whether diagnosis provides a useful focus or whether it restricts and finally 
whether diagnosis is real or not.   
What seems apparent is that this dichotomous nature of participant responses 
reflects the act of diagnosing itself since it mirrors the categorical and structured 
approach of diagnosis (Freeth, 2007b).  This is also acknowledged within the 
counselling psychology literature, for instance, Strawbridge (as cited in Sequeira & 
Van Scoyoc, 2001) who featured as an invited speaker in Sequeira and Van Scoyoc’s 
discussion paper regarding the use of The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
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Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev.; DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 
2000) and testing, acknowledged that diagnosis provides a dichotomy between the 
sick and well.  What also becomes apparent from Sequeira and Van Scoyoc’s paper 
is that the counselling psychologists discussing the issues of DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) and testing were split in terms of their views, in a 
very dichotomous way with some supporting its use whilst others opposed it, thus 
reflecting the very nature of what they were discussing.   It seems that Sequeira and 
Van Scoyoc (2001) offered some insight into counselling psychologists’ response to 
diagnosis in this paper, and this research in some ways echoes the notion that 
counselling psychologists respond in dichotomous ways to diagnosis.  However, 
Sequeira and Van Scoyoc’s paper focused on both psychometric testing and 
diagnosis as different forms of categorisation, whereas the current research offers a 
perspective based purely on diagnosis.  Furthermore, they imply that counselling 
psychologists take one dichotomous position or another, whereas the current 
research highlights that they also move between dichotomous positions rather than 
this being a static divide in the profession.   
Klein’s (1946) concept of splitting seems relevant here.  The dichotomous 
nature of the themes indicates that the participants’ sense-making was in some way 
split.  Consequently, it seems that participant’s responses were either that diagnosis 
is good, for example, it provides a focus, or bad, for example it questions their 
competency.  Moreover, this splitting extends from their responses to diagnosis to 
the individual psychologists in that part of them may have to be split off each time 
they take a new position on diagnosis.  
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The specific dichotomous responses that the participants had were not 
dissimilar to those already acknowledged elsewhere within the literature.   Firstly, 
there was a theme of diagnosis being quite a powerful and dominant presence within 
society in that diagnosis on some level may be providing for society, and this has 
been acknowledged many times before, for instance Laungani (2002) voices how the 
medical model is very much the dominant approach to mental illness and has so far 
held unquestionable power over other approaches and Golsworthy (2004) suggests 
that diagnostic categories provide a “dominant language” (p. 23). Furthermore, 
participants made the link between diagnosis and provision of services, which has 
been acknowledged by Eriksen and Kress (2006) who refer to the use of DSM 
diagnosis as a means to reimburse services.    
Secondly, participants spoke at length about the various ways in which 
diagnosis can be restrictive, and again this is acknowledged elsewhere in the 
literature, such as Golsworthy (2004) who argues that diagnostic manuals, take a 
“one size fits all approach” (p. 26).  More explicitly, there was a theme of the 
participants feeling restricted in terms of their own skills, creativity and competency.  
This is not something that has been ignored, for instance Larsson et al. (2012a) 
acknowledged that counselling psychologists have voiced concerns that the use of 
diagnostic labels can lead to a loss of identity.  This can also be made sense of in 
terms of part of the individual being split off (Klein, 1946), as previously indicated; 
leaving a sense of part of their identity being lost.  However, what the participants in 
the present research bring is a sense of what this feels like. Participants spoke about 
diagnosis contributing to them working in a more simplistic way and they voiced a 
sense of powerlessness when working with diagnosis, as opposed to feeling a sense 
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of freedom when a client does not have a diagnosis.  Moreover, they referred to a 
relationship between diagnosis and a sense of competency with some diagnostic 
labels, and a sense of incompetence with others.   
Finally, there was a difference of opinion amongst the participants as to 
whether or not they considered diagnosis to be real and what makes something real.  
For some it seemed that diagnosis is a shared knowledge and this also made it real, 
whereas for others the lack of validity in diagnosis made it seem unreal, and complex 
human experience is the reality we should be working with.  There were also 
suggestions that admitting diagnosis exits is what makes it a reality, whereas others 
implied that a client’s difficulties do not exist until they are diagnosed.   
Consequently, it seems that the participants could not agree on what reality 
might look like and indeed whether diagnosis is real.  This reflects a parallel process 
within wider society where psychiatric diagnosis is accepted as something real or 
challenged.  For example, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE, 2015) guidance for depression suggests that the first step in treating someone 
with symptoms that resemble depression is to recognise, assess and manage them.  
This idea that depression is something to be recognised, implies that it is real.  Other 
literature has heavily criticised the validity of diagnosis and has also questioned its 
reality.  For instance, Bentall (2004) suggests that the DSM offers a sense of a 
consensus that is illusory and describes the use of diagnosis as comparable to the use 
of horoscopes.  Similarly, Davies (2013) questions how real diagnosis is based on his 
knowledge of how the DSM was devised.  Davies uses the comparison of God’s 
existence with the existence of diagnosis claiming that just because a group of 
theologians say God exists, it does not mean God exists.  Therefore, just because 
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those devising the DSM say that a set of disorders exist, it does not mean that they 
do.  Rather than this difference of opinion among counselling psychologists needing 
to be problematic, it forms part of the pluralistic stance taken within the profession 
(McAteer, 2010). 
As has been touched upon, participants did not all position themselves in any 
one part of the dichotomies outlined above, but rather all varied in terms of where 
they were situated.  This reflects counselling psychologists’ ability to hold more than 
one position (Larsson et al., 2012a).  Furthermore, this dichotomous position echoes 
Frost (2012)’s paper with his reference to the debate between the medical model and 
humanism in counselling psychology and urges the gap between the two to be 
closed.  It seems apparent from the participants that this gap may be smaller than is 
implied by Frost, given the amount of movement between positions.  This is 
indicative of counselling psychologists finding it difficult to clearly define their 
position because this is constantly changing.   
The consequence of this may be that a level of incompetence could be 
communicated to other professionals because counselling psychologists are unable to 
coherently articulate their position on important issues such as diagnosis.   Similarly, 
this will have an impact on both trainees and qualified counselling psychologists 
since, considering Bion’s concept of containment (as cited in Spillius, Milton, 
Garvey, Couve & Steiner, 2011), it may be very confusing and uncontaining to be 
constantly moving between positions.  This lack of containment can lead to a spilling 
over of feelings as well as a limited ability to contain the feelings of clients 
(Casement, 2013).  However, if counselling psychologists developed an increase in 
confidence in terms of holding a changeable position, this may add to a feeling of 
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containment and help to prevent any negative impact on themselves, their clients and 
trainees. These implications for practice and recommendations will be considered 
later.   
As has been outlined the theme of, ‘diagnosis is something to hang your hat 
on,’ resembles the process of diagnosing itself.  However what seems apparent is 
that this sense of order is quite illusory because of the amount of movement across 
dichotomies and so the participants’ positioning on diagnosis becomes unclear.  In a 
similar way, diagnosis offers something ordered and categorical, but this too is 
viewed by some as illusory Bentall (2004).  Scott (2010) suggests that diagnosis can 
be used as a defence against the client, and in a similar way, it may be that these 
dichotomies are an attempt to simplify and defend against the feelings that come up 
when faced with the number of positions taken up by counselling psychologists.  
‘The bigger picture’ theme explores further what the participants may have been 
defending against.   
The Bigger Picture  
This theme provided quite a stark contrast to the dichotomous quality of the 
previous theme with its offerings of something a lot more explosive and complex.  
The theme of the bigger picture has articulated how the complexity within human 
experience is overwhelming and difficult to make sense of.  This can be understood 
in terms of participants letting their defences down and connecting to their felt 
experience, in contrast to the defensive nature of the previous theme.   
Participants voiced how they feel able to hold two or more positions on 
diagnosis, which is reminiscent of other literature such as Larsson, et al., (2012b) 
who found that counselling psychologists construct experience of working with 
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individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia in a relational way, in line with their 
humanistic value base.  However, they also found that the use of language that 
pathologises is always evident.  They highlight how this mirrors the epistemological 
conflict for counselling psychology.   Similarly Craven and Coyle (2007), following 
a Discourse Analysis of interviews with counselling psychologists, found two 
constructions which they called ‘empiricist repertoire’ (featuring more medical 
model language) and ‘contingent repertoire’ (featuring concerns about client 
experience).  It could be argued that the present research also found evidence of 
counselling psychologists holding these positions of seeing value in diagnosis, but 
also valuing the individual.  Yet, what the present research contributes is the 
participants’ felt experience of holding these positions.  More specifically, they name 
a feeling of tension, but whether this tension felt uncomfortable or advantageous 
varied among participants.   
Consequently, this research has gone some way to answering Larsson et al.’s 
(2012b) question regarding whether sitting in between two epistemological positions 
is a hindrance or a help, and it seems that the answer is both.  The extent to which 
each individual counselling psychologist may view their positioning as a hindrance 
or a help at any one time, will depend on how they manage this feeling of tension.  
For a profession that changes position, it seems appropriate that they would consider 
this to be both a hindrance and a help because this in itself represents how they do 
not want to commit themselves to one position.  
The participants also shared in the theme of diagnosis forming part of 
understanding the client’s experience, but the extent to which the diagnosis is 
acknowledged varied between participants.  What seemed clear was that diagnosis 
                                  MAKING SENSE OF DIAGNOSES
  
 98 
 
 
 
 
alone is not enough to understand a person and that it is important to go beyond it 
and acknowledge the person more broadly.  This is reminiscent of Milton (2012) 
who, in his book, urges readers to “go beyond diagnosis” (p. 136) and attempt to 
understand the individual experience.  Like the participants in this research, Milton 
also acknowledges that diagnosis is only part of experience and suggests that his 
book is only the beginning.  So perhaps the present research has provided empirical 
evidence to support Milton’s views that counselling psychologists acknowledge 
diagnosis as part of an individual’s experience, but that it is also important to go 
beyond it.  In addition, what this research indicates is that what is beyond the 
diagnosis is complex. 
Cooper (2009) also discussed how counselling psychologists, with their 
humanistic value base, are in a position to go beyond a client’s diagnosis and see 
them as a whole person.  He suggests that this is something that counselling 
psychologists bring to the field.  Cooper goes on to suggest that in order to make this 
clear, an evidence base would need to be developed through research and asks the 
following specific questions: “How do we most fully acknowledge and validate the 
uniqueness of our clients?” and “How can we draw on diagnoses and psychiatric 
knowledge without falling prey to it?” (p. 127).  While Larsson et al. (2012b) and 
Craven and Coyle (2007) offered a starting point in terms of this evidence base, they 
only partially answer Cooper’s (2009) questions.  They demonstrate that counselling 
psychologists ‘fully acknowledge and validate the uniqueness of clients’, and that 
they ‘draw on diagnoses and psychiatric knowledge,’ but they do not clearly 
communicate how this is done or whether or not counselling psychologists ‘fall 
prey’ to diagnoses.  This present research, in a similar way has added to this research 
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base in answering these questions, but is also able to say something about ‘how’ this 
is done.  The changeable position that participants highlighted, suggests that this 
enables them to avoid ‘falling prey’ to diagnosis and to continue to ‘fully 
acknowledge and validate the uniqueness’ of their clients.  This is not to say that 
counselling psychologists never ‘fall prey’ to diagnosis.  For example, participants 
highlighted that they sometimes simplify their practice when clients have a 
diagnosis.  However, their changeable position enables them to recognise this and 
make appropriate adaptations to their position.  
The present research also brought the theme of “navigating complexity in 
human experience and diagnosis,” which acknowledged that this process can be 
disorderly and confusing.  While previous research has seemingly simplified the 
number of positions that counselling psychologists may take up in terms of 
diagnosis, this research has acknowledged that the lived experience of this is 
challenging in terms of having to make sense of complexity and tolerating this while 
never fully committing to any one position.    Not only were client complexities 
acknowledged, but participants also acknowledged their own complexities in terms 
of their level of experience and their own strong views on diagnosis, thus adding to a 
complex picture. Specifically, it was noted by participants that there was a difference 
in positioning and response to diagnosis between when they trained, or early on in 
their career, and currently.  This may be because training institutions encourage 
trainees to practice defining their position on issues such as diagnosis when in fact 
the reality is quite different since counselling psychologists are supposed to negotiate 
between different positions (Frankland & Walsh, 2005).  This is a crucial finding 
which has important connotations for training, in that there needs to be a more 
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explicit outlining of the complex position counselling psychologists take on 
diagnosis, within training programmes.  How this may be applied to training 
programmes is outlined in the implications and recommendations section of this 
chapter.    
Participants acknowledged that to pinpoint their response purely to the 
diagnosis of their clients, within this bigger picture was difficult to do.  This 
difficulty has been evident in previous research, for example Brody and Farber 
(1996) who examined countertransference responses to vignettes, which made it 
difficult to identify whether the countertransference responses were associated solely 
with the diagnostic label or were a response to the vignette description as a whole. 
However, the present research goes one step further to explain why this might be 
quite so difficult or even impossible, for example, it highlights what it is like to work 
with the complexity of human experience.  While some participants attempted to 
categorise and simplify the complex picture, in a similar way to how diagnosis does, 
others were more willing to accept that the complexity is the reality that needs to be 
tolerated in order to work with clients.  This apparent difference in position adds 
another level of complexity, but also reflects the pluralistic stance of counselling 
psychology (McAteer, 2010).   
A Position of Safe Uncertainty  
It is evident so far that the participants were able to move between positions 
of valuing diagnosis, and of valuing the individual, as well as all their complexities.   
With this in mind, it may be argued that counselling psychologists are able to adopt a 
position of safe uncertainty; a position proposed by Mason (1993).  More 
specifically, it seems that diagnosis provides a position of unsafe certainty whereby 
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it offers an answer for a person’s problems (Mason, 1993).  However, this consensus 
is an illusion once the person and all other complexities are acknowledged (Bentall, 
2004).  On the other hand, when there is no diagnosis and one simply meets the 
person with all their complexities, a position of unsafe uncertainty is adopted where 
the level of complexity can seem overwhelming and difficult to navigate.  
Furthermore, while a position of certainty can diminish creativity and lead to 
paralysis, a position of less certainty can open people up to other possibilities. A 
position of safe uncertainty, on the other hand, offers a position that is not fixed, but 
that flows and evolves (Mason, 1993).   Therefore it seems that participants have 
demonstrated an ability to hold a position of safe uncertainty when it comes to 
diagnosis in that they are aware of the certainty that diagnosis has to offer, but they 
do not solely cling to that, integrating this into the client as a bigger picture to a 
greater or lesser extent.  This positioning also reflects counselling psychologists’ 
ability to work in “creative and flexible ways” (Milton, 2012, p. xiii).  
Nevertheless, while it has been argued that counselling psychologists can 
tolerate uncertainty (Kasket, 2011), it seems from this research that not all 
participants were able to tolerate uncertainty as well as others.  Frankland and Walsh 
(2005) state that there is an expectation that counselling psychologists will be able to 
manage complexity.  Part of managing complexity and working flexibly, inevitably 
involves having to adapt one’s position, which may bring periods of uncertainty.  
However, the participants have acknowledged that this does not always feel 
comfortable and, in one instance, described feeling as though they were left 
questioning everything which resembles Klein’s (1946) concept of fragmentation.  
As has been indicated, when faced with complexity, some participants demonstrated 
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a drive to make sense and pin things down, much like a process offered by diagnosis, 
while others were more able to accept the complexity for what it was.  Both of these 
processes involved adapting to a new position, much like the move from paranoid-
schizoid anxieties and defences to a more depressive position (Klein, 1952).  While 
this reflects a healthy adaptation to new positions, the experience of feeling 
fragmented when a position is uncertain may have important implications for 
practice that are worth considering.   
This process of feeling fragmented at times may mirror a process that occurs 
in the counselling psychology field as a whole.  If this is the case, fragmentation 
usually involves a projective identification defence (Segal, 1988), which would mean 
that anxieties regarding a need to find a position may be projected outwards and 
picked up by other professions who then feel it is unacceptable to not have a 
position.  Alternatively these anxieties could be projected into clients which would 
be very unhelpful for them and their own process, for example, feeling they need to 
take up a position that is not necessarily appropriate for them or that they may not be 
ready for.  Furthermore, if counselling psychologists are not able to tolerate their 
own uncertainties, then it may be difficult for them to help clients do the same. As 
such, it is important for counselling psychologists to be aware of and manage this 
fragmentation by developing some confidence in their ability to change positions and 
communicating this rather than projecting anxieties.    
This issue of fragmentation, seems to be about how well individuals are able 
to tolerate the uncertainty and anxiety involved during the movement in their 
position.  The best way to address this would be to accept that counselling 
psychologists take a position of safe uncertainty.   How this might apply to training 
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and practice is considered in more detail in the implications and recommendations 
section of this chapter.  
Implications and Recommendations for Practice   
The findings of this research offer something quite paradoxical.  They 
suggest that counselling psychologists hold a changeable position on diagnosis that 
is full of uncertainties.  On the one hand, participants seemed able to tolerate this 
uncertainty and on the other they attempted to pin down and label their experience.  
While this uncertain position is in itself one that could be viewed as very 
advantageous and adaptable, but difficult to pin down, it has been suggested that this 
changeability and uncertainty in a position could, and in some ways needs to be, 
labelled as Mason’s (1993) position of safe uncertainty; thus forming a paradox.  
This labelling is reminiscent of the act of diagnosing, but seems to mirror 
counselling psychology’s position on diagnosis and the dilemma highlighted in 
terms of abiding by their humanistic roots and working with the person’s experience, 
versus abiding by the medical model and its use of diagnosis.   However, this 
research has highlighted a felt experience of tension in holding this kind of position, 
which can be tolerable for some, but for others it can be less so.  Similarly the 
uncertainty can be tolerated more so by some than others.   
The implications for those who are able to tolerate this uncertainty may be 
quite positive because they will be able to assertively adapt their position 
appropriately and with ease.  Bion’s concept of containment is relevant here (as cited 
in Spillius, Milton, Garvey, Couve & Steiner, 2011), in that those able to tolerate 
uncertainty may be more able to offer a containing experience for their clients.  
However, those who feel less comfortable with the uncertainty and changeable 
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position, may feel less contained and therefore less able to contain their clients due 
to a spilling over of their own feelings (Casement, 2013).  Furthermore, this may 
also be detrimental for other professionals in terms of understanding what position 
counselling psychologists take on diagnosis, because it may not be communicated so 
assertively.  Finally, it could be detrimental for the counselling psychologists 
themselves and the anxiety it could raise.   
A further finding that may have important implications for practice is that 
there seems to be a difference in terms of counselling psychologists’ responses to 
diagnosis once qualified and when in training.  It seems that in training there is more 
of a fixed perspective on diagnosis, but that this becomes more flexible with time.  
This may be indicative of counselling psychologists building up a tolerance for 
uncertainty over time and becoming more comfortable with a changeable position on 
diagnosis.  This may simply be symptomatic of counselling psychologists’ ever 
evolving professional identity.  Alternatively, it could be that the changeable position 
and tolerance for uncertainty is not realised during training and this could potentially 
lead to confusion and uncertainty in terms of positioning on diagnosis.   
In terms of the implications highlighted here, it is hoped that naming a 
position of safe uncertainty may help reduce any negative implications.  Firstly, 
while a position of safe uncertainty is not something that can be taught, it may be 
beneficial for training programmes to be more explicit about it by teaching through 
the lens of not knowing, adaptability, and developing a position of safe uncertainty.  
This would be important in terms of keeping it a live issue for trainees and to 
maintain awareness of this positioning on diagnosis during their early professional 
development, rather than implying that a position on diagnosis is fixed.  
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Secondly, for counselling psychologists less able to tolerate uncertainty, 
naming a position and keeping it live may help with this and may help them to build 
more confidence in their position.  Furthermore, once named, it can be 
communicated more clearly to other professionals and it may show counselling 
psychologists in a good light since it highlights an adaptability, which suggests that 
they can work in a number of different settings and adjust to the ways of using 
diagnosis within each setting.  These implications for taking a position of safe 
uncertainty would also have a positive impact on clients because an increased 
confidence in positioning among professionals may lead to a more containing 
experience for both therapist and client. 
Furthermore, this position of safe uncertainty proposed may be relevant to 
how counselling psychologists position themselves on other critical issues such as 
age, gender, and class.  Positioning on these issues are inevitably informed by a 
belief system and philosophical underpinnings, which then inform one’s professional 
identity (Gazzola, et al., 2011).  As has been suggested by those such as Frost 
(2012), positioning on diagnosis is influenced by a conflicting philosophical base.  
Consequently, this conflict contributes to uncertainty, and such philosophical 
underpinnings may also apply to other critical issues.  Therefore, further research 
into these critical issues may be able to clarify whether taking a position of safe 
uncertainty would be of benefit or not.  More specifically, IPA studies that explore 
each critical issue independently may be useful initially to offer micro level analyses 
of counselling psychologists’ experiences of each issue in the first instance, with a 
view to enriching any further developments and macro level claims (Smith el al., 
2009).  Alternatively, as these topics for research would be concerned with 
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positioning, it may be more relevant to carry out research focused on social 
psychological processes rather than experience.  Therefore, Grounded Theory studies 
that consider each critical issue independently may be able to offer theoretical level 
insights into counselling psychologists’ positioning on such issues (Willig, 2013). 
Another important finding was in participants feeling a loss of creativity and 
a sense of feeling restricted when working with diagnosis.  Moreover participants 
expressed that their sense of competency is related to the kind of diagnosis they are 
working with.  Together these feelings can contribute to a sense of one’s professional 
identity being challenged. This has important implications for counselling 
psychology practice since the feelings described could impact upon client work in 
that the therapist may not be fully in the room with their clients if they are feeling 
part of them is restricted.    Therefore, the quality of the therapeutic relationship 
would be affected.  In addition, this questioning of competence may be indicative of 
a limited confidence that counselling psychologists have in their own profession.  
This may be due to the quiet voice that counselling psychology has so far had in 
terms of their position on diagnosis. As such, a building of confidence for 
counselling psychologists is necessary because this again, may negatively impact on 
client work through an unconscious process whereby their limited confidence leads 
to their clients lacking confidence in them (Lemma, 2003). 
This sense of diagnosis restricting practice does not seem to be an 
implication for counselling psychology alone but is experienced by other 
professions, for example, within psychoanalysis it is felt that some areas of 
psychotherapy are being destroyed by medical model practices (Mollon, 2010).  In 
addition, the BPS issued a position statement on behalf of all psychologists during 
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the development of DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), expressing 
concern that diagnostic categories have been reduced to the point of pathologising 
normal behaviours (BPS, 2011).     
Consequently, it is important that professions work together to develop ways 
to work through these restrictions that come with diagnosis so that there are not 
negative consequences for clients.  One way that this collaboration could take place 
is via a BPS special interest group on diagnosis, where regular discussions and 
meetings could take place.  Similarly, networking and presentations at multi-
disciplinary conferences could serve a similar purpose.  These kinds of 
communications could also enable counselling psychologists to share and build 
confidence in their position on diagnosis.  
Limitations  
Possible limitations to this research include firstly, that the themes seemed to 
converge at certain points.  For instance the subordinate themes within “the bigger 
picture” were only subtly different from one another.  More specifically, the 
subordinate themes went from referring to a tension in holding different positions on 
diagnosis, to saying a bit more about what these positions are, to then saying that 
actually working with human experience and diagnosis is confusing and complex.  
As such, each subordinate theme was related to and built on the preceding one.  
Consequently this could potentially indicate a limitation in the quality of the data and 
analysis it terms of a lack of rigour (Yardley, 2000).  However, a rigorous process, as 
is outlined in the methodology chapter, was followed throughout the research 
process.  Therefore, rather than a lack of rigour, this overlapping of themes is more 
likely to be symptomatic of something else.  Firstly, this converging of themes may 
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be understood as representing a parallel process that is evident within the counselling 
psychology profession as a whole, that counselling psychologists do not isolate 
themselves to any one position, much like the themes cannot be fully separated.   
Secondly, this may be understood as a reflection of my stage of training.  I 
am at a stage of trying to make sense of my own epistemology and am trying to 
develop a sense of autonomy and trust in my own judgements.  As such, I often find 
myself in a state of confusion and not knowing, where I view all options, in terms of 
positioning on issues, as valid.  The convergence of themes reflects my own identity 
as a counselling psychologist whereby it is still developing and it is not yet coherent.  
Consequently, during the analysis and development of themes, my own sense-
making would have been done through the lens of this confusion and not knowing, 
therefore impacted on the themes developed.  It is worth noting that this is 
characteristic of the double hermeneutic process within an IPA methodology, which 
acknowledges that the researcher is trying to make sense of the participants’ world 
while they are trying to make sense of their world (Smith & Osborn, 2008).  Thus, 
the researcher’s experience will inevitably have an influence on their understanding 
of their participants’ experiences (Smith & Eatough, 2007).  Nevertheless, further 
IPA research from a different researcher may be advantageous in order to determine 
whether this convergence of themes is indeed due to my own stage of training, or 
whether it is shared by others and is therefore more indicative of a process in the 
counselling psychology profession.  
Similarly, given the idiographic nature of IPA, an in depth analysis of 
interviews with six participants has provided an understanding of responses to 
diagnosis specific to these individuals, but more generalized claims about 
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counselling psychology have been made cautiously (Smith et al., 2009).  However, 
in accordance with the concept of Dasein in phenomenology, experience does not 
belong solely to individuals, but is understood as being in relation to other 
phenomenon (Smith et al., 2009).  Furthermore, as is suggested in IPA, links have 
been made between the findings, the researcher’s experience and the existing 
literature and is therefore able to make implications about the wider context (Smith 
& Osborn, 2008).  As such, participants’ responses to diagnosis may be in relation to 
the experience of other counselling psychologists, and the profession as a whole, so 
can say something, but certainly not everything about counselling psychologists’ 
responses to, and position on, diagnosis.     
However, it is also possible that some findings may not be relevant to the 
wider context.  For example, Mason’s (1993) position of safe uncertainty, could be 
representative of my critical realist stance and belief that, while counselling 
psychologists take a position or positions that are real, this position is changeable 
and uncertain, and is constructed by each individual. Consequently, other 
counselling psychologists may not share this perspective.  While a position of safe 
uncertainty allows for this flexibility, it would be important to carry out further 
research to clarify whether a position of safe uncertainty is one that makes sense to 
other counselling psychologists.  Therefore, following further IPA studies with other 
researchers, as has been suggested, perhaps research that utilises a Grounded Theory 
methodology may be able to say more about this position of safe uncertainty and 
whether this is a position taken up by counselling psychologists.  The IPA studies 
may be able to offer micro level analyses which will then enrich any macro level 
claims (Smith el al., 2009).  Such broad claims could potentially come from the 
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Grounded Theory analysis proposed (Brocki & Wearden, 2006).  Furthermore, 
Grounded Theory is compatible with research concerned with social psychological 
processes and it could be argued that, whether counselling psychologists take a 
position of safe uncertainty or not, is a social psychological process issue (Willig, 
2013).   
Finally, as is evident in table one, the majority of participants who took part 
in this research were aged 41-60, and had not been qualified as counselling 
psychologists for significant lengths of time.  This made the sample reasonably 
homogenous, as is preferable in IPA (Smith & Eatough, 2007).  However, I am left 
wondering in what ways the research may have been different with a sample of 
individuals who had been qualified as counselling psychologists for longer.  While 
the current research suggests that positioning on diagnosis is fixed during training, 
but becomes more flexible with time, this may vary at different points within 
counselling psychologists’ careers and possibly between newly qualified and more 
experienced individuals.  Similarly, if a position is fixed during training, the lived 
experience of uncertainty when it comes to positioning once qualified may initially 
come as a shock to those newly qualified.  Consequently, they may be left feeling 
quite confused about their position and this may impact on their ability to make 
sense of their responses to diagnosis. If this is the case, the convergence and 
divergence in the themes may not only be due to the researcher’s stage of training, 
but also that of the participants.   
Alternatively, it may be that more experienced counselling psychologists 
have become less aware of issues around diagnosis and therefore, are less able to 
discuss such issues and so may have been less forthcoming in terms of participation.  
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For instance, Brody and Farber (1996) suggest that, in relation to countertransference 
reactions, experienced therapists do not want to acknowledge doubts regarding their 
interventions.  In a similar way, engaging in a discussion about diagnosis that may 
potentially lead to participants doubting their responses to, or positioning on 
diagnosis may have felt too difficult for more experienced counselling psychologists.   
Counselling psychologists’ responses to and positioning on diagnosis, is 
arguably an issue of professional identity.  Professional identity within counselling 
psychology can be considered to be a formation of beliefs and actions that reflect 
their philosophical base (Gazzola, De Stefano, Audet & Theriault, 2011).   It could 
be argued that responses to diagnosis will be influenced by this belief system and it 
has already been noted that the positional dilemma for counselling psychologists 
stems from conflicting views within their philosophical grounding (Frost, 2012).  As 
such, it may be the case that newly qualified counselling psychologists actually felt 
more able to take part in this research because issues such as diagnosis are present in 
their minds post-qualification when they have been giving thought to their 
professional identity. Perhaps it feels more relevant to individuals who are still 
focused on developing their professional identity whereas for those more 
experienced, they may feel more content with their evolving professional identity, so 
feel less able or inclined to talk about it.   
Conversely, it might be argued that individuals who have been qualified for 
greater lengths of time may have a more established professional identity and 
therefore, are more able to articulate their responses to diagnosis and navigate the 
complexity and uncertainty in their position.  Furthermore, it has been argued that 
issues of professional identity are not easily resolved in training because it continues 
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to develop post-training (Gazzola et al., 2011).  Such claims may support the idea 
that professional identity becomes clearer over time.  Alternatively, it might be 
argued that issues of professional identity are never resolved and continually evolve 
and therefore, the length of time since counselling psychologists have trained would 
have had minimal impact on the findings. 
A final point worth noting is that there were significant differences between 
the lengths of time that participants had been qualified as counselling psychologists, 
for example, one year versus twenty years.  Given that the research found a 
difference in responses and positioning on diagnosis during and post-training, it may 
be that this difference in experience among participants reduced the homogeneity of 
the sample.  If this is the case, it may have consequences regarding the applicability 
of the findings (Smith et al., 2009).  For instance, the convergence and divergence in 
the themes may be due to the participants being at different stages in their 
professional development, rather than it being a reflection of a process in counselling 
psychology more generally.   
The participants’ qualification status may or may not have limited the 
research and while the possible impact on the research has been briefly discussed 
here, any conclusions drawn would be purely speculative at this stage.  Nevertheless, 
this may be something to consider when recruiting participants in any future research 
regarding counselling psychologists’ responses to diagnosis. Further IPA research 
with samples of participants that are more homogenous when it comes to 
qualification may be worthwhile so that claims can be made more assertively with 
regards to the impact of experience on responses to, and positioning on, diagnosis. 
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Concluding Comments  
 It seems that the participants were able to reflect on and make sense of their 
responses to diagnosis and through this, some clarity has been reached in terms of 
their position on diagnosis.  Therefore, this research is able to communicate to 
counselling psychologists and other professionals something about counselling 
psychologists’ position on diagnosis and their reflective capacity. Furthermore, as 
has been suggested, the awareness that has been brought about regarding certain 
responses to diagnosis and positioning on diagnosis, can be shared with counselling 
psychologists, trainees and other professionals, and can be applied to improve the 
therapeutic experience for clients.  
While each superordinate theme in isolation has said something about how 
counselling psychologists respond to their clients’ psychiatric diagnoses, both 
themes taken together have something additional to say.  When considering the two 
superordinate themes together, it seems that the theme, ‘diagnosis is something to 
hang your hat on,’ resembles a dichotomous process much like diagnosis while ‘the 
bigger picture’ theme, highlights the more complicated picture of what it is to be 
human.  The two themes echo patterns in terms of counselling psychologist 
perspectives on diagnosis found before (Larsson et al., 2012b; Craven & Coyle, 
2007; Sequiera & Van Scoyoc, 2001) since participants were able to work with 
diagnosis, but at the same time did not lose sight of the complexity within human 
experience.  However, this research has offered some insights into what the 
experience might be of holding these positions. 
The themes taken together also serve to answer the research question in that 
the participants very much responded to diagnosis through the lens of how they 
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position themselves and what it is like to have a changeable position, including any 
struggles they have with this.  In terms of how they make sense of their response is 
answered by the themes in that the participants either attempted to pin down their 
position, represented by the theme of ‘diagnosis is something to hang your hat on,’ 
or they found themselves navigating the complexity of ‘the bigger picture’ and were 
either able to accept that their position changes or struggled to make sense of the 
uncertainty and complexity.  This has been an important finding because it has 
allowed for an in-between and flexible position to be defined in a way that can be 
communicated to other professionals, and as previous literature has indicated, 
counselling psychology needs to strengthen its voice in terms of how it positions 
itself on issues such as diagnosis.  For instance Cooper (2009) states that “the one 
thing we cannot choose is not to choose,” (p. 127).   
More specifically, what has been suggested is that rather than seeing different 
positions as separate or defined, a position of safe uncertainty can be adopted, which 
is one that “is always in a state of flow” (Mason, 1993, p. 194).  This position allows 
for the flexibility in counselling psychology (Milton, 2012).   Most importantly here 
is that a position of safe uncertainty is not prescriptive, but allows for individual 
constructions of what it may mean to them (Mason, 1993).  However, it has also 
been highlighted that some participants are more comfortable than others at 
tolerating uncertainty, but that this should be an encouraged characteristic of all 
counselling psychologists in the future. 
Reflexive Statement 
Reflexivity in research relates to how the researcher’s own experiences 
impact upon the research process (Etherington, 2004).  Therefore, as a reflexive 
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researcher, I attempted to maintain awareness of how my own experiences would 
have an impact on the whole process.  One of the ways in which I did this was to 
keep a reflexive journal which helped me to bracket my own views and minimise the 
impact this had on the research, although as has been highlighted, some impact is 
inevitable. Furthermore, the importance of methodological, epistemological and 
personal reflexivity are stressed as important for counselling psychology research, as 
is transparency regarding the impact of one’s own subjectivity on the whole research 
process, in order to demonstrate rigour (Kasket, 2011). In addition, reflexivity has a 
particularly important place within IPA research since reflexivity closes “the illusory 
gap between researcher and researched” (Etherington, 2004, p. 32).  This resembles 
the double hermeneutic circle in IPA research that acknowledges how the 
researcher’s sense-making and that of the participant are inter-linked (Smith, & 
Osborn, 2008).  In light of this rationale for reflexivity, I have written the following 
reflexive statement.   
My curiosity with diagnosis began when I started work in a mental health 
service that does not diagnose.  My focus was on working with individuals, not 
people with named problems.  However, when I began my counselling psychology 
training, working within a cognitive behavioural framework, I came into contact 
with clients who had diagnoses and the work I did with them was influenced by 
these diagnoses.  I found myself meeting diagnosed clients with a series of 
assumptions, expectations and biased views about how they might present and what 
treatment may be necessary. I found in one instance that this obscured a relationship 
and the therapy, which ended prematurely.  While I was aware that my expectations 
and reliance on the diagnosis to guide me in my state of unknowing, rather than 
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concentrating on meeting the individual, was partly due to my inexperience, I 
wondered if others shared this experience.  In hindsight, I am curious about my 
choice of research question since this experience early in my training led me to doubt 
my capabilities and doubt how aware I was of my own responses.  My ability to 
understand this influence upon the research question could only have been realised at 
the end of the research process and at the end of my training because it is through 
these experiences that I have been able to develop self-awareness.  Moreover, my 
own reflexivity has helped me to realise this since reflexivity is about being aware of 
one’s responses (Etherington, 2004). 
When writing a literature review in order to formulate a suitable research 
question, I embarked on the diagnosis literature with an almost anti-diagnosis view.  
However, my extreme all or nothing view reflected my inexperience, and through 
supervision, I was able to broaden my perspective and acknowledge the complexity 
of the diagnosis debate.   Once immersed in the literature, I took a step back, 
bracketed my views, and considered literature that held different perspectives.    
Through broadening my perspective, I found myself overwhelmed by the number of 
perspectives within the diagnosis debate.  I narrowed the literature down to two 
perspectives; the humanistic position and the medical model because these are the 
positions that seemed to most coherently stand out to me, and seemed to be relevant 
to counselling psychology.  
Once I had reached a question, I became particularly aware of certain biases 
that I had in the early stages of the research process.  For example, whilst developing 
an interview schedule, I became aware of my own assumptions that counselling 
psychologists would not be in favour of diagnosis and how this was influencing 
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some of the questions that I was developing.  When I became aware of this I 
attempted to bracket my own assumptions in order to not overly influence the 
questions.  Through discussions in supervision and redrafting the schedule several 
times I was able to develop questions that were open and not leading in the direction 
of my assumptions. This bracketing of my assumptions continued whilst conducting 
the interviews by paying close attention to each participant’s words (Smith et al., 
2009). 
While the impact of my own experiences on the themes developed have been 
considered, it is also worth acknowledging the impact on the recommendations. The 
position of safe uncertainty  (Mason, 1993) proposed reflects my stage of 
professional development since the anxieties about something coming to an end are 
very live for me and with that comes a lot of uncertainty.  I have often had a limited 
tolerance for uncertainty and it is something I have had to challenge through the 
training.   Therefore, my proposal for counselling psychologists to more loudly take 
a position of safe uncertainty, may be partly driven by my own experiences.  In 
addition, naming a position of safe uncertainty resembles a need to pin things down 
where even a position of changeability and not knowing has been given a label.  As 
such, it may be that my own need for certainty in some ways led me to diagnose the 
participants and their positioning.      
Further to this position of safe uncertainty is that it resembles a critical realist 
position in as much as it is an in-between position (Willig, 2008).  This may come as 
no surprise since, as was outlined in the methodology, the epistemological position 
of IPA resembles that of critical realism and it is the stance I took when embarking 
on the research.  Consequently the themes identified may have been influenced by 
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my critical realist stance, such as the subordinate theme: “Holding diagnosis in one 
hand, but what does this mean?” which highlights a position taken between 
diagnosis, and knowing this is only part of the person.  This reflects the hermeneutic 
process in IPA whereby in order to see the participants’ phenomenology, the 
researcher’s own interpretation would be needed and thus inevitably will have an 
influence on the findings (Smith et al., 2009).  
What this research has highlighted for me, is that while I have evolved as a 
practitioner over the course of my training, I still have a long way to go in terms of 
building a sense of confidence in my own abilities and who I want to be as a 
practitioner.  While I initially came from an anti-diagnostic position, I am aware that 
my position on this, and other critical issues, has become more flexible with time 
and experience.  I have learned a lot from the participants and there is one participant 
quote I will take away that will influence my developing professional identity by 
reminding me that there are benefits to working both with and without diagnosis: 
“it’s just the difference between having, a paint pallet, with 6 really BOLD colours 
in it and a paint pallet with 150 subtle shades of grey, they’re both, they’re both 
really interesting” (Barbara, 23: 742-747).  By keeping this in mind I can develop a 
flexible position of safe uncertainty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  MAKING SENSE OF DIAGNOSES
  
 119 
 
 
 
 
References 
American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of  
mental disorders (4th ed., text rev.). London, England: American Psychiatric 
Association.  
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of  
mental disorders (5th ed.).  Washington DC: American Psychiatric 
Association.  
Ashley, H. (2010). Humanistic contributions to pluralistic practice.  In. M.  
Milton (Eds.), Therapy and beyond:  Counselling psychology contributions to 
therapeutic and social issues (pp. 123-138).  Chichester:  Wiley-Blackwell.  
Retrieved from https://www.dawsonera.com/abstract/9780470667262 
Bentall, R. P.  (2004).   Madness explained:  Psychosis and human nature.  Penguin  
Books.  
Biggs, S. (2010).  Assessed Unit 4: An academic paper which examines the  
meaning and implications of anti-discriminatory practice in counselling 
psychology.  Counselling Psychology Review, 25(3), 25-31.  Retrieved from 
http://www.bps.org.uk 
Bohart, A. C. (2005).  Evidence-based psychotherapy means evidence-informed,  
not evidence-driven.  Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy, 35(1), 39-53. 
doi: 10.1007/s10879-005-0802-8 
Boyle, M.  (2002). Diagnosis.  In C. Newnes, G. Holmes, & C. Dunn (Eds.), This is  
madness:  A critical look at psychiatry and the future of mental health 
services (pp. 75-90).  PCCS Books.  
British Psychological Society. (2009). Code of Ethics and Conduct: Guidance  
                                  MAKING SENSE OF DIAGNOSES
  
 120 
 
 
 
 
Published by the Ethics Committee of the British Psychological Society.  
Retrieved from 
http://www.bps.org.uk/system/files/Public%20files/bps_code_of_ethics_200
9.pdf   
British Psychological Society. (2010). Code of Human Research Ethics.   
Retrieved From 
http://www.bps.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/code_of_human_researc
h_ethics.pdf  
British Psychological Society. (2011).   British Psychological Society statement on  
the Open Letter to the DSM-5 Taskforce.  Retrieved from 
http://www.bps.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/pr1923_attachment_-
_final_bps_statement_on_dsm-5_12-12-2011.pdf.  
British Psychological Society. (2013). Diagnosis – Policy and Guidance.  Retrieved  
from http://www.bps.org.uk/system/files/documents/diagnosis-
policyguidance.pdf  
British Psychological Society. (2014).  Standards for the Accreditation of  
Doctoral Programmes in Counselling Psychology. Retrieved from 
http://www.bps.org.uk/system/files/Public%20files/PaCT/counselling_accred
itation_2014_web.pdf 
Brocki, J. M., & Wearden, A. J. (2006). A critical evaluation of the use of IPA in  
health psychology.  Psychology and Health, 21(1), 87–108. 
doi:10.1080/14768320500230185 
Brody, E. M., & Farber, B. A. (1996).  The effects of therapist experience and  
                                  MAKING SENSE OF DIAGNOSES
  
 121 
 
 
 
 
patient diagnosis on countertransference.  Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, 
Practice, Training, 33(3), 372-380.  
Bury, D., & Strauss, S. M. (2006).  The scientist-practitioner in a counselling  
psychology setting.  In D. A. Lane, & S. Corr (Eds.), The modern scientist-
practitioner:  A guide to practice in psychology (pp. 119-129).  London:  
Routledge. 
Casement, P.  (2013).  On learning from the patient.  Routledge Mental Health  
Classic Edition. 
Charmaz, K., & Henwood, K.   Grounded Theory.  In C. Willig, & W. Stainton- 
Rogers (Eds.), The Sage handbook of qualitative research in psychology (pp. 
240-260).  Sage Publications.  Retrieved from 
https://www.dawsonera.com/readonline/9781446206478  
Clark, T. & Rowe, R. (2006).  Violence, stigma and psychiatric diagnosis: The  
effects of a history of violence on psychiatric diagnosis.  Psychiatric Bulletin, 
30(7), 254-256. doi: 10.1192/pb.30.7.254 
Cocking, C. (2008). Protocol to Follow if Participants Become Distressed During  
Participation.  London Metropolitan University. 
Colli, A., Tanzilli, A., Dimaggio, G., & Lingiardi, V.  (2014).  Patient personality  
and therapist response: An empirical investigation.  Am J Psychiatry, 171(1), 
102-108. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2013.13020224 
Cooper, M. (2009). 'Welcoming the other: Actualising the humanistic ethic at the   
core of counselling psychology practice.' Counselling Psychology Review, 
24(3), 119-129.  Retrieved from http://www.bps.org.uk 
Cooper, M. & Mcleod, J. (2011).  Pluralistic counselling and psychotherapy.  Los  
                                  MAKING SENSE OF DIAGNOSES
  
 122 
 
 
 
 
Angeles; London: Sage. 
Craven, M. & Coyle, A. (2007).  Counselling psychologists' talk about  
'psychopathology' and diagnostic categories: A reflective account of a 
discourse analytic study.  In E. Lyons & A. Coyle (Eds.), Analysing 
qualitative data in psychology (pp. 235-247).  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications Ltd.  Retrieved from http://www.eblib.com 
Data Protection Act (1998).  Retrieved November 3, 2013 from  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
Davies, J. (2013). Cracked:  Why psychiatry is doing more harm than good.  Icon  
Books Limited. 
Eatough, V. (2012).  Introduction to qualitative methods.  In G. M. Breakwell, J. A.  
Smith, & D. B. Wright (Eds.), Research methods in psychology: 4th edition 
(pp. 321-341). London: Sage. 
Eriksen, K., & Kress, V. E. (2006).  The DSM and the professional counselling  
identity: Bridging the gap.  Journal of Mental Health Counseling, 28(3), 202-
217.   
Etherington, K.  (2004).  Becoming a reflexive researcher:  Using ourselves in  
research.  London:  Jessica Kingsley Publishers.  Retrieved from  
http://0-www.myilibrary.com.emu.londonmet.ac.uk?ID=26671 
Frank, G. (1975).  Psychiatric diagnosis:  A review of research.  Oxford: Pergamon 
Frankland, A., & Walsh, Y.  (2005).  Counselling psychology in the NHS.  The  
Mental Health Review, 10(3), 31-34.  Retrieved from 
 http://search.proquest.com/docview/213846526?accountid=48514 
Freeth, R. (2007a). Working within the medical model. Therapy Today, 18(9), 31- 
                                  MAKING SENSE OF DIAGNOSES
  
 123 
 
 
 
 
34.  
Freeth, R. (2007b).  Humanising Psychiatry and mental health care: The challenge  
of the person-centred approach.  Oxford: Radcliffe Publishing. 
Frost, C. (2012).  Humanism vs. the medical model: Can pluralism bridge the divide  
for counselling psychologists?  A trainee’s perspective.  Counselling 
Psychology Review, 27(1), 53-61. 
Gazzola, N., De Stefano, J., Audet, C., & Theriault, A.  (2011).  Professional  
identity among counselling psychology doctoral students:  A qualitative 
investigation.  Counselling Psychology Quarterly, 24(4), 257-275. 
Golsworthy, R. (2004). Counselling psychology and psychiatric classification:  
Clash or co-existence? Counselling Psychology Review, 12(3), 23-28.    
Hammersley, D. (2010). The interface between psychopharmacological and  
psychotherapeutic approaches. In R. Woolfe, S. Strawbridge, B.  
Douglas, & W Dryden (Eds.), Handbook of counselling psychology: 3rd 
edition (pp. 630-652). London: Sage.    
Harris, M. J. (1994). Self-fulfilling prophecies in the clinical context: Review and  
implications for clinical practice.  Applied & Preventive Psychology, 3(3), 
145-158. 
Hutchinson, J., & Lema, J. C. (2009).  Ordinary and extraordinary narratives  
of heroism and resistance: Uncovering resilience, competence and 
growth.  Counselling Psychology Review. 24(3/4), 9-15.  Retrieved from 
http://www.bps.org.uk 
James, P.  (2010, July).  The current position of counselling psychology: A  
                                  MAKING SENSE OF DIAGNOSES
  
 124 
 
 
 
 
personal opinion.  Paper presented at the Annual Counselling Psychology 
Conference, The British Psychological Society, Division of Counselling 
Psychology, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. Retrieved from 
http://dcop.bps.org.uk /dcop/the-forum/poster-presentations/the-current-
position-of-counselling-psychology-a-personal-opinion..cfm 
Jordan, R. (2009).  Adapt, research and survive!  Taking counselling psychology  
forward into the next decade.  Counselling Psychology Review.  24(1), 11-
14. Retrieved from http://www.bps.org.uk 
Kasket, E. (2011).  Counselling psychology research in training and beyond.     
Paper presented at the November 2011 Division of Counselling Psychology 
Trainee Talk, British Psychological Society, London.  
Kindermann, P. (2009).  The future of counselling psychology: A view from  
outside.  Counselling Psychology Review, 24(1), 16-21.  Retrieved from 
http://www.bps.org.uk 
Klein, M.  (1946). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms.  In Envy and gratitude and  
other works 1946-1963 (pp. 1-24).  Vintage: 1997 
Klein, M. (1952). Some theoretical conclusions regarding the emotional life of the  
infant.  In Envy and gratitude and other works 1946-1963 (pp. 61-93).  
Vintage: 1997 
Langdridge, D., & Hagger-Johnson, G. (2009).  Introduction to research methods  
and data analysis in psychology: 2nd edition. Pearson Education Limited.  
Larsson, P., Brooks, O., & Loewenthal, D. (2012a).  Counselling psychology and  
diagnostic categories: A critical literature review.  Counselling Psychology 
Review, 27(3), 55-67. 
                                  MAKING SENSE OF DIAGNOSES
  
 125 
 
 
 
 
Larsson, P., Loewenthal, D., & Brooks, O.  (2012b).  Counselling psychology  
and schizophrenia: A critical discursive account.  Counselling Psychology 
Quarterly, 25(1), 31-47.  Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515070.2012.662785  
Laungani, P. (2002). Mindless psychiatry and dubious ethics.  Counselling  
Psychology Quarterly, 15(1), 23-33. doi: 10.1080/09515070110102305  
Lemma, A.  (2003).  Introduction to the practice of psychoanalytic psychotherapy.   
Chichester:  Wiley.  Retrieved from  
http://0-www.myilibrary.com.emu.londonmet.ac.uk?ID=10156 
London Metropolitan University’s Code of Good Research Practice (2014).  
Retrieved from http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/media/london-metropolitan-
university/london-met-documents/professional-service-departments/research-
office/handbooks/Code-of-Good-Research-Practice.pdf  
Lyons, E. (2007).  Analysing qualitative data: Comparative reflections. In E.  
Lyons & A. Coyle (Eds.), Analysing qualitative data in psychology (pp. 35-
50).  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Ltd. Retrieved from 
http://www.eblib.com 
Markham, D. (2003).  Attitudes towards patients with a diagnosis of borderline  
personality disorder: social rejection and dangerousness.  Journal of Mental 
Health, 12(6), 595-612.  doi: 10.1080/09638230310001627955 
Martin, G. N., Carlson, N. R., & Buskist, W. (2010). Psychology: 4th edition.  
Harlow: Allyn and Bacon. Retrieved from  
http://0-www.myilibrary.com.emu.londonmet.ac.uk?ID=252977 
Mason, B. (1993).  Towards positions of safe uncertainty.  Human Systems: The  
                                  MAKING SENSE OF DIAGNOSES
  
 126 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Systemic Consultation & Management, 4, 189-200.   
Maxwell. J. A. (2012).  A realist approach for qualitative research.   Sage  
Publications.  Retrieved from 
http://www.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-binaries/44131_1.pdf  
McAteer, D. (2010).  Philosophical pluralism:  Navigating the sea of diversity in  
psychotherapeutic and counselling psychology practice.  In. M. Milton 
(Eds.), Therapy and beyond:  Counselling psychology contributions to 
therapeutic and social issues (pp. 5-19).  Chichester:  Wiley-Blackwell.  
Retrieved from https://www.dawsonera.com/abstract/9780470667262  
Mendel, R., Traut-Mattausch, E., Jonas, E., Leucht, S., Kane, J.M., Maino, K.,  
Kissling, W., & Hamann, J. (2011).  Confirmation bias:  Why psychiatrists 
stick to wrong preliminary diagnoses.  Psychological Medicine, 41(12), 
2651-2659.  doi:10.1017/ S0033291711000808 
Milton, M. (2012). Diagnosis and beyond: Counselling psychology contributions to  
understanding human distress.   PCCS Books  
Milton, M.  (2012).  Epilogue.  In M. Milton (Eds.), Diagnosis and beyond:   
Counselling psychology contributions to understanding human distress (pp. 
133-136).  PCCS Books. 
Milton, M.  (2012).  Preface.  In M. Milton (Eds.), Diagnosis and beyond:   
Counselling psychology contributions to understanding human distress (pp. 
xi-xvi).  PCCS Books. 
Milton, M., Craven, M., & Coyle, A.  (2010).  Understanding human distress:   
                                  MAKING SENSE OF DIAGNOSES
  
 127 
 
 
 
 
Moving beyond the concept of ‘psychopathology.’  In. M. Milton (Eds.), 
Therapy and beyond:  Counselling psychology contributions to therapeutic 
and social issues (pp. 57-72).  Chichester:  Wiley-Blackwell. 
Mollon, P. (2010). Our rich heritage – are we building upon it or destroying it?   
Some malign influences of clinical psychology upon psychotherapy in the 
UK.  Psychodynamic Practice, 16(1), pp. 7-24. doi: 
10.1080/14753630903474629 
Nehls, N. (1998). Borderline personality disorder: Gender stereotypes, stigma,  
and limited system of care.  Issues in Mental Health Nursing, 19(2), 97–112. 
doi: 10.1080/016128498249105 
NICE (2015, September 13).  Care for Adults with Depression.  Retrieved from    
http://pathways.nice.org.uk/pathways/depression#path=view%3A/pathways/d
epression/care-for-adults-with-depression.xml&content=view-index 
O’Shaughnessy, E.  (2013).  Reparation (2): Waiting for a concept.  The second  
in a series of three papers presented during the seminar ‘Facing the Pain of 
Crimes and Their Reparation’ at the 48th International Psychoanalytical 
Association congress.  Retrieved from http://www.melanie-klein-
trust.org.uk/domains/melanie-klein-
trust.org.uk/local/media/downloads/Edna_OShaughnessy___Reparation___P
rague_2013.pdf 
Parpottas, P. (2012).  A critique on the use of standard psychopathological  
classifications in understanding human distress: The example of ‘schizoid 
personality disorder.’  Counselling Psychology Review, 27(1), 44-52. 
Patil, T., & Giordano, J. (2010). On the ontological assumptions of the medical  
                                  MAKING SENSE OF DIAGNOSES
  
 128 
 
 
 
 
model of psychiatry: Philosophical considerations and pragmatic tasks.  
Philosophy. Ethics and Humanities in Medicine, 5, 1-7. 
Payne, S. (2007).  Grounded Theory. In E. Lyons & A. Coyle (Eds.), Analysing  
qualitative data in psychology (pp. 35-50).  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications Ltd.  Retrieved from http://www.eblib.com 
Plock, S. (2010).  Humanistic approaches.  In R. Woolfe, S. Strawbridge, B.  
Douglas, & W Dryden (Eds.), Handbook of counselling psychology: 3rd 
edition (pp. 130-1150). London: Sage.    
Poland, J., & Caplan, P. J. (2004).  The deep structure of bias in psychiatric  
diagnosis.  In P. J. Caplan, & L. Cosgrove (Eds.), Bias in psychiatric 
diagnosis (pp. 9-24).  Oxford: Jason Aronson.  
Scott, H. (2010). The medical model: the right approach to service provision?  
Mental Health Practice, 13(5), 27-30.   
Segal, H. (1988).  Introduction to the work of Melanie Klein.  London:  Karnac  
and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. Retrieved from 
 https://www.dawsonera.com/abstract/9781849400657 
Segal, D. L., Corcoran, J., & Coughlin, A. (2002).  Diagnosis, differential  
diagnosis and the SCID.  In M. Hersen, L. K. Porzelius (Eds.), Diagnosis, 
conceptualization and treatment planning for adults: A step-by-step guide. 
(pp. 13-34).  Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
Publishers. Retrieved from http://www.eblib.com  
Sequeira, H., &  Van Scoyoc, S. (2001). Division round table 2001:  Should  
counselling psychologists oppose the use of DSM-IV and testing?  
Counselling Psychology Review, 16(4), 44-48. 
                                  MAKING SENSE OF DIAGNOSES
  
 129 
 
 
 
 
Smith, J.A. (1995). Semi-structured interviewing and qualitative analysis.  In J.  
A. Smith, R. Harré, & L.V Langenhove (Eds.), Rethinking methods in 
psychology (pp. 9-26).  London: Sage.     
Smith, J. A. & Eatough, V.  (2007).  Interpretative phenomenological analysis.  
In E. Lyons & A. Coyle (Eds.), Analysing qualitative data in psychology (pp. 
35-50).  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Ltd. Retrieved from 
http://www.eblib.com 
Smith, J. A. & Eatough, V. (2012). Interpretative phenomenological analysis.   
In G. M. Breakwell, J. A. Smith, & D. B. Wright (Eds.), Research methods in 
psychology: 4th edition (pp. 439-459). London: Sage. 
Smith, J. A., Flowers, P., & Larkin, M. (2009).  Interpretative phenomenological  
analysis:  Theory, method and research.  London: Sage. 
Smith, J. A., Jarman, M., & Osborn, M. (1999).  Doing interpretative  
phenomenological analysis.  In M. Murray, & K. Chamberlain (Eds.), 
Qualitative health psychology: theories and methods (pp. 218-240).  London: 
Sage.  
Smith, J.A., & Osborn, M.  (2008).  Interpretative phenomenological analysis.  In J.  
A. Smith (Eds.), Qualitative psychology: A practical guide to research 
methods (pp. 53-80).  London: Sage. 
Spillius, E. B,., Milton, J., Garvey, P., Couve, C., & Steiner, D.  (2011).  The new  
dictionary of kleinian thought.  Routledge:  Taylor & Francis Group. 
Strawbridge, S., & Woolfe, R. (2010).  Counselling psychology: Origins,  
developments and challenges.  In R. Woolfe, S. Strawbridge, B.  
                                  MAKING SENSE OF DIAGNOSES
  
 130 
 
 
 
 
Douglas, & W Dryden (Eds.), Handbook of counselling psychology: 3rd 
edition (pp. 3-22). London: Sage.    
The Association for Humanistic Psychology in Britain (AHPb, 2013).  
Retrieved from www.ahpb.org.  
Tyrer, P., & Steinberg, D. (2005).  Models for mental disorder: Conceptual  
models in psychiatry: 4th edition.  John Wiley and Sons Limited. Retrieved 
from http://0-www.myilibrary.com.emu.londonmet.ac.uk?ID=30877 
Vincent, S. (2005).  Being Empathic: A companion for counsellors and therapists.   
Oxford: Radcliffe. 
Willig, C. (2008).  Introducing qualitative research in psychology: Adventures in  
theory and method: 2nd edition.  Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill Open University 
Press. Retrieved from  
http://0-www.myilibrary.com.emu.londonmet.ac.uk?ID=178561 
Willig, C. (2012).  Qualitative interpretation and analysis in psychology.   
Maidenhead:  Open University Press. Retrieved from http://www.eblib.com 
Willig, C. (2013).  Introducing qualitative research in psychology: 3rd edition.   
Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill Education Open University Press. 
Yardley, L. (2000).  Dilemmas in qualitative health research.  Psychology and  
Health, 15(2), 215-228. doi: 10.1080/08870440008400302 
  
 
 
 
   
 
                                  MAKING SENSE OF DIAGNOSES
  
 131 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix A - Recruitment Advert......…………………………………… 132 
Appendix B - Recruitment Poster...……………………………………… 133 
Appendix C - Participant Information Sheet…..………………………... 134 
Appendix D - Consent Form……..……………………………………….. 139 
Appendix E - Participant Demographic Information Sheet…….……… 141 
Appendix F - Interview Schedule……...…………………………………. 142 
Appendix G - Debrief Sheet………………………………………………. 144 
Appendix H - Ethical Approval …..………………………………………. 146 
Appendix I - Distress Protocol …..………………………………………... 147 
Appendix J - Sample Transcript………………………………………….  149 
Appendix K - List of Emerging Themes For Barbara…………………... 154 
Appendix L - Barbara: Clustering Themes Stage One………………….. 158 
Appendix M - Barbara: Clustering Themes Stage Two………………… 163 
Appendix N - Barbara: Clustering Themes Stage Three………………... 167 
Appendix O - Clustering Themes Across Participants Phase One……... 170 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  MAKING SENSE OF DIAGNOSES
  
 132 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A - Recruitment Advert 
Dear All, 
I am a second year student at London Metropolitan University (LMU), 
presently reading for a Professional Doctorate in Counselling Psychology. I am 
currently recruiting qualified counselling psychologists as participants in my 
research project.  The title of the research project is: How do counselling 
psychologists make sense of their clients’ psychiatric diagnoses?  An interpretative 
phenomenological analysis.   
This research aims to explore the responses counselling psychologists have to 
different psychiatric diagnoses given to their clients, whether they are aware of these 
responses and how they make sense of these responses.  Responses can be both 
positive and negative and refer to an internal emotional or cognitive response such as 
assumptions and biases.   
Participation will involve taking part in a semi-structured audio-recorded 
interview.  Interviews will be held at a location and time convenient to participants 
and will last approximately one hour.  This research has obtained a favourable 
ethical opinion from the ethics committee at LMU. 
I am looking to recruit counselling psychologists in the UK who have 
experience of working directly with clients in therapy who were diagnosed with a 
psychiatric illness.  This research is being supervised by Dr. Marta Sant, Lecturer in 
Counselling Psychology at LMU (Email: m.sant@londonmet.ac.uk, Tel: 0207 
1332140) 
I would sincerely appreciate your participation in this research project.  If 
you would like to take part in this research and would like an information sheet, 
please contact me at:  
 
Email: how0055@my.londonmet.ac.uk. 
Tel: 07580491618 
 
I look forward to hearing from you, many thanks. 
Holly Weston  
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Appendix B - Recruitment Poster 
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Appendix C - Participant Information Sheet 
 
London Metropolitan University 
166-220 Holloway Road 
London 
N7 8DB 
 
 
Title: How do counselling psychologists make sense of their clients’ psychiatric 
diagnoses?  An interpretative phenomenological analysis. 
 
Thank you for your interest in the above named research project.  If you are still 
interested in participating please read the following information regarding the project 
and details about what participation will involve. 
 
Information about the project 
I am a second year student at London Metropolitan University (LMU), presently 
reading for a Professional Doctorate in Counselling Psychology.  This research 
project is being supervised by Dr. Russel Ayling, Visiting Lecturer in Counselling 
Psychology, at LMU.   
 
This research aims to explore the responses counselling psychologists have to 
psychiatric diagnoses given to their clients, whether they are aware of these 
responses and how they make sense of these responses.  Responses can be both 
positive and negative and refer to an internal emotional or cognitive response that 
can occur in many forms e.g. assumptions or biases.  An awareness of one’s own 
responses can demonstrate a reflective capacity and responses that are either helpful 
or challenging may be identified and considered in relation to clinical practice.  This 
project hopes to contribute to the limited research regarding counselling 
psychology’s epistemological position on diagnosis, as well as to highlight 
counselling psychologists’ reflective capacity. Furthermore this research project may 
promote the importance of being aware of one’s responses which could stimulate 
other mental health professionals’ own self-awareness and reflective capacities; thus  
helping to promote a fairer therapeutic experience for clients.   Data will be analysed 
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using an interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) (*Smith and Eatough, 
2012).  This research has obtained a favourable ethical opinion from the ethics 
committee at LMU.   
 
I would like to hear from you if you feel comfortable to talk about what diagnosis 
means to you, your experience of working with clients who have previously received 
a psychiatric diagnosis, including what responses you might have had to these 
diagnoses and your understanding of your responses.  If you believe that talking 
about these experiences may be distressing or upsetting in any way and for whatever 
reason, then thank you for your interest in this research project, however it is 
considered that you would not be suitable to participate. 
 
What would participation involve? 
Your participation in this research project will involve attending a face to face audio-
recorded interview, lasting approximately one hour, held at a time and place of 
convenience to you.  Prior to the interview you will be sent a consent form and you 
will be asked to read and sign two copies, one for you to keep and one to give to the 
researcher at your interview.  Prior to commencement of the interview, you will be 
asked to fill in a demographic information sheet that will be used to inform the data 
and you will be given the opportunity to ask any further questions before the 
interview begins.  The demographic information sheet will be stored securely and 
will not be used for any other purpose other than to inform the data.  
 
Is the research confidential?    
By volunteering to take part in this research project, you are also giving permission 
for the interviews to be audio-recorded and transcribed.  Audio-recordings, 
transcripts, signed copies of consent forms, demographic information sheets and any 
other participant information will be kept in a secure location in accordance with the 
**Data Protection Act (1998). However, the consent forms, or any other potentially 
identifiable information related to you will be stored separately from the rest of the 
data.  Furthermore electronic data, including transcripts, will be saved in password 
protected files and on a password protected USB which will be stored in a secure 
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location.  Following completion of the project, all data will be stored securely for a 
maximum of 10 years, as is recommended in ***London Metropolitan University’s 
Code of Good Research Practice (2014). The research project may be published 
following completion. 
 
For the purposes of data storage and writing up the project, you will be allocated a 
pseudonym available only to me.    Any identifiable information related to you, your 
clients, your place of work and any clinical experiences that you disclose will be 
altered in the verbatim transcripts and throughout the project write up. 
 
While these lengths will be taken to maintain confidentiality, if you were to disclose 
information regarding harm to self or others, I would have an obligation to break 
confidentiality in accordance with the ****British Psychological Society (BPS) 
Code of Ethics and Conduct (2009).  
 
In case that the interview will be conducted at a private address (for example, at your 
home), I would need to provide my supervisor with the address where the interview 
will take place and details regarding the time of the interview.  This is done in order 
to protect both student researchers and potential research participants. 
 
Participation withdrawal 
You will be given the opportunity to decline answering any of the questions during 
the interview and the interview can be terminated at any time without question.  
Following completion of the interview, you may withdraw your participation up to 
four weeks following the interview.  In the instance of participation withdrawal at 
any stage up to four weeks post-interview, your data will be deleted and will not 
feature in the project.  As analysis will begin shortly following the interview it will 
not be possible to withdraw from the project beyond four weeks post-interview.   
 
Following participation    
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Following participation you will be provided with a debrief sheet.  If you would like 
to obtain information about the research findings, please inform me of this and I will 
be very happy to forward you a copy of the completed work. 
 
If you have any complaint, concern or question about this research please feel free to 
contact my research supervisor, Dr. Russel Ayling (contact details given below). 
 
Should you require any further information, or would like to participate in this 
project, 
kindly contact me at: 
 
 
 
 
I would sincerely appreciate and welcome your participation in this research project 
and I look forward to hearing from you.   
 
Many thanks for your time. 
 
Holly Weston 
 
* Smith, J. A. & Eatough, V. (2012). Interpretative phenomenological analysis.   
In G. M. Breakwell, J. A. Smith, & D. B. Wright (Eds.), Research methods in 
psychology: 4th edition (pp. 439-459). London: Sage. 
 
**London Metropolitan University’s Code of Good Research Practice (2014).  
Retrieved from http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/media/london-metropolitan-
university/london-met-documents/professional-service-departments/research-
office/handbooks/Code-of-Good-Research-Practice.pdf  
 
***Data Protection Act (1998).  Retrieved November 3, 2013, from 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
Supervisor: Dr. Russel Ayling 
Email: r.ayling@londonmet.ac.uk 
 
Researcher email: how0055@my.londonmet.ac.uk 
 
Researcher Tel: 07580491618 
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****British Psychological Society. (2009). Code of Ethics and Conduct: Guidance 
published by the Ethics Committee of the British Psychological Society.  Retrieved 
from  
http://www.bps.org.uk/system/files/Public%20files/bps_code_of_ethics_2009.pdf 
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Appendix D - Consent Form 
Research project title:  How do counselling psychologists make sense of their 
clients’ psychiatric diagnoses?  An interpretative phenomenological analysis. 
 
Name of researcher:  Holly Weston 
Researcher email:  how0055@my.londonmet.ac.uk 
 
Research supervisor: Dr. Russel Ayling 
Research supervisor email:  r.ayling@londonmet.ac.uk 
 
Please indicate if you agree with the following statements by ticking the boxes:  
 
 I have been given an information sheet and consent form for my perusal.  
 I understand the intent and purpose of the research project. 
 I have been given adequate time to consider participation and I have been 
given the opportunity to ask any questions. 
 I am aware that my participation will involve an audio-recorded interview.  
 I agree to my interview being audio-recorded.  
 I understand that I can decline answering a question or ask for the interview 
to be terminated at any time. 
 I understand that I may withdraw from the research project within 4 weeks 
following my interview.  
 I understand that if I withdraw from the research project, all my data will be 
destroyed. 
 I am aware that all data will be kept securely and any verbatim material will 
be anonymised.  
 I agree to and understand the limits of confidentiality. 
 I agree to all data including transcripts, audio-recordings, consent forms and 
demographic sheets being stored for a maximum of ten years post interview. 
 I am aware of and agree to anonymised, verbatim material being published. 
 I feel emotionally able to take part in this research project. 
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 I am aware that there will be a debrief following my participation in this 
research project. 
 I am aware of who I will need to contact if I want to withdraw my data or if I 
have a question, concern or complaint about this research project. 
 I agree to take part in this research project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Participant name…………………….. 
Date…………………………………… 
Signature…………………………….. 
 
Researcher name……………………… 
Date……………………………………. 
Signature………………………………. 
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Appendix E - Participant Demographic Information Sheet 
 
 
Please can you answer the following questions.  The answers to these questions will 
be used to inform the research data and for no other purpose.  They will be stored 
and disposed of in the same way as all other data as is outlined in your information 
sheet. 
 
What is your gender?:   Male     Female       
 
What is your age?:  20-30   31-40    41-50    51-60    60+   
 
What is your counselling psychology qualification? 
 
........................................................................................................................................ 
 
How many years has it been since you qualified? 
 
........................................................................................................................................ 
 
Please list the types of settings you have worked in e.g. NHS, charity, or 
university counselling service and the client groups worked with in each setting 
e.g. adult, child and adolescent etc: 
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Appendix F - Interview Schedule 
 
Introduction 
 
 Introduce myself 
 Consent form collection 
 Demographic information sheet 
 Any outstanding questions 
 Housekeeping: fire alarms etc. 
 Explain withdrawal procedure, e.g. can decline any question or end interview 
at any time without question. 
 
Questions 
 
1. Could you tell me about what psychiatric diagnosis means to you? 
 What are your thoughts/ feelings about diagnosis?  Does this depend on the 
diagnosis? How and why? 
 Do different diagnoses have different meanings? 
 Is there a particular diagnosis that has a particular meaning for you? Why? 
 
2. Can you tell me about your experience(s) of working with clients who have 
been given a psychiatric diagnosis? 
 What were your thoughts? 
 What were your feelings? 
 Did you consider a client’s diagnosis/diagnoses prior to meeting them for the 
first time? 
 How did you experience the therapeutic relationship? 
 Have there been any repetitions in your experience? What and why? 
 What do you understand of your experience? 
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3. How does your experience(s) compare to those when working with clients 
without a psychiatric diagnosis? 
 Is it any different and how/why? 
 How do your thoughts compare? 
 How do your feelings compare? 
 How does the therapeutic relationship compare? 
 What do you understand of your experience? 
 
4. Can you tell me about your awareness of your experience(s) whilst with clients 
during therapy sessions? 
 Are you aware of thoughts/feelings? 
 How do you process your thoughts/feelings? 
  Is this different with different diagnoses? Why? 
 How does this compare between  working with clients with a diagnosis 
and working with clients without a diagnosis? 
 How do you think your own experience impacts on the therapy? 
 
5. Is there anything you would like to add before we finish? 
 What has it been like to take part in this interview today? 
 
Close of interview 
 
 Any questions? 
 Offer debrief sheet 
 Thank you for participating 
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Appendix G - Debrief Sheet 
Research project title:  How do counselling psychologists make sense of their 
clients’ psychiatric diagnoses?  An interpretative phenomenological analysis. 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
Thank you very much for your participation in this research project.  Your 
willingness to participate is greatly appreciated.  If you have any questions regarding 
any stage of the research process, please do not hesitate to contact me: 
 
Researcher email: how0055@my.londonmet.ac.uk  
 
If you have any complaint, concern or question about this research, please feel free 
to contact my research supervisor:   
 
Research supervisor name: Dr. Russel Ayling 
Email: r.ayling@londonmet.ac.uk  
 
If today’s interview has elicited any distressing or difficult feelings for you, the 
agencies below can offer support and advice: 
 Samaritans 
The Samaritans offer the opportunity to speak to someone over the phone, at any 
time about anything that is troubling you and can offer support.  
Tel: 08457 90 90 90  
Website: http://www.samaritans.org 
 
 The British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP) and 
The United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy (UKCP) can provide 
information regarding therapists and how to find one: 
 
 BACP: 
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Address: 
British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy 
BACP House,  
15 St John's Business Park,  
Lutterworth,  
Leicestershire 
LE17 4HB 
 
Tel: 01455 883300 
Email:  bacp@bacp.co.uk 
Website: www.bacp.co.uk 
 
 UKCP: 
Address:  
2nd Floor,  
Edward House 
2 Wakley Street 
London  
EC1V 7LT 
 
Tel: 020 7014 9955 
 
Email: info@ukcp.org.uk 
 
Website: www.psychotherapy.org.uk 
 
 You may also contact your General Practitioner (GP) for support or to 
seek a referral to a therapist. 
 
If you would like to see a copy of the research following write up, you can request to 
do so by contacting me via the contact details above.  Estimated date of completion 
is 20th August 2015. 
 
Many thanks again 
 
Holly Weston 
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Appendix H - Ethical Approval 
  
  
London Metropolitan University, School of Psychology, 
Research Ethics Review Panel   
  
 I can confirm that the following project has received ethical approval to 
proceed:  
  
Title:  How do counselling psychologists make sense of their   clients’ 
psychiatric diagnoses? An interpretative phenomenological analysis.  
Student:  Holly Weston  
Supervisor:  Dr. Marta Sant  
  
 Ethical clearance to proceed has been granted providing that the study 
follows the ethical guidelines used by the School of Psychology and British 
Psychological Society, and incorporates any relevant changes required by 
the Research Ethics Review Panel. All participating organisations should 
provide formal consent allowing the student to collect data from their staff.  
  
The researcher is also responsible for conducting the research in an 
ethically acceptable way, and should inform the ethics panel if there are any 
substantive changes to the project that could affect its ethical dimensions, 
and re-submit the proposal if it is deemed necessary.  
  
 Signed:  
  
Date: 31/01/2014  
  
  
Dr Chris Chandler  
(Chair - School of Psychology Research Ethics Review Panel) 
chandler@staff.londonmet.ac.uk  
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Appendix I - Distress Protocol 
 
Protocol to follow if participants become distressed during 
participation : 
 
This protocol has been devised to deal with the possibility that some participants 
may become distressed and/or agitated during their involvement in this research. 
There follows below a three step protocol detailing signs of distress that the 
researchers will look out for, as well as action to take at each stage. It is not expected 
that extreme distress will occur, or that the relevant action will become necessary. 
However it is included in the protocol, in case of emergencies where professionals 
cannot be reached in time. 
 
Mild distress: 
 
Signs to look out for: 
1) Tearfulness 
2) Voice becomes choked with emotion/ difficulty speaking 
3) Participant becomes distracted/ restless 
 
Action to take: 
1) Ask participant if they are happy to continue 
2) Offer them time to pause and compose themselves 
3) Remind them they can stop at any time they wish if they become too 
distressed 
 
Severe distress: 
 
Signs to look out for: 
1) Uncontrolled crying/ wailing, inability to talk coherently 
2) Panic attack- e.g. hyperventilation, shaking, fear of impending heart attack  
3) Intrusive thoughts of the traumatic event- e.g. flashbacks 
 
Action to take: 
1) The researcher will intervene to terminate the interview/experiment. 
2) The debrief will begin immediately 
3) Relaxation techniques will be suggested to regulate breathing/ reduce 
agitation 
4) The researcher will recognize participants’ distress, and reassure that their 
experiences are normal reactions to abnormal events and that most people 
recover.  
5) If any unresolved issues arise during the interview, accept and validate their 
distress, but suggest that they discuss with mental health professionals and 
remind participants that this is not designed as a therapeutic interaction 
6) Details of counselling/therapeutic services available will be offered to 
participants 
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Extreme distress: 
 
Signs to look out for: 
1) Severe agitation and possible verbal or physical aggression 
2) In very extreme cases- possible psychotic breakdown where the participant 
relives the traumatic incident and begins to lose touch with reality 
 
Action to take: 
1) Maintain safety of participant and researcher 
2) If the researcher has concerns for the participant’s or others’ safety, he will 
inform them that he has a duty to inform any existing contacts they have with 
mental health services, such as a Community Psychiatric Nurse (CPN) or 
their GP. 
3) If the researcher believes that either the participant or someone else is in 
immediate danger, then he will suggest that they present themselves to the 
local A&E Department and ask for the on-call psychiatric liaison team. 
4) If the participant is unwilling to seek immediate help and becomes violent, 
then the Police will be called and asked to use their powers under the Mental 
Health Act to detain someone and take them to a place of safety pending 
psychiatric assessment. (This last option would only be used in an extreme 
emergency)     
 
 
© Chris Cocking, London Metropolitan University Nov 2008 
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Appendix J - Sample Transcript: Barbara pp. 21-25 Inclusive 
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Appendix K - List of Emerging Themes for Barbara 
Diagnosis is descriptive, L. 5-7; L. 35-37; L. 771-772; L. 778 
Diagnosis categorises, L. 7-8 
Diagnosis provides access to treatment, L. 8-10 
Diagnosis is not concerned with individual experience, L. 10-12 
Medical model is intrusive, L. 12-14 
Reductionist, L. 12-14; L. 371; L. 390; L. 758 
Personality disorders hold meaning, L. 23-24 
Personality disorder is a broad concept, L. 25-26 
Personality disorder is ubiquitous, L. 26-28 
Personality disorder diagnosis elicits an internal struggle, L. 30 
Behaviour reduced to be measurable, L. 36-40 
Diagnosis contradicts personal experience, L. 41-46 
Diagnosis creates conflict, L. 44-46 
Hatred of psychiatric language, L. 50-53 
Psychiatric language is offensive, L. 53-54 
Psychiatric language is dehumanising, L. 60-61 
Labelling, L. 65; 160-161; L. 245-246; L. 327-328; L. 543-544; L. 677-679; L. 701 
Diagnosis can dictate response, L. 64-65 
Diagnosis can be damaging, L. 64-70 
Preconceived responses, L. 65-70 
Diagnosis is prevalent, L. 75-76 
The individual predominates the diagnosis, L. 78-81 
Diagnosis is meaningless, L. 76-81 
Diagnosis provides a sense of knowing, L. 88-94; 104-108; L. 308-310; L. 430-432; 
L. 641-642; L. 691 
Diagnosis provides guidance, L. 92-95; L. 694-695 
Diagnosis is containing, L. 97-102; L. 292-293; L. 692-695 
Diagnosis eliminates uncertainty, L. 107-108 
Feeling reassured by diagnosis, L. 102-106 
Loss of identity, L. 110-111 
Inhumane treatment, L. 113-114 
Considers individual in context, L. 116-120 
Individuals are complex, L. 123-127 
Feeling there’s more to consider than a diagnosis, L. 129-131 
Working with someone with BPD feels intense, L. 135-136 
Complexity about a person is difficult to articulate, L. 133-134 
More to consider than diagnosis, L. 135-138 
Diagnosis is a help and a hindrance, L. 139-141 
Doubt in the existence of diagnosis, L. 143-144 
Categorisation, L. 145-146 
Diagnosis is a burden, L. 151-152; 159-160; L. 573-574 
Diagnosis is considered before meeting the person, L. 155-157 
Working through own response to diagnosis, L. 159-162 
Countertransference from diagnosis, L. 164-165 
Ambivalence about diagnosis, L. 170-171; L. 298; L. 380 
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Diagnosis is powerful, L. 171-172; L. 292-297; L. 306-307; L. 324-328; L. 538-539; 
L. 627-629; L. 700-701 
Aware of countertransference feelings, L. 1773-175 
Internal response to diagnosis, L. 178-179 
Experience of self is constant, L. 180-181 
Repetitions in internal response, L. 182-191 
Diagnosis is part of a complex picture, L. 202-203 
Complex relationship, L. 210-213 
Controlling own feelings, L. 210-211 
Power struggle, L. 215; L. 220-222 
Aware of own experience, L. 216-218 
Confusion in relationship, L. 220-221 
Loss of power, L. 222 
Loss of awareness, L. 220-221 
Awareness of feelings, L. 225-227 
Strength of own feeling parallels that of the client, L. 235-237 
Trying to maintain control, L.238 
Awareness difficult to maintain, L. 238-239 
Repetition in experience, L. 240-243 
Diagnosis helps make sense of experience, L. 246-248 
Diagnosis determines treatment, L. 257-259; L. 627-629 
Dehumanising L. 260-261; L. 451-453 
Diagnoses given weightings, L. 264 
Society influences response to diagnoses, L. 264-266 
Society pays attention to some diagnoses, L. 26-=5-266 
Diagnosis impacts on therapy, L. 274 
Diagnosis influences language used, L. 277-278 
Significance of setting, L. 276-278 
Reductionist, L. 279-280; L. 451-453 
Diagnosis narrows focus, L. 282-284 
Absence of diagnosis brings you closer to the individual, L. 287-289 
Use of own response to make sense of client experience, L. 288-291 
Diagnosis reduces autonomy, L. 292 
Closer to the client with no diagnosis, L. 304-305 
Diagnosis determines focus, L. 306-314; L. 375-378 
Closer to client experience with no diagnosis, L. 315-316 
Diagnosis makes experience of therapy indescribably different, L. 322-323 
When diagnosis is absent, sharp contrast to when it’s not, L. 319-320 
Loss of autonomy, L. 324 
Diagnosing brings sense of finality, L. 324-325 
Naturally evolving therapeutic relationship with no diagnosis, L. 333 
Diagnosis is disempowering for clients, L. 335-339 
Diagnosis elicits assumptions and predictions, L. 338-340 
Practitioner experience is relevant to the context, L. 344-346 
Complexity, L. 345-346; L. 566-568; L. 577-578; L. 609-611; L. 687 
More challenging with no diagnosis, L. 350 
Diagnosis influences thinking, L. 349-353 
A client’s whole experience is considered with no diagnosis, L. 356-361 
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Work is more complex with no diagnosis, L. 360-361 
Diagnosis dampens creativity, L. 361-363 
Diagnosis adds to complexity, L. 264-365; L. 573-574 
Diagnosis elicits assumptions, L. 380 
Diagnosis simplifies, L. 380-384; L. 619 
Diagnosis as quick fix, L. 386-389 
Transparency about diagnosis, L. 414-415 
Awareness of experience is important, L. 418-419 
Diagnosis forms part of understanding client experience, L. 421-423 
Transparency about own process, L. 425-426 
Diagnosis is reassuring, L. 430-431 
Diagnosis externalises problem, L. 433-435 
Talk explicitly about thoughts on diagnosis to maintain awareness, L. 439-441 
Being aware of own responses is part of a counselling psychologist’s identity, L. 
467-468 
Awareness makes counselling psychologists distinct, L. 469-470 
Self-awareness facilitates being open about thoughts and feelings, L. 477-480 
Transparency about own experience leads to balance of power, L. 479-483 
Awareness brings a sense of control, L. 486-487 
Transparency about own position brings you closer to client experience, L. 505-508 
Awareness of own experience differs between diagnoses, L. 521 
Diagnosis can only describe, L. L. 545 
Some diagnoses bring more complexities than others, L. 549-551 
Some presentations oppose the therapy process, L. 554-556 
Response to behaviour vs response to diagnosis is difficult to differentiate, L. 562-
568 
Difficult to isolate diagnosis as a variable, L. 566-568; L. 577-579 
Diagnosis is informative, L. 570-571 
Reflective capacity, L. 587; L. 652-653 
Awareness is not always conscious, L. 587-590; L. 652-653 
Diagnosis directs attention, L. 615 
Finer processes get missed with diagnosis, L. 617-619 
Aversion to some diagnoses, L. 628-629 
Assumptions about diagnosis effect behaviour, L. 631-633 
Possibilities are endless with no diagnosis, L. 635-636 
Diagnosis brings a sense of certainty, L. 638 
More room for reflection with no diagnosis, L. 654-657 
Diagnosis shuts down curiosity and reflection, L. 657-659 
Settings using diagnosis can be pressured, L. 666-667 
Diagnosis can be invalid, L. 667-668 
Risk of losing counselling psychologist identity, L. 672-675; L. 752-755; L. 758 
Diagnosis provides information, L. 688-689 
Use diagnosis with caution, L.695 
Overuse of diagnosis misses the person, L. 695-697; L. 712-715 
Diagnosis is dominant language, L. 700-703 
Easiest to conform to using diagnosis, L. 706-711 
Diagnosis provides a short-cut, L. 712 
Therapy is endlessly different with no diagnosis, L. 723 
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Diagnosis seeks to measure experience, L. 726-730 
More focus on the relationship with no diagnosis, L. 731-732 
Therapy is more spontaneous with no diagnosis, L. 731-732 
Therapy is more tentative with no diagnosis, L/ 736-741 
Therapy is interesting regardless of a diagnosis, L. 742-747 
Counselling psychologist identity, L. 749-750 
Counselling psychologists pay attention to diagnosis and the person, L. 744-750 
Context is relevant, L. 752-755; L. 757-758 
Medical model is powerful, L. 757-758 
In between position on diagnosis, L. 767-768 
Finding a position on diagnosis is a process, L. 763-768 
Acknowledge diagnosis and explore individual experience, L. 770-774 
The individual is paramount, L. 788-789; L. 801-803 
Diagnosis is less significant than the individual, L. 791-795 
Diagnosis is separate from the person, L. 789-795 
The person is more memorable than the diagnosis, L. 798-799 
Diagnosis is useful in the moment, L. 801 
The in between position creates tension, L. 808-811 
The tension from an in between position is constant, L. 813-814 
Counselling psychology position is challenged, L. 818-829 
Diagnosis dominates, L. 819-822 
The tension creates challenges in working and communication, L. 824-825 
Difference between a paint pallet with 6 bold colours and one with 150 shades of 
grey, they’re both really interesting, L. 742-747 
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Appendix L - Barbara:  Clustering Themes Stage One 
Diagnosis is limited 
Diagnosis is descriptive, L. 5-7; L. 35-37; L. 771-772; L. 778; L. 545 
Diagnosis categorises, L. 7-8  
Reductionist, L. 12-14; L. 371; L. 390; L. 758; L. 279-280; L. 451-453 
Behaviour reduced to be measurable, L. 36-40 
Labelling, L. 65; 160-161; L. 245-246; L. 327-328; L. 543-544; L. 677-679; L. 701 
Categorisation, L. 145-146 
Diagnosis simplifies, L. 380-384; L. 619 
 
Diagnosis is not concerned with individual experience  
Diagnosis is separate from the person, L. 789-795 
Diagnosis externalises problem, L. 433-435 
Diagnosis is not concerned with individual experience, L. 10-12 
Diagnosis contradicts personal experience, L. 41-46 
Psychiatric language is dehumanising, L. 60-61 
Inhumane treatment, L. 113-114 
Dehumanising L. 260-261; L. 451-453 
Diagnosis is disempowering for clients, L. 335-339 
Overuse of diagnosis misses the person, L. 695-697; L. 712-715 
Use diagnosis with caution, L.695 
 
Diagnosis provides 
Diagnosis provides a sense of knowing, L. 88-94; 104-108; L. 308-310; L. 430-432; 
L. 641-642; L. 691 
Diagnosis provides guidance, L. 92-95; L. 694-695 
Diagnosis is containing, L. 97-102; L. 292-293; L. 692-695 
Diagnosis eliminates uncertainty, L. 107-108 
Feeling reassured by diagnosis, L. 102-106 
Diagnosis provides access to treatment, L. 8-10 
Diagnosis provides information, L. 688-689 
Diagnosis is reassuring, L. 430-431 
Diagnosis brings a sense of certainty, L. 638 
Diagnosis is informative, L. 570-571 
Diagnosis seeks to measure experience, L. 726-730  
Diagnosis is useful in the moment, L. 801 
 
Diagnosis is intrusive 
Medical model is intrusive, L. 12-14 
Hatred of psychiatric language, L. 50-53 
Psychiatric language is offensive, L. 53-54 
Diagnosis can be damaging, L. 64-70 
Doubt in the existence of diagnosis, L. 143-144 
Diagnosis is a burden, L. 151-152; 159-160; L. 573-574 
Diagnosis can be invalid, L. 667-668 
Diagnosis impacts on therapy, L. 274 
 
                                  MAKING SENSE OF DIAGNOSES
  
 159 
 
 
 
 
Diagnosis holds a lot of power 
Diagnosis is dominant language, L. 700-703 
Easiest to conform to using diagnosis, L. 706-711 
Diagnosis can dictate response, L. 64-65 
Diagnosis is prevalent, L. 75-76 
Diagnosis is powerful, L. 171-172; L. 292-297; L. 306-307; L. 324-328; L. 538-539; 
L. 627-629; L. 700-701 
Society influences response to diagnoses, L. 264-266 
Society pays attention to some diagnoses, L. 265-266 
Diagnosis influences language used, L. 277-278 
Medical model is powerful, L. 757-758 
Diagnosis dominates, L. 819-822 
Diagnosing brings sense of finality, L. 324-325 
Personality disorder is ubiquitous, L. 26-28 
Diagnosis determines treatment, L. 257-259; L. 627-629 
 
Threat to professional identity 
Loss of identity, L. 110-111 
Loss of power, L. 222 
Diagnosis reduces autonomy, L. 292 
Loss of autonomy, L. 324 
Risk of losing counselling psychologist identity, L. 672-675; L. 752-755; L. 758 
Counselling psychologist identity, L. 749-750 
Counselling psychology position is challenged, L. 818-829 
 
Individual is more that diagnosis 
The individual is paramount, L. 788-789; L. 801-803 
Diagnosis is less significant than the individual, L. 791-795 
The person is more memorable than the diagnosis, L. 798-799 
The individual predominates the diagnosis, L. 78-81 
 
Complexity  
Some diagnoses bring more complexities than others, L. 549-551 
Response to behaviour vs response to diagnosis is difficult to differentiate, L. 562-
568 
Difficult to isolate diagnosis as a variable, L. 566-568; L. 577-579 
Individuals are complex, L. 123-127 
Feeling there’s more to consider than a diagnosis, L. 129-131 
Complexity about a person is difficult to articulate, L. 133-134 
More to consider than diagnosis, L. 135-138 
Diagnosis is part of a complex picture, L. 202-203 
Complex relationship, L. 210-213 
Practitioner experience is relevant to the context, L. 344-346 
Complexity, L. 345-346; L. 566-568; L. 577-578; L. 609-611; L. 687 
Work is more complex with no diagnosis, L. 360-361 
Diagnosis adds to complexity, L. 264-365; L. 573-574 
Considers individual in context, L. 116-120 
Context is relevant, L. 752-755; L. 757-758 
                                  MAKING SENSE OF DIAGNOSES
  
 160 
 
 
 
 
Significance of setting, L. 276-278 
 
Ambivalence 
Diagnosis is a help and a hindrance, L. 139-141  
Ambivalence about diagnosis, L. 170-171; L. 298; L. 380 
Therapy is interesting regardless of a diagnosis, L. 742-747 
 
Valuing diagnosis and experience creates tension 
Diagnosis forms part of understanding client experience, L. 421-423 
Diagnosis helps make sense of experience, L. 246-248 
Counselling psychologists pay attention to diagnosis and the person, L. 744-750 
In between position on diagnosis, L. 767-768 
Finding a position on diagnosis is a process, L. 763-768 
Acknowledge diagnosis and explore individual experience, L. 770-774 
The in between position creates tension, L. 808-811 
The tension from an in between position is constant, L. 813-814 
The tension creates challenges in working and communication, L. 824-825 
 
Recognising own responses 
Working with someone with BPD feels intense, L. 135-136 
Countertransference from diagnosis, L. 164-165 
Internal response to diagnosis, L. 178-179 
Experience of self is constant, L. 180-181 
Repetitions in internal response, L. 182-191 
Repetition in experience, L. 240-243 
Strength of own feeling parallels that of the client, L. 235-237 
Personality disorders hold meaning, L. 23-24 
 
Responses to diagnosis are limiting 
Diagnosis shuts down curiosity and reflection, L. 657-659 
Aversion to some diagnoses, L. 628-629 
Diagnosis is considered before meeting the person, L. 155-157 
Preconceived responses, L. 65-70 
Diagnosis narrows focus, L. 282-284 
Diagnosis determines focus, L. 306-314; L. 375-378 
Diagnosis elicits assumptions and predictions, L. 338-340 
Diagnosis influences thinking, L. 349-353 
Diagnosis dampens creativity, L. 361-363 
Diagnosis elicits assumptions, L. 380 
Diagnosis directs attention, L. 615 
Assumptions about diagnosis effect behaviour, L. 631-633 
 
Awareness of own responses 
Working through own response to diagnosis, L. 159-162 
Awareness makes counselling psychologists distinct, L. 469-470 
Aware of countertransference feelings, L. 1773-175 
Controlling own feelings, L. 210-211 
Aware of own experience, L. 216-218 
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Awareness of feelings, L. 225-227 
Trying to maintain control, L.238 
Use of own response to make sense of client experience, L. 288-291 
Talk explicitly about thoughts on diagnosis to maintain awareness, L. 439-441 
Being aware of own responses is part of a counselling psychologist’s identity, L. 
467-468 
Self-awareness facilitates being open about thoughts and feelings, L. 477-480 
Transparency about own experience leads to balance of power, L. 479-483 
Awareness brings a sense of control, L. 486-487 
Transparency about own position brings you closer to client experience, L. 505-508 
Awareness of own experience differs between diagnoses, L. 521 
Awareness of experience is important, L. 418-419 
Transparency about own process, L. 425-426 
Reflective capacity, L. 587; L. 652-653 
Awareness is not always conscious, L. 587-590; L. 652-653 
Awareness difficult to maintain, L. 238-239  
Transparency about diagnosis, L. 414-415 
Loss of awareness, L. 220-221 
 
Therapy is uninhibited without diagnosis 
Absence of diagnosis brings you closer to the individual, L. 287-289; L. 304-305; L. 
315-316 
A client’s whole experience is considered with no diagnosis, L. 356-361 
Diagnosis makes experience of therapy indescribably different, L. 322-323 
When diagnosis is absent, sharp contrast to when it’s not, L. 319-320 
Naturally evolving therapeutic relationship with no diagnosis, L. 333 
More challenging with no diagnosis, L. 350 
Finer processes get missed with diagnosis, L. 617-619 
More room for reflection with no diagnosis, L. 654-657 
Therapy is endlessly different with no diagnosis, L. 723 
More focus on the relationship with no diagnosis, L. 731-732 
Therapy is more spontaneous with no diagnosis, L. 731-732 
Therapy is more tentative with no diagnosis, L/ 736-741 
Possibilities are endless with no diagnosis, L. 635-636 
 
 
Discarded themes 
 
Diagnosis as quick fix, L. 386-389  
Diagnosis provides a short-cut, L. 712 
Some presentations oppose the therapy process, L. 554-556 
Personality disorder is a broad concept, L. 25-26 
Settings using diagnosis can be pressured, L. 666-667 
Diagnosis can only describe, L. L. 545 – incorporated with diagnosis is descriptive  
Closer to the client with no diagnosis, L. 304-305 AND  
Closer to client experience with no diagnosis, L. 315-316  - incorporated into: 
Absence of diagnosis brings you closer to the individual, L. 287-289 
Personality disorder diagnosis elicits an internal struggle, L. 30 
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Diagnosis creates conflict, L. 44-46 
Power struggle, L. 215; L. 220-222 
Confusion in relationship, L. 220-221 
Therapy is interesting regardless of a diagnosis, L. 742-747 
Diagnosis is meaningless, L. 76-81 
Diagnoses given weightings, L. 264 
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Appendix M - Barbara:  Clustering Themes Stage Two 
Diagnosis simplifies, L. 380-384; L. 619 
Diagnosis is descriptive, L. 5-7; L. 35-37; L. 771-772; L. 778; L. 545 
Diagnosis categorises, L. 7-8  
Reductionist, L. 12-14; L. 371; L. 390; L. 758; L. 279-280; L. 451-453 
Behaviour reduced to be measurable, L. 36-40 
Labelling, L. 65; 160-161; L. 245-246; L. 327-328; L. 543-544; L. 677-679; L. 701 
Categorisation, L. 145-146 
Doubt in the existence of diagnosis, L. 143-144 
Diagnosis is a burden, L. 151-152; 159-160; L. 573-574 
Diagnosis can be invalid, L. 667-668 
 
Use diagnosis with caution, L.695; L. 767-770 
Diagnosis is separate from the person, L. 789-795 
Diagnosis externalises problem, L. 433-435 
Diagnosis is not concerned with individual experience, L. 10-12 
Diagnosis contradicts personal experience, L. 41-46 
Dehumanising L. 260-261; L. 451-453; L. 60-61; L. 113-114 
Diagnosis is disempowering for clients, L. 335-339 
Overuse of diagnosis misses the person, L. 695-697; L. 712-715 
The individual is paramount, L. 788-789; L. 801-803; L. 791-795; L. 798-799; L. 78-
81 
 
Containment vs. complexity 
Diagnosis provides a sense of knowing, L. 88-94; 104-108; L. 308-310; L. 430-432; 
L. 641-642; L. 691 
Diagnosis provides, L. 92-95; L. 694-695; L. 8-10; L. 688-689 
Diagnosis is containing, L. 97-102; L. 292-293; L. 692-695 
Diagnosis eliminates uncertainty, L. 107-108;  L. 638 
Diagnosis is reassuring, L. 430-431; L. 102-106 
Some diagnoses bring more complexities than others, L. 549-551 
Difficult to isolate diagnosis as a variable, L. 566-568; L. 577-579; L. 562-568 
Complexity, L. 345-346; L. 566-568; L. 577-578; L. 609-611; L. 687; L. 360-361; L. 
264-365; L. 573-574; L. 123-127; L. 129-131; L. 133-134; L. 135-138; L. 202-203; 
L. 210-213 
Context is relevant, L. 752-755; L. 757-758; L. 276-278; L. 116-120; L. 344-346 
 
Risk of losing counselling psychologist identity, L. 672-675; L. 752-755; L. 758; 
L. 110-111 
Medical model is intrusive, L. 12-14 
Diagnosis can be damaging, L. 64-70 
Diagnosis is dominant language, L. 700-703 
Easiest to conform to using diagnosis, L. 706-711 
Diagnosis can dictate response, L. 64-65 
Diagnosis is powerful, L. 171-172; L. 292-297; L. 306-307; L. 324-328; L. 538-539; 
L. 627-629; L. 700-701; L. 757-758; L. 75-76; L. 819-822; L. 257-259; L. 627-629 
Society influences response to diagnoses, L. 264-266 
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Society pays attention to some diagnoses, L. 265-266 
Diagnosing brings sense of finality, L. 324-325 
Loss of power, L. 222 
Diagnosis reduces autonomy, L. 292; L. 324 
 
Difference between a paint pallet with 6 bold colours and one with 150 shades of 
grey, they’re both really interesting, L. 742-747 
Ambivalence about diagnosis, L. 170-171; L. 298; L. 380; L. 139-141  
Diagnosis forms part of understanding client experience, L. 421-423 
Diagnosis helps make sense of experience, L. 246-248 
Counselling psychologists pay attention to diagnosis and the person, L. 744-750 
In between position on diagnosis, L. 767-768 
Finding a position on diagnosis is a process, L. 763-768 
Acknowledge diagnosis and explore individual experience, L. 770-774 
Tension L. 808-811; L. 813-814; L. 824-825 
 
Awareness makes counselling psychologists distinct, L. 469-470; L. 467-468 
Working through own response to diagnosis, L. 159-162 
Awareness and control, L. 210-211; L. 486-487; L.238 
Aware of own experience, L. 216-218; L. 225-227; L. 1773-175 
Awareness of own experience differs between diagnoses, L. 521 
Awareness of experience is important, L. 418-419 
Awareness is not always conscious, L. 587-590; L. 652-653 
Use of own response to make sense of client experience, L. 288-291 
Talk explicitly about thoughts on diagnosis to maintain awareness, L. 439-441 
Self-awareness facilitates being open about thoughts and feelings, L. 477-480 
Transparency and balance of power, L. 479-483; L. 505-508; L. 425-426; L. 414-415 
Reflective capacity, L. 587; L. 652-653 
Awareness difficult to maintain, L. 238-239; L. 220-221 
Countertransference from diagnosis, L. 164-165 
Internal response to diagnosis, L. 178-179 
Experience of self is constant, L. 180-181 
Repetitions in internal response, L. 182-191 
Repetition in experience, L. 240-243 
Strength of own feeling parallels that of the client, L. 235-237 
 
Diagnosis makes experience of therapy indescribably different, L. 322-323; L. 
319-320 
Absence of diagnosis brings you closer to the individual, L. 287-289; L. 304-305; L. 
315-316 
A client’s whole experience is considered with no diagnosis, L. 356-361 
Naturally evolving therapeutic relationship with no diagnosis, L. 333 
More challenging with no diagnosis, L. 350 
Finer processes get missed with diagnosis, L. 617-619 
More room for reflection with no diagnosis, L. 654-657 
Therapy is endlessly different with no diagnosis, L. 723 
More focus on the relationship with no diagnosis, L. 731-732 
Therapy is more spontaneous with no diagnosis, L. 731-732 
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Therapy is more tentative with no diagnosis, L/ 736-741 
Possibilities are endless with no diagnosis, L. 635-636 
Diagnosis impacts on therapy, L. 274 
Diagnosis shuts down curiosity and reflection, L. 657-659 
Aversion to some diagnoses, L. 628-629 
Diagnosis is considered before meeting the person, L. 155-157 
Preconceived responses, L. 65-70 
Diagnosis narrows focus, L. 282-284 
Diagnosis determines focus, L. 306-314; L. 375-378 
Diagnosis elicits assumptions and predictions, L. 338-340; L. 380 
Diagnosis influences thinking, L. 349-353 
Diagnosis dampens creativity, L. 361-363 
Diagnosis directs attention, L. 615 
Assumptions about diagnosis effect behaviour, L. 631-633 
 
Discarded themes 
 
Diagnosis as quick fix, L. 386-389  
Diagnosis provides a short-cut, L. 712 
Some presentations oppose the therapy process, L. 554-556 
Personality disorder is a broad concept, L. 25-26 
Settings using diagnosis can be pressured, L. 666-667 
Diagnosis can only describe, L. L. 545 – incorporated with diagnosis is descriptive  
Closer to the client with no diagnosis, L. 304-305 AND  
Closer to client experience with no diagnosis, L. 315-316  - incorporated into: 
Absence of diagnosis brings you closer to the individual, L. 287-289 
Personality disorder diagnosis elicits an internal struggle, L. 30 
Diagnosis creates conflict, L. 44-46 
Power struggle, L. 215; L. 220-222 
Confusion in relationship, L. 220-221 
Therapy is interesting regardless of a diagnosis, L. 742-747 
Diagnosis is meaningless, L. 76-81 
Diagnoses given weightings, L. 264 
 
Discarded from “diagnosis provides” because do not fit the new theme: 
“contained vs unbounded.” 
Diagnosis is informative, L. 570-571 
Diagnosis seeks to measure experience, L. 726-730  
Diagnosis is useful in the moment, L. 801 
 
Discarded from “diagnosis holds a lot of power” because too weak.   
Diagnosis influences language used, L. 277-278 
 
Discarded from “power struggles” because does not fit.   
Counselling psychologist identity, L. 749-750 
Counselling psychology position is challenged, L. 818-829 – too weak 
Hatred of psychiatric language, L. 50-53; L. 53-54 
Personality disorder is ubiquitous, L. 26-28 
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Discarded from “Middle ground position on diagnosis” because does not fit.   
Therapy is interesting regardless of a diagnosis, L. 742-747 
 
Discarded from “awareness of own responses” because not a great fit.   
Working with someone with BPD feels intense, L. 135-136 
Personality disorders hold meaning, L. 23-24 
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Appendix N - Barbara: Clustering Themes Stage Three 
Diagnosis simplifies, L. 380-384; L. 619 
Diagnosis is descriptive, L. 5-7; L. 35-37; L. 771-772; L. 778; L. 545 
Diagnosis categorises, L. 7-8; L. 145-146; L. 65; 160-161; L. 245-246; L. 327-328; 
L. 543-544; L. 677-679; L. 701 
Reductionist, L. 12-14; L. 371; L. 390; L. 758; L. 279-280; L. 451-453; L. 36-40 
Doubt in the existence of diagnosis, L. 143-144; L. 667-668 
 
Use diagnosis with caution, L.695; L. 767-770 
Diagnosis is separate from the person, L. 789-795; L. 433-435 
Diagnosis is not concerned with individual experience, L. 10-12; L. 41-46; L. 695-
697; L. 712-715 
Dehumanising L. 260-261; L. 451-453; L. 60-61; L. 113-114 
Diagnosis is disempowering for clients, L. 335-339 
The individual is paramount, L. 788-789; L. 801-803; L. 791-795; L. 798-799; L. 78-
81 
Diagnosis can be damaging, L. 64-70 
 
Containment vs. complexity 
Diagnosis provides, L. 92-95; L. 694-695; L. 8-10; L. 688-689 L. 88-94; 104-108; L. 
308-310; L. 430-432; L. 641-642; L. 691 
Diagnosis is containing, L. 97-102; L. 292-293; L. 692-695; L. 430-431; L. 102-106 
Diagnosis eliminates uncertainty, L. 107-108;  L. 638 
Some diagnoses bring more complexities than others, L. 549-551 
Difficult to isolate diagnosis as a variable, L. 566-568; L. 577-579; L. 562-568; L. 
752-755; L. 757-758; L. 276-278; L. 116-120; L. 344-346 
Complexity, L. 345-346; L. 566-568; L. 577-578; L. 609-611; L. 687; L. 360-361; L. 
264-365; L. 573-574; L. 123-127; L. 129-131; L. 133-134; L. 135-138; L. 202-203; 
L. 210-213 
 
Diagnosis is powerful and can reduce autonomy 
Risk of losing counselling psychologist identity, L. 672-675; L. 752-755; L. 758; L. 
110-111 
Loss of power, L. 222 
Diagnosis reduces autonomy, L. 292; L. 324 
Diagnosis is dominant language, L. 700-703 
Easiest to conform to using diagnosis, L. 706-711 
Diagnosis can dictate response, L. 64-65 
Diagnosis is powerful, L. 171-172; L. 292-297; L. 306-307; L. 324-328; L. 538-539; 
L. 627-629; L. 700-701; L. 757-758; L. 75-76; L. 819-822; L. 257-259; L. 627-629 
Society influences response to diagnoses, L. 264-266 
Diagnosing brings sense of finality, L. 324-325 
 
Difference between a paint pallet with 6 bold colours and one with 150 shades of 
grey, they’re both really interesting, L. 742-747 
Ambivalence about diagnosis, L. 170-171; L. 298; L. 380; L. 139-141  
Diagnosis forms part of understanding client experience, L. 421-423; L. 246-248 
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Counselling psychologists pay attention to diagnosis and the person, L. 744-750; L. 
770-774 
In between position on diagnosis, L. 767-768 
Finding a position on diagnosis is a process, L. 763-768 
Tension L. 808-811; L. 813-814; L. 824-825 
 
Awareness of experience and transparency 
Awareness makes counselling psychologists distinct, L. 469-470; L. 467-468 
Awareness and control, L. 210-211; L. 486-487; L.238 
Aware of own experience, L. 216-218; L. 225-227; L. 1773-175; L. 521; L. 418-419 
Awareness is not always conscious, L. 587-590; L. 652-653 
Use of own response to make sense of client experience, L. 288-291; L. 164-165; L. 
235-237 
Talk explicitly about thoughts on diagnosis to maintain awareness, L. 439-441 
Transparency and balance of power, L. 479-483; L. 505-508; L. 425-426; L. 414-415 
Reflective capacity, L. 587; L. 652-653 
Awareness difficult to maintain, L. 238-239; L. 220-221 
Internal response to diagnosis, L. 178-179; L. 182-191; L. 240-243 
 
Indescribable differences between therapy with and therapy without a diagnosis 
Diagnosis makes experience of therapy indescribably different, L. 322-323; L. 319-
320; L. 723; L. 274 
Absence of diagnosis brings you closer to the individual, L. 287-289; L. 304-305; L. 
315-316; L. 356-36; L. 333 
Finer processes get missed with diagnosis, L. 617-619 
Therapy is more spontaneous with no diagnosis, L. 731-732 
Therapy is more tentative with no diagnosis, L. 736-741 
Diagnosis shuts down curiosity and reflection, L. 657-659 
Reacting to diagnosis, L. 628-629; L. 155-157; L. 65-70; L. 338-340; L. 380; L. 349-
353; L. 631-633 
Diagnosis directs attention, L. 615; L. 282-284; L. 306-314; L. 375-378 
Diagnosis dampens creativity, L. 361-363 
 
Discarded themes 
 
Diagnosis as quick fix, L. 386-389  
Diagnosis provides a short-cut, L. 712 
Some presentations oppose the therapy process, L. 554-556 
Personality disorder is a broad concept, L. 25-26 
Settings using diagnosis can be pressured, L. 666-667 
Diagnosis can only describe, L. L. 545 – incorporated with diagnosis is descriptive  
Closer to the client with no diagnosis, L. 304-305 AND  
Closer to client experience with no diagnosis, L. 315-316  - incorporated into: 
Absence of diagnosis brings you closer to the individual, L. 287-289 
Personality disorder diagnosis elicits an internal struggle, L. 30 
Diagnosis creates conflict, L. 44-46 
Power struggle, L. 215; L. 220-222 
Confusion in relationship, L. 220-221 
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Therapy is interesting regardless of a diagnosis, L. 742-747 
Diagnosis is meaningless, L. 76-81 
Diagnoses given weightings, L. 264 
 
Discarded from “diagnosis provides” because do not fit the new theme: 
“contained vs unbounded.” 
Diagnosis is informative, L. 570-571 
Diagnosis seeks to measure experience, L. 726-730  
Diagnosis is useful in the moment, L. 801 
 
Discarded from “diagnosis holds a lot of power” because too weak.   
Diagnosis influences language used, L. 277-278 
 
Discarded from “power struggles” because does not fit.   
Counselling psychologist identity, L. 749-750 
Counselling psychology position is challenged, L. 818-829 – too weak 
Hatred of psychiatric language, L. 50-53; L. 53-54 
Personality disorder is ubiquitous, L. 26-28 
 
Discarded from “Middle ground position on diagnosis” because does not fit.   
Therapy is interesting regardless of a diagnosis, L. 742-747 
 
Discarded from “awareness of own responses” because not a great fit.   
Working with someone with BPD feels intense, L. 135-136 
Personality disorders hold meaning, L. 23-24 
 
Diagnosis is a burden, L. 151-152; 159-160; L. 573-574 
Society pays attention to some diagnoses, L. 265-266 
Medical model is intrusive, L. 12-14 
Working through own response to diagnosis, L. 159-162 
Self-awareness facilitates being open about thoughts and feelings, L. 477-480 
Experience of self is constant, L. 180-181 
More focus on the relationship with no diagnosis, L. 731-732 
More room for reflection with no diagnosis, L. 654-657 
Possibilities are endless with no diagnosis, L. 635-636 
More challenging with no diagnosis, L. 350 
  
                                  MAKING SENSE OF DIAGNOSES
  
 170 
 
 
 
 
Appendix O - Clustering Themes Across Participants 
This is an image to represent how themes were clustered across participants.  The 
images on the following six pages break this picture up into readable segments.
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